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No. 20170436-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.

DAVID BRUCE BUTTARS,
Defendant/Appellant.
__________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
A jury found Buttars guilty of four counts of securities fraud and one count of
pattern of unlawful activity. The State secured these convictions through a combination
of inadmissible bank record evidence, erroneous instructions, and improper expert
testimony and prosecutorial argument. Individually and cumulatively, these errors
undermine confidence in the fairness of Buttars’s trial.
ISSUES, STANDARDS, PRESERVATION
Issue I: Whether the court erred in admitting the bank record evidence.
Specifically:
A. Whether the court erred in denying Buttars’s motion to suppress
unconstitutionally seized bank records.
Standard/Preservation: This Court applies a clearly-erroneous standard to
factual findings and reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. State v.
Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶10. This issue is preserved. R.766-48, 886-907, 962-1055
(briefing); R.3061-96 (argument); R.1085-90, 3098-3104 (rulings).

B. Whether the court erred in admitting the bank records under the residual
exception to the hearsay rule.
Standard/Preservation: “Whether evidence is admissible is a question of law,
which [this Court] review[s] for correctness, incorporating a ‘clearly erroneous’
standard… for []factual determinations.’” Radman v. Flanders, 2007 UT App 351,¶4.
This issue is preserved. R.734-36, 862-85, 910-61,1058-1063 (briefing); R.3104-39
(argument); R.1148-1155, 3180-3212 (ruling).
C. Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the bank record
summaries (Exhibits 26-32) as inadmissible under rule 1006 where they did
not prove the content of the underlying bank records.
Standard/Preservation: This issue is unpreserved. But it can be reached under
the doctrine of ineffective assistance, which is an exception to the preservation rule
and is reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114,¶28.
Issue II: Whether counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing incorrect
instructions on the definition of “willfulness.”
Standard/Preservation: This Court will review jury instructions for correctness.
State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This issue is unpreserved and
may be reviewed for ineffective assistance or exceptional circumstances. Kozlov, 2012
UT App 114,¶28.
Issue III: Whether this Court should reverse where expert testimony, prosecutorial
argument, and a jury instruction misstated the law surrounding a defendant’s disclosure
obligations under the securities fraud statute.
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Standard/Preservation: “‘Questions of law are reviewed for correctness.’” State v.
Goodrich, 2016 UT App 72,¶6. This issue is partially preserved. R.4124-26. To the
extent the issue is unpreserved, it may be reviewed for ineffective assistance. Kozlov,
2012 UT App 114,¶28; supra §III.B.
Issue IV: Whether this Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts where
the State’s experts gave testimony that violated rules 702, 704, and 403.
Standard/Preservation: The Court reviews the admission of expert testimony for an
abuse of discretion. State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). This issue is
preserved. R.5210-29 (Curtis’s testimony); R.4827-38, 5225-26 (Lloyd’s testimony).
Issue V: Whether cumulative error requires reversal.
Standard/Preservation: A claim of cumulative error “requires [this Court] to apply
the standard of review applicable to each underlying claim.” Radman, 2007 UT App
351,¶4. Preservation is inapplicable.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/FACTS
The charges stemmed from Buttars’s involvement in the startup companies,
Ellipse Technology and MOVIEblitz North America. R.1-58, 534-39. Buttars became a
suspect after the State’s investigator, Agent Nesbit, spent several years pursuing Buttars’s
ex-girlfriend’s allegation that Buttars stalked her. R.650, 685-87, 689-90; see 570-711.
Buttars successfully defended those allegations both civilly and criminally, obtaining an
acquittal in the criminal case and prevailing and obtaining attorney fees in the civil
matter. R.679, 614-41. But the ex-girlfriend, an investor in Ellipse, further complained
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that Ellipse was a “lousy company.” R.631. Nesbit investigated Ellipse and MOVIEblitz
and subpoenaed Buttars’s bank records.
As a result of Nesbit’s investigation, Buttars was charged with four counts of
securities fraud, second/third degree felonies; four counts of theft, second/third degree
felonies; and one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony. R.1-58,
394-98, 534-39. Specifically, the State alleged that in 2009-2010, Buttars—with his codefendant Mark LaCount—misused investor funds and omitted and misrepresented
material facts to investors, in violation of Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3), 61-1-21. Id. The
magistrate expressed “misgivings” about the State’s case, but bound it over. R.2794-95.
After extensive litigation regarding the admissibility of Buttars’s bank records, the court
ruled the records admissible. Infra pp.13-16.
The case proceeded to a jury trial held on September 26-28, 2016. R.1363-75. The
court gave two instructions, discussed in detail below (infra pp.51-52, 62), that Buttars
now challenges on appeal. Addendum B (instructions). The jury acquitted on all four
counts of theft, but found Buttars guilty on the pattern count and on all four counts of
securities fraud. R.1432-33. The court sentenced Buttars to three 0-5 year prison terms
(securities fraud counts) and two 1-15 year prison terms (securities fraud and pattern
counts), running them all concurrently. R.1491-93; Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment,
Commitment). Buttars appealed. R.2587-88.
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Trial Evidence
Background.
Ellipse Technology was a startup company incorporated in 2005. R.4856;
St.Ex.36. Ellipse sought to create movie kiosks where customers could load movies onto
personalized flash drives. R.4856; St.Ex.1. Then, customers could take the flash drives
home and watch the movies on their home devices. Id. Buttars, a trained engineer, was
the “brains” behind the project. R.4856, 4886, 4944, 4972, 5032.
Buttars ultimately became the CEO of Ellipse and another man, Vince Romney,
became the president. R.4895, 4910, 4954, 5028-29. The two owned the company
“50/50,” R.4940, though several others also became involved, including Steven
Gerritsen. R.4907-10, 4953-54, 5025, 5030. For some time, Romney and Buttars worked
for the company full time and drew a salary. R.4863, 4889-91, 4947.
Ellipse was headquartered at Buttars’s Park City home—which was equipped with
a basement conference room, servers, and a phone system. R.4891-93, 4958. Weekly
meetings were held there, R.4891, 4911-12, 4944, 4958, 5028, and it was common for
Ellipse-related travelers to stay at Buttars’s home when visiting on business. R.4892.
Ellipse also obtained investors, went on business trips, and sought the advice of attorneys.
R.4888, 4960, 5027-28, 5065-66; St.Ex.32. By 2009, Ellipse was about 75-85 percent on
the way toward having a working prototype. R.4930-31.
At some point, Ellipse’s attorneys advised Buttars and the company to stop raising
money from friends and family and to target institutional investors. R.4864-65, 4912-13,
5039-40. The State presented evidence that Ellipse received several offers from
5

institutional investors in 2007-2008, but Buttars rejected them. R.4865-66, 4919-22,
5034-36. This upset some of those involved in the company. R.4919-21.
In the latter part of 2008, Buttars involved LaCount in Ellipse. R.4940, 5030,
5040-41. LaCount traveled to Europe to promote the company in Switzerland, R.492230, 4868-69, 4890, but when he returned, the company was in need of money. R.4869-70.
And at a certain point, Romney allegedly “found out… that there had been fundraising
[through friends and family] at a micro level again.” Id. One witness testified that during
this timeframe Buttars fired him for failing to secure fundraising and stated “how do you
expect me to support two families on what you've brought in?” R.4965-68. The State also
presented testimony that Ellipse money went toward paying LaCount’s mortgage,
R.4924-30, 4937-41, and another witness testified that he suspected Buttars was misusing
funds. R.5047-49.
Romney testified that in early 2009, in response to allegations of Buttars’s misuse
of funds and improper fundraising, he and several others retained independent counsel.
R.4870-71, 4874-4877, 4881-82, 5047-49. After some correspondence, Buttars allegedly
resigned as CEO but would not relinquish his shares. R.5069-70. Moreover, Romney
testified that both he and Buttars’s names were on the pending patents needed to advance
the technology. R.4901-02, 5484-87. According to the State’s witnesses, these were “road
blocks” that impeded Ellipse from proceeding without Buttars. R.5069-70.
Buttars and LaCount went forward with the technology under the company name,
MOVIEblitz. St.Ex.37. The existence of a licensing agreement between Ellipse and
MOVIEblitz sounded “vaguely familiar” to the State’s investigator. R.5534-35.
6

Moreover, the State did not pull the applicable patents or introduce the patents into
evidence. R.5537, 5486.
The Investors.
Of 50-70 investors, only 4 investors—Mother, Neighbor, Neighbor's boyfriend,
and Neighbor's ex-husband—testified. R.5073-5167, 5504-06, 5520-21, 5557-58.
Mother’s investment. Mother heard about Ellipse and MOVIEblitz from her son,
Gerritsen, R.5025. Mother testified that she spoke with Buttars on “a couple occasions is
all” (R.5074); she thought Gerritsen provided most of the information about the
investment. R.5081. On one occasion, Mother “th[ought] [she] might’ve had a phone
call” with Buttars in which Buttars said that her investment would be “used for the
technology and to bring it to market… more quickly.” R.5078-79; see also R.5041-42,
5067 (Gerritsen testifying to a phone call in which Buttars communicated to Mother that
the company was “close to getting a product developed” and was raising money to
develop prototypes). Mother had previously indicated that she spoke with Buttars only
once at a concert. R.5532-33.
On March 10-11, 2009, Mother invested $5000. R.5028; St.Exs.3, 26. 1 She signed
a subscription agreement for stock in Ellipse, acknowledging, among other things, that
“acquisition of the [s]ubscribed [s]hares represent[s] a speculative investment involving a

1

Mother previously invested $10,000 in 2007. R.5028; St.Exs.3, 26.
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high degree of risk.” R.5077-78, 5081-82; St.Ex.4. 2 Mother said she never received
anything evidencing stock ownership. R.5078-79.
The investments of LaCount’s neighbors/friends. Neighbor learned about
MOVIEblitz after she was approached by LaCount—a friend who lived in her
neighborhood. R.5089, 5105, 5123. Neighbor hosted approximately three meetings at her
home to discuss MOVIEblitz and invited her boyfriend and ex-husband to attend.
R.5105, 5112-13, 5118-27, 514.
The first two meetings took place around May 2009 with LaCount, Neighbor, and
Neighbor’s boyfriend present. R.5090-91, 5118-19, 5136, 5141-42. Neighbor and her
boyfriend testified inconsistently as to whether Buttars was present at this first meeting,
id., but agreed that at one of the meetings, Buttars gave a “presentation about what
MOVIEblitz was.” R.5090-96, 5106,5112, 5118-20, 5130-31, 5136, 5145; St.Exs.8,13.
According to Neighbor, Buttars explained the “technical aspects,” including showing
them the “patents he had gotten” and describing the technology. R.5090-91, 5102,5106,
5112, 5136. They were also presented with the MOVIEblitz business plan. R.5095-96;
St.Ex.8. This plan included a sample subscription agreement that discussed the risks of
investing as well as pro forma financials that contemplated the payment of salaries.
St.Ex.8.

“Subscription agreements… contain the obligations of the parties with respect to
the [securities] transaction and define what's being sold, and what's being paid, in
exchange for that particular security.” R.5467-68, 5490.
2
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At one of the meetings, “it was stated” that investment money would be used to
incorporate in Nevada and develop a media key and a kiosk. R.5098-99, 5112,5133. 3
Moreover, Neighbor's boyfriend previously indicated in a State-provided questionnaire
that it was “LaCount [who] told us how great the company was, and our money... was
going to be used to register the company in Nevada.” R.5139. Neighbor's boyfriend
mentioned Buttars little in the questionnaire “because [LaCount] was initially the one that
did all this stuff.” R.5141-42.
Neighbor hosted a third meeting in late 2009-early 2010 at which Buttars allegedly
gave a similar presentation. R.5113, 5124-25, 5148. Neighbor, Neighbor’s boyfriend,
Neighbor’s ex-husband, LaCount, and Buttars were present. Id. Neighbor’s ex-husband
recalled Buttars saying that the technology was “unique,” but did not “recall a whole lot
about the conversation.” R.5148-49.
In late May 2009, Neighbor and her boyfriend each invested $2000 in exchange
for stock in MOVIEblitz. R.5092-94, 5107, 5120-21. St.Ex.5-6, 9-10. They testified that
upon Buttars’sand LaCount's request, they wrote their checks out to Buttars. R.5091-93,
5120-21; see also R5139. Portions of their investments were ultimately deposited in
Buttars’s personal account. St.Ex.26. After investing, both Neighbor and her boyfriend
signed subscription agreements similar to the one signed by Mother. R.5995, 5099-5102,
5107, 5112,5129-30; St.Ex.7,14; Def.Ex.28.

3

The State stipulated that MOVIEblitz was indeed registered in Nevada. R.5522.
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On January 11, 2010, Neighbor’s boyfriend invested another $7000 in
MOVIEblitz in exchange for 70,000 shares. R.5126-27; St.Exs.11-12, 15. Neighbor’s exhusband also invested, writing checks for $10,000 on February 1-2, 2010, in exchange for
a stock. R.5149-51; St.Exs.16-19. After investing, Neighbor’s ex-husband signed a
subscription agreement. R.5153; St.Ex.20. Neighbor’s ex-husband understood it as an
“investment opportunity to get[] Movie Blitz off the ground” and understood that his
investment would be used to develop a media key and kiosks. R.5148-49, 5154-55.
According to the investors, Buttars did not mention: that there were risks involved
in the business; that MOVIEblitz was undercapitalized and had outstanding debt; that a
failed company called Ellipse predated MOVIEblitz and was dedicated to developing a
similar product; that other individuals had a claim to the intellectual property; and that
their investments would be for another purpose, like paying Buttars’s personal expenses.
R.5080, 5096-99, 5111-13, 5119-20, 5133-34, 5148-49, 5154-56, 5162.
The investors described the communications surrounding Ellipse and MOVIEblitz
using descriptors such as “positive,” “no risks involved,” and painting a “pretty picture”
about a product that “nothing… [could] compete with.” R.5067, 5080, 5090-91, 5096-97,
5112, 5118-20, 5124-25, 5130-31, 5145, 5156, 5161. Moreover, the investors testified
that they never received returns on their investments. R.5078-79, 5101-03, 5110, 5133,
5152, 5155. The summaries reveal a payment to Neighbor’s ex-husband for $6,500.
St.Ex.26 at 12.
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Bank record summaries and Curtis’s expert testimony
To try to demonstrate that Buttars misused investor money for personal expenses,
the State admitted “summaries” of Buttars personal and business bank records through its
forensic accounting expert, John Curtis. R.5168-69, 5175-5209; St.Exs.26-32. The
summaries, marked as Exhibits 26-32, are attached at Addendum C. Moreover, the record
suggests that all exhibits, including Exhibits 26-32, were available to jurors during
deliberations. R.5668. The underlying bank records themselves were not admitted.
Exhibits 26-32 purport to document the flow of incoming and outgoing funds
relating to the accounts of Ellipse, MOVIEblitz, and Buttars’s personal account.
St.Exs.26-32. The summaries do not account for nearly $80,000 worth of checks that
Buttars gave to Ellipse from his personal account from September, 2007-January, 2009.
Def.Exs.11-22.
The summaries also label certain transactions as “investor money” and opine that
funds were “comingled.” Id. In addition, Exhibits 26-31 categorize certain payments as
“questionable,” and “potentially legitimate.” St.Exs.26-31. Among the “questionable”
payments were payments to Buttars, LaCount, “Steve Groves (private investigator),”
“Reynalda Juarez (Housekeeping),” “Kay Burmingham (Lawyer and [Buttars’s] Exwife),” and “BAC Home Loans,” as well as payments to restaurants, utility companies,
grocery stores, and a talent management group. Id. The State attempted to support its
conclusion that these payments were questionable by eliciting testimony that Ellipse had
no need to pay for a talent agency, a private investigator, or the housekeeper (who
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testified that she cleaned Buttars’s whole home). R.4867-88, 4917-18, 4961-62, 5042-46,
5456-57.
On direct, Curtis went through payments and observations that raised “red flags”
and “st[oo]d out.” E.g., R.5199, 5204, 5207, 5180-82,5185, 5195, 5199-5200. Moreover,
over Buttars’s objections, Curtis identified various characteristics of “fraud, deceit, or
theft,” and opined that these characteristics were present in Buttars’s case. R.5210-29. 4
According to Curtis, documents relating to the foreclosure of Buttars’s home and his
missed credit card payments further supported Curtis’s opinions; the documents
demonstrated that Buttars’s was in “financial distress”—which, Curtis said, “would be a
significant disclosure to investors.” R.5423-39; St.Exs.39-40
On cross-examination, defense counsel went through the various transactions and
payments in detail, eliciting evidence that many of the payments could be proper business
expenses associated with bringing the product to market. R.5248-5268, 5295-5307,531318; see, e.g., R.5521, 5295-96, Def.Exs.1,24. Curtis also acknowledged that a person can
account for any misplaced payments in their end-of-the-year taxes. R.5233, 5306-07,
5233, 5317-18. Even though the State procured Buttars’s tax documents, it did not
present them at trial, and it did not provide them to Curtis. R.5307-08, 5521.
Moreover, Curtis acknowledged that if Buttars paid himself a salary, payments
from the business accounts to Buttars’s personal account would not be “questionable,”
provided the salary “was disclosed and authorized.” R.5258-59, 5315-18. The State tried

4

Curtis’s testimony is set forth in detail at pp.69-70 and Addendum D.
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to rebut the defense’s suggestion that Buttars was paying himself a salary by introducing
a document in which Buttars stated that he was unemployed during the relevant time
frame. See St.Ex.40—attachment B. Curtis never spoke with LaCount and thus, could not
testify to the purpose behind the payments to him. R.5315-16.
Lloyd’s expert testimony
Brian Lloyd, the State’s securities expert, made various statements about the
disclosure obligations of securities salespeople, R.4826-38, 4843-44, 5468-69; and—over
Buttars’s objections—the meaning of material. R.4827-39; Addendum E (Lloyd’s
testimony). In closing, the prosecutor also made statements about the legal obligations of
disclosure. Addendum F (prosecutor’s argument). The statements of Lloyd and the
prosecutor are discussed in detail below. Infra p.61.
Moreover, Lloyd testified that “[b]ased on [his] experience in the securities
industry” it would be “important” to disclose whether patents are encumbered and
whether a predecessor company existed. R.5471-5475.
Bank Records
The State applied to obtain Buttars’s bank records through the Subpoena Powers
Act (“SPA”). R.785-801, 805-42, 859, 1085-86; Def.Ex. A-L (9/14/2015 Hr’g); St.Ex.8
(9/14/2015 Hr’g).
Prior to issuing the subpoenas, the State filed a statement of good cause, R.786-92,
806-12, 825-33; Def.Ex.A-B, G-H, and a magistrate “[a]pprov[ed]… an [i]nvestigation”
based on “good cause appearing.” R.793-95, 814-16, 822-24. Def.Ex.C, I, K. The
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magistrate then reviewed each subpoena to “determin[e] whether the subpoenas were
reasonably related to the [court-authorized] criminal investigation.” R.1087.
The State then served the subpoenas on Buttars’s banks, JP Morgan Chase and
Frontier Bank. 5 R.797-99, 818-20, 834-36, 839-42, 1086-87; Def.Ex.D, J. The subpoenas
contained references to an irrelevant provision of the Utah Code and ordered the
recipients “not to disclose to any person the existence or service of the subpoena.” See id.
The State did not obtain a secrecy order, as required by Utah Code §77-22-2, to keep the
investigation or the subpoenaed materials secret. R.1087. Rather, the inclusion of this
language “was an error.” R.1086. The State never notified Buttars that it had issued
subpoenas to his banks. R.1087, 2972-73.
Producing the Frontier records took some time because Frontier had closed its
Utah branch and “most everything [wa]s jumbled in storage.” R.2963-64; Def.Ex O
(9/14/2015 Hr’g). Frontier ultimately produced the records in 3-4 productions, but only
two productions were accompanied with custodian certificates. R.1150, 3197-98. It was
unclear which certificate went to which production. R.3197-98.
Curtis compiled summaries of the records, St.Exs.26-32, and the State moved for a
pretrial ruling on the summaries’ admissibility. R.734-36, 862-85. It argued that the
underlying bank records were admissible under rules 803(6) and 703. R.734-36, 862-85.

In 2012, Frontier Bank was acquired by a successor bank and moved its entire
administration to California. R.844-46, 4050-51.
5
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The State further argued that the summaries were admissible under rule 1006 because
they distilled voluminous records. See id.
The defense objected to the admission of the bank records/summaries on two
primary grounds. First, Buttars argued that the State obtained the bank records in secrecy
and without notice, in violation of his rights under the Utah Constitution and Fourth
Amendment. R.766-87, 962-1055, 3067-86, 3093-3096. Second, Buttars argued that the
bank records/summaries were inadmissible because the missing custodian certificates
precluded admissibility under rule 803(6)’s business records exception to the hearsay
rule. R.910-61.
The court held an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of the bank
records/summaries. R.855-56, 2933-3048. There, the State introduced the summaries, but
did not introduce the underlying bank records. Curtis and Nesbit testified that the records
appeared to be complete and “were what they purported to be.” R.1150, 1217-18. The
State, however, did not call a records custodian.
After briefing and argument on the admissibility of the bank records/summaries,
the court issued two rulings. See R.766-87 886-907, 962-1055 (suppression briefing);
R.3061-96 (suppression argument); R.1085-90, 3098-3104 (suppression ruling); R.73436, 862-85, 910-61, 1058-1063 (initial hearsay briefing); R.3104-39 (initial hearsay
argument); R.1148-1155, 3180-3212 (initial hearsay ruling).
First, the court denied Buttars’s motion to suppress the bank records. R.1085-90,
3098-3104; Addendum G (order). It determined (1) that the State is not required to notify
defendants when it issues subpoenas for their bank records; (2) that the erroneous secrecy
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language did not render the subpoenas unlawful; (3) and in any event, the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule applied. R.1085-90.
Second, the court denied, without prejudice, the State’s motion to admit the bank
records. R.1148-1155, 3180-3212; Addendum H (order). It reasoned that “while… the
State met its burden of proving [] authenticity,” the missing custodian certificates
precluded the State from meeting its burden under rule 803(6). R.1148-1155. Thus, the
records were inadmissible hearsay. Id. The court also determined that Curtis could rely
on the bank records to form an opinion under rule 703. Id. But it did not rule on the
admissibility of the records under rule 703 because the parties did not brief the second
prong of rule 703—whether the records’ “‘probative value in helping the jury evaluate
[Curtis’s] opinion substantially outweigh[ed] their prejudicial effect.’” R.1153-54.
The State then filed a supplemental brief, arguing that the bank records were
admissible under rule 703’s second prong. R.1137-1145; 1177-1185. Alternatively, the
State asserted that the evidence was admissible under rule 807’s residual exception to the
hearsay rule. Id.
After considering the additional briefing and argument, the court ruled that the
bank records were admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. R.113745, 1158-1174, 1177-85 (briefing); R.3216-42 (argument); R.1216-23, 3274-93 (ruling);
Addendum H (applicable order). The court “d[id] not address whether the records or
summaries [we]re also admissible under Rule 703” because they were “admissible for
their substance under Rule 807.” R.1219.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. This Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts because the trial court
erred in admitting prejudicial bank record evidence. The bank record evidence was
inadmissible for three reasons.
First, the court should have suppressed the bank record evidence because the State
unconstitutionally obtained the evidence using secret and unlawful subpoenas.
Second, the summaries (Exhibits 26-32) were inadmissible under rule 1006 because the
underlying bank records constituted inadmissible hearsay that did not qualify under the
residual exception. And third, the summaries were inadmissible under rule 1006 because
they contained State-drawn conclusions and extra-bank record information; counsel
performed ineffectively by failing to object to the summaries on the grounds that they did
not prove the content of the underlying bank records.
II. Counsel rendered ineffective assistance by allowing an incorrect instruction
defining “willfulness.” The instruction incorrectly incorporated conscious
avoidance/willful blindness principles and misarticulated the conduct that must be the
object of a defendant’s willfulness. Allowing this instruction constituted deficient
performance that prejudiced Buttars. Alternatively, this Court may reverse under the
exceptional circumstances doctrine.
III. This Court should reverse because the State presented prejudicial expert
testimony, argument, and jury instructions that misstated the law and expanded the
conduct criminalized by the securities fraud statute. Specifically, the misstatements
incorrectly suggested that the law imposed an affirmative duty to disclose material
17

information—a violation of which rendered a defendant’s genuine beliefs in his
statements “not[] a defense.” To the extent counsel failed to adequately preserve the
issue, that failure constituted ineffective assistance.
IV. The trial court erred by admitting expert testimony that violated rules 702,
704, and 403. The expert testimony of Curtis and/or Lloyd did not help the trier of fact,
was unduly prejudicial, and improperly stated legal conclusions. This Court should
reverse because the improper testimony undermines confidence in the verdict.
V. Cumulative error requires reversal.
ARGUMENT
I.

The bank record evidence was inadmissible.
The bank record evidence was inadmissible because the State obtained Buttars’s

bank records in violation of his rights under Article I, §14 of the Utah Constitution and
the Fourth Amendment. Infra §I.A. Even if the records were lawfully obtained, the
summaries were inadmissible because the underlying bank records were hearsay. Infra
§I.B. Alternatively, counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the summaries on the
grounds that they did not accurately reflect the contents of the underlying bank records.
Infra §I.C.
A. The court erred in failing to suppress the bank record evidence.
The State violated Buttars’s rights under Article I, §14 and Fourth Amendment by
using secret SPA subpoenas to obtain his protected bank records. This Court should
reverse because the State unlawfully seized Buttars’s bank records, infra §I.A.1; the good
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faith exception does not apply, infra §I.A.2; and the bank record evidence prejudiced
Buttars. Infra §I.A.3.
1. The State unlawfully seized Buttars’ bank records.
Article I, §14 and the Fourth Amendment grant defendants the right “to be secure
in their… papers... against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Utah Const. art. I, §14;
U.S.Const. amend. IV; Addendum I (provisions). In State v. Thompson, our supreme
court interpreted Article I, §14 to grant defendants a privacy interest in their bank records
and a right to be free from seizures of those records by way of unlawful subpoenas. 810
P.2d 415, 416-18 (Utah 1991).
In Thompson, the State began an investigation of the defendants' financial
activities and issued subpoenas duces tecum to banks for the defendants' financial
records. Id. at 415-16. The defendants argued that the subpoenas were illegal. Id. at 416.
They also sought suppression of the records because attaining the evidence through
invalid subpoenas constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. See id.
The Utah Supreme Court held “that under [A]rticle I, [§]14 of the Utah
Constitution, [the] defendants... had a right to be secure against unreasonable searches
and seizures of their bank [records] ‘and all papers which they supplied to the bank...
upon the reasonable assumption that the information would remain confidential.’” Id. at
418. The court determined that the defendants had a “right to privacy” in the content of
their bank records. Id. It then acknowledged that the subpoenas were unlawful/invalid. Id.
at 420. The supreme court determined that the search and seizure of the bank records by
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way of unlawful subpoenas was therefore unreasonable under Article I, §14. Id. at 41819.
The question in this case, then, is what makes a subpoena lawful? Id. And
relatedly, were the SPA subpoenas lawful here? Id.
***
The SPA gives the State broad powers to subpoena information and seemingly
applies to privileged and constitutionally-protected information—including bank records.
Utah Code §77-22-2; Addendum I. When the act faces constitutional problems, our
supreme court has been willing read in procedural protections so as to save it from
unconstitutionality. See In re Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988)
(superseded by statute).
The SPA provides that “upon application and approval of the district court and for
good cause shown, [the prosecutor may] conduct a criminal investigation.” Utah Code
§77-22-2(2)(a). Upon such a showing, the prosecutor may then “subpoena witnesses” and
“require the production of… documents.” Id. §77-22-2(3)(a). The prosecutor, however,
“shall… apply to the district court for each subpoena[]” and “show that the requested
information is reasonably related to the criminal investigation authorized by the court.”
Id. §77-22-2(3)(b).
Moreover, “[u]pon an additional showing by a prosecutor that publicly releasing
information… may ‘pose a threat of harm to a person or otherwise impede the
investigation,’ a court may order, among other things, that the ‘occurrence of... the
subpoenaing of evidence... be kept secret.’” Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶19.
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The SPA—and of course the state and federal constitutions—dictate the
lawfulness of subpoenas issued under the act. See Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633.
Moreover, the Thompson court looked to Criminal Investigation for the “the test of
whether a subpoena issued under the [SPA] is lawful.” Thompson, 810 P.2d at 418.
Buttars recognizes, as the trial court did, that Criminal Investigation and
Thompson concerned subpoenas that were issued under a previous version of the SPA—a
version of the act that did not require the prosecution to apply to a court for individual
subpoenas. R.1088-89. The Criminal Investigation court, however, did not find the SPA’s
lack of judicial oversight to be fatal. Instead, the court was concerned with, among other
things, the subpoenaed party’s ability to mount a meaningful pre-compliance challenge to
the subpoena. 754 P.2d at 656, 658-59.
The Criminal Investigation court stated, that “a subpoenaed person must have a
meaningful opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of a subpoena.” Id. at 656. Moreover,
while our supreme court determined that the SPA was facially constitutional, it held that
the SPA was unconstitutionally applied where the “secrecy provisions… were applied too
broadly.” Id. at 659. And to the extent that the broadly-applied secrecy provisions
“impeded the challenge of subpoenas…, it operated to deny rights against unreasonable
search and seizure.” Id. More recently, our supreme court relied on Criminal
Investigation to similarly hold that “[t]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the
subpoenaed party is allowed ‘to question the reasonableness of the subpoena, before
suffering any penalties for refusing to comply with it, by raising objections… in [the]
district court.’” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14,¶31.
21

The pre-compliance opportunity to challenge the subpoena would be of little value
without notice. State v. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72,¶32. Indeed, “‘[t]he fundamental requisite
of due process… is the opportunity to be heard, a right which has little reality or worth
unless one is informed that the matter is pending and one can choose for himself whether
to contest.’” Id.
Due process and other constitutional concerns dictate that in certain situations, a
defendant is entitled to notice of the issuance of a subpoena. Yount, 2008 UT App 102.
This Court recognized these principles in Yount, which held that the “the State's failure to
notify Defendant of the subpoenas for his medical records was a violation of his rights
and rendered the subpoenas invalid.” Id.¶16.
In Yount, this Court explained “that due process concerns arise where no notice is
given to the party whose confidential or privileged records are subpoenaed.” Id.¶13.
“When a party's confidential records are reviewed before he even knows they are
subpoenaed, he cannot choose to protect them.” Id. (cleaned up). Thus, “‘[t]he only way
to prevent this is to ensure that the party receives notification that a subpoena has been
issued.’” Id. And where the Yount defendant did not receive notice, he “was denied an
opportunity to assert his potential privilege or to otherwise pursue procedural safeguards
in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure.” Id.¶16.
Here, the trial court was wrong to conclude that “[t]he State is [n]ot [r]equired to
[g]ive [n]otice to a [s]uspect in a [c]riminal [i]nvestigation [w]hen the State [i]ssues
[s]ubpoenas to [b]anks for a [s]uspect’s [b]ank [r]ecords.” R.1088. While the SPA
contains no express notice requirement, the act does not override basic constitutional
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requirements. Case law suggests that to be lawful and constitutional, interested parties
must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to object to subpoenas. Criminal
Investigation, 754 P.2d at 656, 658-59; Burns, 2006 UT 14,¶31; Yount, 2008 UT App
102,¶¶13-16. Moreover, notice is critical in providing a defendant a pre-compliance
opportunity to object. Gonzales, 2005 UT 72,¶32; Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶¶13-16.
And where protected/privileged documents are the subject of the subpoena, notice is
necessary to avoid due process and other constitutional problems. Yount, 2008 UT App
102,¶¶13-16.
The State in this case used a subpoena to obtain Buttars’s protected bank records.
Like the privileged medical records in Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶¶13-16, Buttars’s bank
records were constitutionally protected under Article I, §14. Thompson, 810 P.2d at 41618. Thus, as in Yount, Buttars was entitled to notice to allow him to object to the
subpoena and “pursue procedural safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure.”
Id.¶16. Without notice, the subpoenas were unlawful. Id.
The erroneously included secrecy provision further worked to deprive Buttars of
notice and the opportunity to object. R.797-99, 818-20, 834-36, 839-42, 1086-87;
Def.Ex.D, J. The secrecy provisions directed the banks “not to disclose to any person the
existence or service of the subpoena.” Id. These secrecy provisions were indisputably
included in “error.” R.1086.
In rejecting the import of the secrecy provision, the trial court reasoned that the
State had otherwise “met all the requirements of obtaining a lawful subpoena” and that
the erroneous grant of a secrecy order “is not a basis for attacking” the subpoena’s
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validity. R.1088-89. But when the erroneous inclusion of a secrecy order serves to
preclude a defendant from challenging a subpoena for constitutionally-protected
documents, the subpoena is invalid. Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d at 656, 658-59;
Burns, 2006 UT 14,¶31; Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶¶13-16. Indeed, as discussed, case
law shows that interested parties must be afforded a pre-compliance opportunity to
challenge subpoenas for protected documents. Id.
Here, the erroneous secrecy provision further deprived Buttars of notice and a precompliance opportunity to object. For instance, California law, which governed the
conduct of the Frontier Bank records custodian, prohibits disclosure of bank records
absent “serv[ice of] a copy of the subpoena… on the customer” and the allowance of 10
days for the customer to seek quashal of the subpoena. Cal. Gov’t Code §§7470(a) &
(a)(2); 7474(a) & (a)(1)-(3). Any notice that Buttars might have received from his bank
was further precluded by the secrecy provision.
The court was also wrong to focus on whether Buttars “would have successfully
moved to quash” the subpoenas. R.1088-90. Buttars was entitled to a pre-compliance
opportunity to object regardless of whether he would ultimately succeed in quashing
them. To draw a comparison, Utah courts have determined that even if communications
may fall under a privilege exception, “‘the patient has the right to be notified of the
potential disclosure of confidential [medical] records.’” Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶15.
“This notification is required to provide the patient with an ‘opportunity to assert [the]
privilege’ and to… ‘pursue the appropriate procedural safeguards in court to avoid
unnecessary disclosure.’” Id.
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Just as a defendant need not show that privilege will bar the release of medical
records, Buttars did not need to prove that the release of his bank records would be barred
and the State's subpoena would be quashed. What is important is that Buttars be given an
opportunity to “‘pursue procedural safeguards in court to avoid unnecessary disclosure.’”
Id. 6
In short, to be lawful, Buttars needed notice and a meaningful pre-compliance
opportunity to challenge the subpoenas. The subpoenas issued to Buttars’s banks lacked
these necessary procedural protections and were therefore unlawful. The seizure of
Buttars’s bank records pursuant to unlawful subpoenas constituted an unreasonable
search that violated Buttars’s State and federal constitutional rights. Thompson, 810 P.2d
at 418.
2. The violation requires suppression.
The bank record evidence must be excluded pursuant to the Fourth Amendment,
Article I, §14, Thompson, and Yount. In Thompson, our supreme court considered
whether the unlawfully seized bank records should be suppressed. 810 P.2d at 419. At the
outset, the court noted that “‘[e]xclusion of illegally obtained evidence is a necessary
consequence of police violations of [A]rticle I, [§]14.’” Id. “The supreme court accepted
the defendants' analogy between a[n] officer's erroneous action in a warrantless search
and an attorney's ‘unconstitutional application of the [SPA].’” Yount, 2008 UT App
For instance, Buttars could have contended that due to the protected status of the
records, the State needed to make a higher showing than that required by the SPA, which
only required that the bank records be “reasonably related to the criminal investigation”
for which there was “good cause.” Utah Code §77-22-2(3)(b).
6
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102,¶15. “Based on the general rule and this analogy, the supreme court concluded that
‘[a]ll bank records obtained as a result of illegal subpoenas must... be suppressed unless
[the] good faith exception’” applied. Id. The good faith exception did not apply, however,
because the “illegal subpoenas [were] issued… by the attorney general, who [wa]s
chargeable for the illegality.” Thompson, 810 P.2d at 419-20.
Relying on Thompson, this Court in Yount likewise suppressed “medical records[]
obtained through subpoenas that were illegal due to the State's failure to notify Defendant
of their issuance.” Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶24. Moreover, the Yount court determined
that the good faith exception did not apply “because the trial court merely authorized the
prosecutor to prepare” the subpoenas. Id.¶26 n.3. The court, however, “did not authorize
the prosecutor to issue the subpoenas in secret or to otherwise issue them without notice
to Defendant.” Id.
Here, the trial court erred in declining to suppress the bank record evidence. As in
Thompson and Yount, Buttars had a privacy interest in the bank records. Thompson, 810
P.2d 415 at 418-20; Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶24. Moreover, as explained above, the
State obtained Buttars’s bank records through subpoenas that were illegal. Supra §I.A.
“Thus, under Article I, [§]14…, the evidence obtained through the State's illegal
subpoenas… must be suppressed unless an exception to the exclusionary rule applies.”
Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶24.
The trial court determined that the good faith exception applied because the State
obtained judicial review and “reasonably relied on the Court’s approval of the
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subpoenas.” R.1089-90. But the circumstances did not warrant the application of the
good faith exception.
Similar to Yount, a court in this case initially approved the issuance of subpoenas
to Buttars’s banks. R.797-99, 818-20, 834-36, 839-42, 1086-87; Def.Ex.D, J; Yount, 2008
UT App 102, Id.¶¶5, 26 n.3. The subpoenas then directed the banks to keep the
subpoenas secret. Id. But the subpoenas did not spell out the procedure by which the
prosecutor should issue the subpoenas. Id. Nor did the court “authorize the prosecutor to
issue the subpoenas… without notice to [the] Defendant.” Id. In other words, the courtapproved secrecy provision authorized secrecy on the part of the banks—not the State.
Moreover, the State’s failure to provide notice was chargeable solely to the State and its
attorneys. Thus, the trial court erred in applying the good faith exception “because the
error that rendered the subpoenas illegal was due to the attorney's conduct and the
attorney's errors were not excused by any sort of reasonable reliance on the court's
authorization.” Yount, 2008 UT App 102,¶23.
In short, the Fourth Amendment, Article I, §14, Thompson, and Yount required
suppression of the bank records and all derivative testimony. Murray v. U.S., 487 U.S.
533, 536-37 (1988) (the exclusionary rule “prohibits the introduction of derivative
evidence, both tangible and testimonial, that is the product of the primary evidence”).
3. Prejudice.
When an error is constitutional in nature, the State bears the burden of
demonstrating that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v.
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California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); State v. Lujan, 2015 UT App 199,¶16 n.2, cert.
granted, (applying the Chapman standard to state constitutional error).
Here, admission of the bank record evidence violated Buttars’s state and federal
constitutional rights. Accordingly, the State must prove that admission of the bank record
evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State cannot meet this burden.
The bank record evidence was “crucial” evidence that went to all counts. R.1222.
To convict Buttars of securities fraud, the jury had to find that Buttars (1) misstated a
material fact, omitted a material fact necessary to complete a misleading predicate
statement, or engaged in an act that operated as a fraud/deceit, and (2) acted willfully. See
Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3), 61-1-21. The State relied on the bank records to prove
securities fraud, using them to try to demonstrate that Buttars: misstated facts by
knowingly using investment money differently than what he represented to investors,
R.5610, 5656-67, 5659-60; omitted to tell investors how he used the investments of
previous investors, R.5654; and engaged in an act that operated as a fraud/deceit. R.522728. Moreover, the instructions told jurors that securities fraud constituted “unlawful
activity” upon which the pattern count could rest. R.1411, 1425-26. Thus, the bank
records impacted the pattern count too.
Additionally, much of the State’s evidence centered on the bank records. The
summaries depended on the bank records. See R.5175; St.Exs.26-32. Likewise, Curtis’s
testimony derived almost exclusively from his analysis of the bank records. R.5168-5334,
5442-5455.
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Without the bank record evidence, the State’s case rested predominantly on the
testimony of the investors, to whom—the State argued—Buttars failed to disclose certain
information. For instance, the State argued that Buttars was guilty of securities fraud
because he omitted to tell investors about Ellipse, R.5614, 5617; the existence of prior
allegations that Buttars misused Ellipse funds, R.5614-17, 5653; the potentially
encumbered patents, R.5616, 5653; and the payment of salaries. R.5613. But this
evidence was not overwhelming, and there was evidence upon which the jury could doubt
these claims.
Buttars had no “‘affirmative duty to disclose in the absence of a prior [,
misleading] statement.’” State v. Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶10. And the evidence was
vague and inconsistent as to what, if anything, Buttars said to the investors. R.5081
(Mother testifying that Gerritsen provided most of the information about the investment);
R.5078-79 (Mother testifying that she “th[ought] [she] might’ve had a phone call” with
Buttars in which Buttars told her how her investment would be used); R.5532-33
(evidence that Mother spoke with Buttars only once at a concert); R.5119 (Neighbor’s
boyfriend testifying that Buttars gave a “presentation about what MovieBlitz was.”);
R.5090-91, 5102, 5106, 5112 (Neighbor testifying that Buttars explained the “technical
aspects,” including showing her the “patents he had gotten” and describing the
technology); R.5098-99, 5133 (“it was stated” the money would be used in a particular
way); R.5139 (it was “‘Mark LaCount [who] told us how great the company was’” and
how “‘our money… was going to be used’”); R.5141-42 (“[LaCount] was initially the
one that did all this stuff”).
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Moreover, there was evidence that Buttars did not attend all the investor meetings.
R.5118-19. In fact, evidence showed that it was Gerritsen and LaCount who primarily
interacted with investors —investors who were Gerritsen and LaCount’s neighbors,
friends, and relatives. R.5089, 5105, 5123, 5136,5139, 5141-42. By contrast, Buttars was
the “brains” who lacked a personal connection with the investors. R.5106, 5136. Given
the evidence, a jury could acquit upon a finding that Buttars did not utter any misleading
predicate statements; he did not act willfully as he was not privy to any conversation
during which the predicate statements were made; and/or he did not act willfully because
he believed that LaCount and Gerritsen had already informed investors of all the
necessary information.
There was also evidence upon which a jury could find that Buttars believed all that
he said (assuming he said anything). Indeed, evidence showed that Buttars was pursuing
a legitimate technology, he believed in the company, and he “was trying to do things
right.” R.4887-88, 4944-45, 4972, 5057,5232-35, 5295-96, 5632; St.Ex.26; Def.Ex.2,4,6.
He believed in the technology enough to devote nearly $80,000 of his own money.
Def.Ex.11-22. He had retained lawyers and applied for patents, and there was evidence of
a licensing agreement between Ellipse and MovieBlitz. R.4866, 4888, 5534-35.
Moreover, evidence showed that Buttars had done his research, compiling a detailed
business plan with financial projections (contemplating salaries) and a sample
subscription agreement that discussed the risks of investing. St.Ex.8. This was not a case
involving some sham product. Buttars had a viable technology, but like many startups,

30

his company did not ultimately prevail. Given this evidence, a jury could find that Buttars
believed everything he told investors and could acquit because he did not act willfully.
Additionally, the jury’s acquittals on the theft counts indicate that jurors were
conflicted about the State’s evidence and its theory of the case. State v. Richardson, 2013
UT 50,¶44. Under these circumstances, the State cannot demonstrate that the admission
of the bank record evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. The court erred in admitting Exhibits 26-32 because the underlying bank
records constituted inadmissible hearsay.
The Frontier bank records were inadmissible hearsay. While the State did not
introduce the underlying bank records, it admitted summaries of the records (Exhibits 2632) pursuant to rule 1006. These summaries relied either solely or mostly on the Frontier
records. R.916-17; St.Exs. 26-32. Where the underlying bank records were inadmissible
hearsay, rule 1006 precluded the summaries’ admission.
Hearsay is a “statement that [] the declarant does not make while testifying at the
current trial” and “a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”
Utah R. Evid. 801(c), 802; Addendum I. Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls under an
exception. Id. Admissible out-of-court statements may be the subject of a rule 1006
summary. Sunridge Dev. Corp. v. RB&G Eng'g, Inc., 2013 UT App 146,¶¶19-20. Rule
1006 provides that a “proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the
content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently
examined in court.” Utah R. Evid.1006; Addendum I.
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But Utah courts agree that rule 1006 summaries “‘cannot be used as a cover for
bringing [in] inadmissible hearsay.’” Sunridge, 2013 UT App 146,¶20. “Thus, the
proponent of a summary must also show that the underlying records are admissible,
which typically requires a showing that the records qualify under the business records
exception to the hearsay rule.” Id. Stated differently, rule 1006 summaries must be
excluded if the underlying records do not qualify under a hearsay exception. Id.
Here, the underlying bank records constituted inadmissible hearsay. The court
correctly determined that the records did not qualify under the business records
exception. But it incorrectly determined that they were admissible under the hearsay
rule’s residual exception. Infra §I.B.1. Moreover, admission of the hearsay summaries
prejudiced Buttars. Infra §I.B.2.
1. The residual exception did not apply; thus, the bank records constituted
inadmissible hearsay.
“[T]he residual exception is a catchall provision that may be applied when a
hearsay statement ‘is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or
804.’” State v. Clopten, 2015 UT 82,¶23. The rule states:
(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is
not excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not
specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice.
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(b) Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing,
the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer
the statement and its particulars, including the declarant's name and
address, so that the party has a fair opportunity to meet it.
Utah R. Evid. 807; Addendum I.
“This exception… was intended for use in those rare cases where, although the
out-of-court statement does not fit into a recognized exception, its admission is justified
by the inherent reliability of the statement and the need for its admission.” State v.
Nelson, 777 P.2d 479, 482 (Utah 1989). The residual hearsay exception is to be used
“rarely,” “construed strictly,” and employed only in “exceptional circumstances” where
“the high requirements” of the rule are met. Workman, 2005 UT 66,¶12; State v. Webster,
2001 UT App 238,¶26.
This case was not one of those rare and exceptionable cases. Specifically, the State
did not meet rule 807’s requirements of notice, trustworthiness, reasonable efforts, or
interests of justice.
Notice. “[T]he purpose of the notice provision [is]… to afford the adverse party an
opportunity to attack the statement's trustworthiness.” Webster, 2001 UT App 238,¶21.
Without adequate notice of the proponent’s intent to rely on the residual exception, the
opposing party need “only be prepared to contest whether the statement fits under one of
the other specific, narrow exceptions.” Id. Accordingly, rule 807 requires reasonable
notice not only of the proponent’s intent to rely on the hearsay statement, but also
“requires notice of the proponent's intent to rely on th[e] [residual] exception.” Id.¶22.
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Here, the court erred in determining that the State had provided proper notice.
R.1220. The State initially proceeded on various theories for the bank records’
admissibility, none of which involved the residual hearsay exception. R.734-36, 862-85,
910-61, 1058-1063. The evidentiary hearing addressing the bank records’ admissibility
revolved around the State’s initial theories. R.855-56, 2933-3048. Only after the
evidentiary hearing and several months of briefing, did the State raise the residual
exception. R.1137-1145; 1177-1185.
The court determined Buttars “had a fair opportunity to respond” to the State’s
residual exception arguments. R.1220. But Buttars’s opportunity to attack the bank
records’ trustworthiness was limited by the facts that came out at the evidentiary
hearing—facts that were developed to challenge the admissibility of the bank records
under “other specific, narrow exceptions.” Webster, 2001 UT App 238,¶21. Had the State
provided notice prior to the evidentiary hearing, Buttars could have tailored his crossexamination to address trustworthiness and introduced evidence relating to the
trustworthiness issue. Absent an opportunity to develop the evidence toward this purpose,
Buttars lacked a fair “opportunity to attack the statement's trustworthiness.” Id.
Trustworthiness. The court erred in determining that the bank records had
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Our supreme court’s decision in
Clopten is instructive on this point.
The Clopten court held that statements were inadmissible under the residual
exception because they did not meet trustworthiness requirement. 2015 UT 82,¶¶24-26.
There, the supreme court considered the residual exception after first deeming the
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statements inadmissible under the statement-against-interest exception. Id. The proponent
asserted that the statements satisfied the residual exception’s trustworthiness requirement
based on (1) “corroborat[ing] [] extrinsic evidence” and (2) their tendency to subject the
declarant to potential harm. Id. The Clopten court rejected both contentions. Id.
On the first point, the Clopten court stated that the “trustworthiness requirement is
not satisfied by extrinsic corroborating evidence.” Id.¶25. “Instead, courts look to either
the circumstances in which the hearsay statement was made or the content of the
statement itself.” Id. To satisfy the trustworthiness element, “‘hearsay evidence... must
possess indicia of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to
other evidence at trial.’” Id.
The supreme court likewise rejected the proponent’s contention that the statements
had inherent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. Id.¶26. That contention could
be dismissed “for the same reasons that the statement-against-interest exception d[id] not
apply.” Id. Thus, the Clopten court held that the statements were inadmissible where the
proponent failed to show “that the statements ha[d] ‘equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness’ that [we]re different from other recognized exceptions to the hearsay
rule.” Id.¶24 (emphasis added).
Under Clopten, then, guarantees of trustworthiness must be both inherent and
different from the recognized exceptions. Id.¶¶24-26. Indeed, the text of the rule suggests
that the residual exception does not allow statements that have indicia of trustworthiness
that are the same as—but fall short of—those contemplated under the recognized
exceptions. Utah R. Evid.807. Rule 807 contemplates that the residual exception may be
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applied when a hearsay statement “is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in
Rule 803 or 804.” Id. If the statement offered under rule 807 has indicia of reliability that
is the same as a recognized exception (for instance, the statement subjects the declarant to
harm), then it is likely of a type that is “specifically covered” by a recognized exception.
Admissibility is therefore governed by the recognized exception—not the residual
exception. Keller v. Martinez, 2014 UT App 2,¶9 (“statutes that address specific
circumstances ‘control over more general ones’”).
Moreover, if the statement does not satisfy the recognized exception, then it lacks
circumstantial indicia of trustworthiness and fails under the residual exception for the
“same reasons” it fails under the recognized exception. Clopten, 2015 UT 82,¶26.
Indeed, the text of the rule requires “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.” Utah. R. Evid.807. A statement that does not comport with the
requirements of the applicable recognized exception cannot have “equivalent” guarantees
of trustworthiness. Id. Otherwise the recognized exception would have allowed it.
The residual exception “is not a basis to admit hearsay when the proponent of the
evidence has failed to comply with the foundation requirements of other [hearsay]
exceptions… under which the proffered statement might have been admitted, had the
conditions precedent for their application been observed.” Clifton v. Gusto Records, Inc.,
852 F.2d 1287 (6th Cir. 1988) (unpublished decision). Instead, the residual exception is
reserved for “exceptional” cases, Workman, 2005 UT 66,¶12; Webster, 2001 UT App
238,¶26, where the recognized exceptions do not apply due to the unique character of the
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evidence and the “different” indicia of trustworthiness that it brings. Clopten, 2015 UT
82,¶24. That was not the case here.
In this case, the court made two fundamental errors in its application of the law.
First, the court expressly relied on extrinsic corroborating evidence to support the
admissibility of the bank records—specifically, the testimony of Nesbit and Curtis.
R.1221. But Clopten held that trustworthiness must be inherent; the “trustworthiness
requirement is not satisfied by extrinsic corroborating evidence.” Clopten, 2015 UT
82,¶25. Thus, the court was wrong to rely on “extrinsic evidence to support”
trustworthiness. R.1221.
Second, the inherent indicators of trustworthiness the court relied upon—for
instance, that the records were kept in the usual course of business—were not “different
from other recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Clopten, 2015 UT 82,¶24. In other
words, the court merely looked to the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness
required by the business records exception—an exception for which the court found the
proper foundation lacking. R.1153. Records that did not meet the requirements of the
business records exception lacked “equivalent” guarantees of trustworthiness. If the
guarantees were truly equivalent, then the business records exception would have allowed
them. Utah. R. Evid. 803(6), 807; Addendum I.
Even without considering the court’s misapplication of the law, the record reveals
that the State (the hearsay’s proponent) did not meet its burden of establishing
trustworthiness. For instance, the State failed to introduce the underlying bank records
themselves, producing only the summaries instead. This deprived the court of the
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opportunity to properly examine the trustworthiness of the Frontier records. U.S. v.
Turner, 718 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2013) (the trustworthiness analysis “is a highly factspecific inquiry”). Moreover, the hearsay’s trustworthiness was belied by record evidence
showing that the Frontier records had been “jumbled in storage.” R.2963-64; Def.Ex O
(9/14/2015 Hr’g).
In short, the State did not meet its trustworthiness burden and the court misapplied
the law. Thus, the court erred in determining that the bank records satisfied rule 807’s
trustworthiness requirement.
Reasonable efforts to obtain more probative evidence. Although Rule 807 does not
contain an explicit unavailability requirement, “it still requires the proponent… to
undertake reasonable efforts to get better evidence, and Rule 807(a) only applies if
another exception does not.” U.S. v. Turner, 561 F. App'x 312, 321 (5th Cir. 2014);
accord N.D. v. A.B., 2003 UT App 215,¶18.
Here, the bank records/summaries—as proffered by the State—were not the most
probative evidence of Buttars’s expenditures. R.1222. Of greater probative value were
records that a custodian showed to be accurate and trustworthy–that is, regular entries of
Buttars’ expenditures made near the time of the transaction and kept in the ordinary
course of business. Utah R. Evid. 803(6).
Calling the custodian to testify was one way the State could have ensured that the
most probative evidence of Buttars’s expenditures went to the jury. But the record reveals
no attempt on the part of the State to call a custodian. See R.2919, 3117, 3136, 3244. Nor
did the court identify any reasonable efforts to do so. R.1222. On the contrary, the State
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took the position that it “d[id] not have to bring in a records custodian from these banks.”
R.3136. This position contradicts both the letter and spirit of rule 807, which is reserved
for truly exceptional circumstances involving a showing of “need.” Nelson, 777 P.2d at
482; Workman, 2005 UT 66,¶12; Webster, 2001 UT App 238,¶26; Turner, 561 F. App'x
at 321. Accordingly, the court erred in determining that the State satisfied this prong.
N.D., 2003 UT App 215,¶18.
Interests of justice. For many of the reasons already discussed, admitting the bank
records under the residual exception did not serve the purposes of the rules and the
interests of justice. Rule 102 states that “[t]he[] rules should be construed so as to…
promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining the truth and
securing a just determination.” Utah R. Evid.102. The record does not reveal how
admitting the bank records through the residual exception—without the custodian
certifications that would otherwise be required under the business records exception—
best serves the end of ascertaining the truth. N.D., 2003 UT App 215,¶20.
The firmly rooted exceptions to our hearsay rules serve the interests of justice by
ensuring the trustworthiness of out-of-court statements. State v. Cude, 784 P.2d 1197,
1199 (Utah 1989). Where, as here, rule 807 is used to do an end-run around the
established exceptions and their trustworthiness requirements, neither the purposes of the
rules nor the interests of justice are served. Indeed, the business records exception would
be of little use if courts could bypass it in favor of the residual exception whenever the
requisite foundation was lacking. Such a prospect is even more troubling when the record
reveals that the State did not even take reasonable efforts to establish the requisite
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foundation. See R.3136; N.D., 2003 UT App 215,¶20. The court did not weigh these
important considerations.
In short, the court erred in determining that the Frontier records qualified under
rule 807. The records were thus inadmissible hearsay. And because the underlying bank
records were inadmissible, the Exhibit 26-32 summaries were inadmissible to the extent
that they relied on the Frontier records.
2. Prejudice.
An error is prejudicial when “there [i]s ‘a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant’” “without the error.” State v. Fontana, 680 P.2d 1042,
1048 (Utah 1984).
Here, Buttars was prejudiced by the admission of Exhibits 26-32. As discussed,
the bank records went to all securities fraud counts as well as the pattern count. Supra
p.28 And the State relied upon the bank records to prove its case. Id. Exhibits 26-32
relied either solely or mostly on the inadmissible Frontier records. R.916-17; St.Exs.2632. Without the Frontier records, jurors were left with a comparatively small number of
transactions from a time that predated the investments of the testifying investors as well
as a list of investments (mostly from 2007). Id. The summaries, in other words, rose and
fell with the Frontier records.
The court’s erroneous ruling allowed the State to use summaries as substantive
evidence. R.1219. 7 The State did just that, making the summaries a “crucial” part of its

As noted, the trial court declined to rule on whether the bank records/summaries
were admissible under rule 703. R.1219. The court correctly noted, nevertheless, that had
7
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case. R.1222. Not only did the State admit the summaries as exhibits, but it also elicited
detailed testimony from Curtis highlighting various transactions and statements contained
in the summaries. E.g., R.5175-204.
Moreover, the summaries were not cumulative. This is true even assuming that
Curtis could rely on the summaries to form his in-court conclusions. The summaries
constituted the only evidence that purported to show the actual flow and source of funds.
R.1222. Unlike the conclusion testimony of Curtis, the records were allegedly objective
and unbiased. The State recognized as much, arguing that the bank records/summaries
“don’t have a motive. Their credibility’s not at issue. [They] are cold, hard facts.”
R.5651. But without an opportunity to review the “hard facts” for themselves, jurors had
reason to be skeptical of any bald conclusions about the bank records that Curtis might
have given. Additionally, the record reveals that the summaries were available to the
jurors during deliberations. R.5668. This allowed jurors to place particular emphasis on
the summaries.
Meanwhile, the State’s case was not otherwise overwhelming. As detailed above,
the State’s remaining evidence—chiefly, the investor testimony—did not provide a
strong basis for the jury to convict. Supra pp.29-31. In fact, the jury acquitted on all theft
counts, indicating that jurors were conflicted about the State’s case. Richardson, 2013 UT
50,¶44.

it admitted the evidence under rule 703, the evidence could “only [be used] for the
purpose of assisting the jury in evaluating an expert’s opinion.” Id.
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Moreover, absent the summaries, there was evidence upon which the jury could
have acquitted. Supra pp.29-31. For instance, jurors could have doubted that Buttars
acted willfully, finding that Buttars believed all that he said; was not privy to the
utterance of any misleading predicate statements; and/or he believed that LaCount and
Gerritsen had already informed investors of all the necessary information. Id. Thus, it is
reasonably likely that but for the summaries’ admission, Buttars would have enjoyed a
more favorable result.
C. Exhibits 26-32 were inadmissible under rule 1006 because they did not prove
the content of the underlying bank records.
The summaries did not prove the content of the underlying bank records; instead,
they contained information outside of the bank records and were augmented with Statedrawn conclusions. Moreover, counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the bank
records on these grounds.
1. The summaries did not accurately prove the content of the underlying bank
records.
Rule 1006 permits summaries that “prove the content of voluminous writings,
recordings, or photographs.” Utah R. Evid.1006 (emphasis added). If the summary does
not accurately summarize the source materials, it does not “prove the content” of the
underlying evidence. Id. Moreover, only “writings, recordings, or photographs” may be
summarized; this means that a person’s personal knowledge, opinions, or theories cannot
be the subject of a rule 1006 summary. Id.; see U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n v. Scott, 673 N.W.2d
646, 655 (S.D. 2003).
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Rule 1006’s plain language, then, places several limitations on the admissibility of
summaries. To be admissible, a summary must “summarize[] the information contained
in the underlying documents accurately, correctly, and in a nonmisleading manner.” U.S.
v. Bray, 139 F.3d 1104, 1110 (6th Cir.1998). “Charts and summaries are… inadmissible
if they contain information not present in the… material on which they are based.” U.S. v.
Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 25 (1st Cir.1984), modified on other grounds by U.S. v. Piper, 35
F.3d 611 (1st Cir.1994).
Moreover, the summary must not be “embellished by or annotated with the
conclusions of or inferences drawn by the proponent.” Bray, 139 F.3d at 1110. “Care
must be taken to insure that [rule 1006] summaries accurately reflect the contents of the
underlying documents and do not function as pedagogical devices that unfairly
emphasize part of the proponent's proof or create the impression that disputed facts have
been conclusively established.” Drougas, 748 F.2d at 25.
Here, the State’s summaries did more than summarize the content of the
underlying bank records. First, Curtis compiled the summaries based on sources
extraneous to the bank record data. R.3245; see R.3015; R.6118. The court found that the
summaries “were based in part on the bank records, but they also included evidence that
[]Curtis reviewed… [like] police reports and things like that, so he had additional
information about the case.... Curtis also testified that he did some followup looking into
individual transactions.” R.3245; see also R.3015; R.6118. Moreover, the record suggests
that in creating the summaries, Curtis relied on information provided by an unidentified
Wells Fargo fraud investigator and another non-testifying witness. R.2677; see R.6125;
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St.Ex. 26. Curtis, therefore, compiled the summaries using information “not present” in
the underlying records. Drougas, 748 F.2d at 25.
Second, the record reveals that Exhibits 26-32 summarized information that did
not qualify as “writings, recordings, or photographs.” Utah R. Evid.1006. Curtis
acknowledged, for example, that he compiled the “questionable payments” portion of the
summaries based on his “involvement with the facts in the case, review of the file,
interview of some of the witnesses, including alleged victims, and [his] general
[investigation] experience.” R.3017; see R.6118; R.6121-22. Thus, the summaries were
partially based on testimonial evidence and Curtis’s personal knowledge/experience—
sources that were not the proper subject of a rule 1006 summary. Utah R. Evid.1006.
Third, the summaries were embellished with conclusions and inferences drawn by
the State. Bray, 139 F.3d at 1110. The summaries did not merely list Buttars’s various
financial transactions, but went a step further by categorizing certain payments as
“questionable” and “potential[ly] legitimate.” St.Exs.26-32. These were State-drawn
conclusions that did not prove the content of the underlying bank records. R.3017.
The summaries also concluded that Buttars “commingled” funds. St.Exs.27-31.
And commingling, Curtis later testified, was something that is characteristic of “fraud”
and “deceit.” R.5227-28. The summaries also made assumptions about which payments
constituted “investor money.” Compare St.Ex. 26 at 1 (categorizing the payments of
, and

-- -

(revealing blank “memo” lines on the

as “investor money”), with St.Ex. 32

and
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payments; a memo line

marked

” on the

“Bnf: David Buttars” on the

-

payment; and a memo line marked

payment).

In short, the summaries were based on extra-bank record information and were
embellished with the gloss of the State. The Exhibit 26-32 summaries, therefore, were
inadmissible under rule 1006.
2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the summaries on the
grounds that they did not accurately prove the content of the bank records.
“When analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [this Court] must
make two distinct determinations: (1) whether counsel's performance was deficient in that
it ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness’; and (2) whether counsel's
performance was prejudicial in that ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’”
State v. King, 2010 UT App 396,¶30.
Counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness when
it “would not have been futile to object” and this Court can “perceive no tactical reason
why such an objection was not made.” State v. Jordan, 2018 UT App 187,¶51. Moreover,
counsel performs deficiently when “there is only upside” to pursuing a legally viable
action and “no reasonable lawyer would have found an advantage” in proceeding as
counsel did. State v. Barela, 2015 UT 22,¶27.
In this case, counsel performed deficiently by failing to lodge an accuracy/contentbased objection to Exhibits 26-32 on the grounds described above. Supra §I.C.1. As
shown, the summaries did not accurately prove the content of the underlying bank
45

records, as required by rule 1006. Id. Thus, an objection in this regard “would not have
been futile.” Jordan, 2018 UT App 187,¶51.
Moreover, there is “no tactical reason why such an objection was not made.” Id.
Before trial, the defense attacked the admissibility of the bank record summaries on
multiple grounds. E.g., R.766-87, 910-61. The record thus suggests that counsel’s
objective was to exclude the bank records. Id. Failing to object on accuracy/content
grounds was inconsistent with counsel’s exclusion objective. Id. This suggests that
counsel’s failure to object was not strategy, but an oversight. Id.
The misleading summaries also put before the jury damaging, State-drawn
conclusions about disputed issues. St.Exs.26-32. An objection would have forced the
State to remove all conclusions and extra-bank record information. And an objection
would have provided jurors with an accurate understanding of the bank records’ content
and would have removed the impression that disputed evidence was conclusively proven
in the records. Under these circumstances, “there [wa]s only upside” in lodging an
accuracy/content-based objection and “no reasonable lawyer would have found an
advantage” in proceeding as counsel did. Barela, 2015 UT 22,¶27.
Moreover, it is reasonably likely that but for counsel’s failure to object, Buttars
would have enjoyed a more favorable result. As detailed above, the summaries
constituted “critical” evidence that went to all counts. Supra p.28. Furthermore, the State
relied upon the summaries to try to prove its case. Id. And, as discussed, the jury had
reason to doubt that the investors’ testimony was enough to satisfy the elements of the
offenses. Supra pp.29-31.
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The conclusions drawn by the summaries also went to key disputed issues. For
instance, the State argued that Buttars made illegitimate or “questionable” purchases and
comingled funds. St.Ex.26-32. The defense disputed this, eliciting believable evidence
that Buttars’s expenditures were legitimate business transactions. R.5248-5268, 52955307,5313-18; see, e.g., R.5521, 5295-96, Def.Exs.1,24. Yet, the summaries gave the
State an advantage by creating the impression that these “disputed facts ha[d] been
conclusively established.” Drougas, 748 F.2d at 25. Moreover, categorizing certain
payments as investor money was an assumption beneficial to the State. St.Ex.26, 32.
Indeed, this assumption fit into the State’s narrative that Buttars had a pattern of
“misusing investor funds”; substantiated its claim that Buttars engaged in a course of
conduct that operated as a fraud; and bolstered its contention that Buttars omitted to tell
investors how he used the funds of past “investors.” R.5226-29, 5610, 5654-67,5659-60.
Meanwhile, absent the summaries’ conclusions, the jury had reason to believe that
Buttars’s expenditures were legitimate and associated, for instance, with bringing the
product to market and registering the company in Nevada. Evidence showed that Buttars
did, in fact, register the company in Nevada. R.5522. Moreover, the defense elicited
testimony that bringing the product to market could involve a host of different
expenditures. R.5239-40,5256-57.
Evidence also showed that any misplaced payments could be accounted for in tax
paperwork (the State pulled Buttars’s taxes, but did not introduce them at trial or provide
them to Curtis). R.5233, 5306-08, 5317-18. And defense counsel elicited evidence that
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Buttars “was trying to do things right,” and if he made mistakes in his accounting, it was
not willful. E.g., R.5232-35, 5295-96, 5632; St.Ex.4,8,26; Def.Ex.2,4,6.
On cross-examination, defense counsel went through the various transactions in
detail, eliciting testimony that many of the payments could be proper business expenses.
R.5248-5268, 5295-5307,5313-18; see, e.g., R.5521, 5295-96, Def.Exs.1,24. This
testimony was believable too. For instance, the defense produced evidence that the
payments to Buttars’s “lawyer/ex-wife” was for relevant patent work. R.4866-67;
Def.Ex.24. Moreover, the BAC Home Loans payment was made with a check that noted
“corporate office rent” in the memo. Def.Ex.1. Indeed, evidence showed that Buttars
conducted business out of his home and had hosted business travelers at his home in the
past. R.4891-93, 4958. That Buttars paid himself a salary was also believable, given that
he had previously drawn a salary and he had the technical background necessary to
develop the product. R.4856, 4863, 4886, 4889-91, 4944, 4972, 5032. Thus, the jury
could have doubted that Buttars’s expenditures were “questionable.”
Additionally, the record suggests the summaries were available to jurors during
deliberations. R.5668. This created a danger that the State’s conclusions/assumptions
were unduly emphasized to jurors. State v. Cruz, 2016 UT App 234,¶¶35-41.
That the State did not introduce the underlying bank records made matters worse.
The summaries were admitted as substantive evidence in lieu of the bank records
themselves. This meant jurors had no way to separate argument/assumption from the
underlying content of the bank records. For all the jury knew, the underlying records
themselves—rather than the State’s expert—could have flagged the transactions as
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“questionable.” St.Ex.26-31. The State gave argument supporting this belief; it claimed
the records “don’t have a motive. Their credibility’s not at issue. [They] are cold, hard
facts.” R.6593-94. But the bank record summaries were more than just “hard facts.” They
represented the State’s conclusions and arguments about key aspects of the case—
conclusions that were disguised as substantive evidence and available to jurors
throughout deliberations. Under these circumstances, it is reasonably likely that Buttars’s
would have enjoyed a more favorable result but for counsel’s failure to object.
II.

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by proposing/allowing an
incorrect instruction on the definition of “willfulness.”
Instruction 42 incorrectly told jurors that Buttars acted willfully if he had the

conscious desire to avoid facts. Infra §II.A. Proposing/allowing this instruction
constituted deficient performance that prejudiced Buttars. Infra §§II.B-C.
A. The jury was incorrectly instructed on the definition of willfulness.
As charged, the securities fraud statute makes it unlawful for a person, “in
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security,” to directly/indirectly:
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.
Utah Code §61-1-1(2)-(3); Addendum I.
These sections “must be read in conjunction with section 61-1-21,” which
specifies “willfully” as the requisite mental state for a criminal violation. State v. Larsen,
865 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Utah 1993); Utah Code §§61-1-21(1)(a), 61-1-21(2); Addendum I.
49

Thus, to be guilty of a criminal violation of §61-1-1(2), the defendant must have
“willfully omit[ted] or misstate[d] material facts.” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360. To be guilty
of a criminal violation of §61-1-1(3), the defendant must have “willfully engag[ed] in
conduct ‘which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.’” Fibro
Trust v. Brahman Financial, 1999 UT 13,¶15.
Willfulness is a “highly culpable mental state”—the highest under Utah law
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360; Utah Code §76-2-103. “A person engages in conduct…
willfully… when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause
the result.” Id. §76-2-103(1). In the context of securities fraud, “‘[t]o act willfully…
means to act deliberately and purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or
inadvertently.’” Fibro Trust, 1999 UT 13,¶15.
“[W]illfulness ‘does not require an intent to violate the law or to injure another.’”
State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,¶13. But it is not enough to show that the defendant
ought to have been aware of the risk. See Utah Code §76-2-103(4). Nor is it enough to
show that he was aware of the risk but disregarded it. See id. §76-2-103(3). It is not even
enough to show that he was “aware that his conduct [was] reasonably certain to cause the
result.” Id. §76-2-103(2); see State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,¶36.
Rather, “the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
‘desired to engage in the conduct or cause the result.’” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1360; State v.
Martinez, 2000 UT App 320,¶12 n.5 (intent “require[s] actual knowledge… and thus
turn[s] on the defendant’s subjective mental state”), aff’d, 2002 UT 80; Silver v. Auditing
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Div., 820 P.2d 912, 915 (Utah 1991) (“The usual meaning of the term ‘intent’ is that one
must have a conscious objective… to accomplish the prohibited end.”).
Thus, under §61-1-1, the State must prove that it was the defendant’s “conscious
objective or desire to” misstate a material fact, omit a material fact necessary to complete
a misleading predicate statement, or engage in an act that operated as a fraud. Utah Code
§§61-1-1(2)-(3), 76-2-103(1); Fibro Trust, 1999 UT 13,¶15; Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358
n.3.
Here, the instructions defining willfulness were incorrect and/or misleading. The
court provided three willfulness instructions. R.1424, 1412-13; Addendum B. First, the
court gave Instruction 52, a stock instruction that included the statutory definition of
willfulness: “A person engages in conduct… willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result.” R.1424.
Second, Instruction 41, repeated the statutory definition and provided additional
State-favorable guidance:
…
A defendant acts willfully if it was his conscious objective or desire to
engage in the conduct or cause the result—not that it was the defendant’s
conscious desire or objective to violate the law, nor that the defendant knew
that he was committing fraud in the sale of the security.
R.1412.
Third, the court gave Instruction 42, an instruction drafted by defense counsel.
R.1297,1413. The first two sentences offer a general definition, stating:
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To act willfully it must be a person’s conscious objective or desire to
engage in certain conduct or cause a certain result. A person acts willfully if
he acts purposefully and not because of mistake or accident.
Id. Then, the remainder of the instruction provides a case-specific definition, which
states:
In the context of willful misstatements or omissions of material facts,
willfully implies knowledge of the falsity of the misstatements and
knowledge of the omitted facts and knowledge of the materiality of the
misstatement(s). That knowledge can be inferred if the defendant
consciously avoided the existence of a fact or facts; however, the defendant
cannot be convicted if he was merely negligent, careless or foolish. He must
have acted with the conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact
or facts.
R.1413 (emphasis added).
The italicized portion of Instruction 42 renders the definition of willfulness
incorrect and/or misleading in two fundamental ways. First, Instruction 42 incorrectly
imports conscious avoidance principles into the definition of willfulness. E.g., R.1413
(knowledge may be inferred when a “defendant consciously avoid[s] the existence of…
facts”). The conscious avoidance doctrine, a.k.a. “willful blindness,” U.S. v. Reyes, 302
F.3d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 2002), holds that “knowledge of a fact... may be found when the jury
is persuaded that the defendant consciously avoided learning [of a] fact while aware of a
high probability of its existence.” U.S. v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2003). But
in Moore, this Court held that Utah’s securities fraud statutes do not “impose criminal
liability for acts amounting to willful blindness or a violation of a duty to know.” Moore,
2015 UT App 112,¶10.
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It is worth noting that courts that have embraced this doctrine impose a far more
stringent standard than that articulated by Instruction 42. Indeed, to “give willful
blindness an appropriately limited scope that surpasses recklessness and negligence,” the
Supreme Court requires that a “defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high
probability that a fact exists.” Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 769
(2011) (emphasis added); see U.S. v. Kaiser, 609 F.3d 556, 566-67 (2d Cir. 2010). Even
the definition of recklessness contemplates awareness of a “substantial and unjustifiable”
risk that a fact exists. Utah Code §76-2-103(3). In effect, Instruction 42 supported a belief
that willfulness involved conduct that would not even amount to recklessness.
Second, the instruction misarticulated the conduct that must be the object of a
defendant’s objective/desire. R.1413. While initially stating that a defendant must act
with the objective/desire “to engage in the conduct,” Instruction 42 then went on to
erroneously identify the pertinent “conduct” as the decision to ignore facts. Id. (the
defendant “must have acted with the conscious… desire to ignore a material fact”). But
the object of the defendant’s “conscious objective or desire” is not ignorance of facts; it is
the misstatement of a material fact, the omission of a material fact necessary to complete
a misleading predicate statement, or an act that operates as a fraud. Utah Code §§61-11(2)-(3), 76-2-103(1); Fibro Trust, 1999 UT 13,¶15; Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1358 n.3.
Moreover, consciously ignoring the existence of material facts is not criminal.
There is no duty to know and no duty to disclose in the absence of a prior misleading
statement. Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶10; State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App 382,¶42. There
is a duty, however, to refrain from making misstatements and refrain from uttering half53

truths that mislead. Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3), 61-1-21. It is the willful violation of
these duties that is a crime. Id. Tethering a defendant’s objective/desire to the ignorance
of facts significantly distorted the mental state required for securities fraud.
In short, the combined effect of both of these errors was to incorrectly focus the
jury’s analysis on whether Buttars was purposeful in his ignorance. And as a result, the
instructions allowed jurors to convict based on non-criminal conduct.
The remaining instructions did not cure these errors. The jury was given the
abstract definition of willfulness. R.1413, 1424. But the challenged portion expounded
upon the general definition with an erroneous case-specific definition. R.1413. And it
was the erroneous case-specific definition that jurors would consider controlling. State v.
Reigelsperger, 2017 UT App 101,¶96 (“juries can… conclude that a general mens rea
requirement applies to all elements… except where a specific mental state is expressly
indicated” (emphasis added)).
Telling jurors they could not convict based on negligence, accident, or
carelessness did not help either. R.1413. This language had no curative value because
Instruction 42 incorrectly shifted the analysis away from whether the defendant
purposefully or accidently misstated facts, and placed the focus on whether the defendant
was purposeful or accidental in his ignorance. Id. Thus, the accident/negligence language
served only to remind jurors that a defendant cannot be guilty for accidentally or
negligently ignoring facts. Moreover, any good that came from the portion requiring
“knowledge” of the omitted facts/misstatements was immediately undone by the next

54

sentence, which instructed jurors that they could “infer[]” knowledge from conscious
avoidance. Id.
Buttars recognizes that Moore appeared to approve of the language he challenges,
stating: “Larsen requires that [the defendant’s] convictions rest on facts indicating, for
example, that he ‘made a willful misstatement or omission of a material fact’ by having
‘consciously avoided the existence of a fact or facts’ or, in other words, that [the
defendant] ‘acted with a conscious objective or desire to ignore a material fact or facts.’”
Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶17. But Moore’s language of approval may be regarded as
nonbinding dicta, Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20,¶28, as it was “not necessary to sustain
the decision” of the Moore court. E. Bench Irrigation Co. v. State, 300 P.2d 603, 606
(Utah 1956).
If the language was not dicta, then Buttars asks this Court to overrule it. Before
overruling precedent, this Court considers (1) the authority’s “persuasiveness” and the
“reasoning on which the precedent was originally based”; and (2) “how firmly the
precedent has become established.” In Interest of B.T.B., 2018 UT App 157,¶39.
Here, both factors favor disavowal. First, Moore’s conscious avoidance language
rests on tenuous legal grounds. Larsen did not—as the Moore court suggested—embrace
the conscious avoidance language. See Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355. The conscious avoidance
language appears to originate from Chapman, which merely quoted the language because
it appeared in one of the instructions given at the defendant’s trial. State v. Chapman,
2014 UT App 255,¶11. Indeed, Chapman, an insufficient evidence case, had nothing to
say about the propriety of the conscious avoidance language. Id. The challenged
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language, therefore, comes not from reasoned analysis, but from an instruction given in
Chapman.
Second, Moore’s conscious avoidance language has not become firmly entrenched
in Utah’s jurisprudence. Moore was issued fairly recently. And the conscious avoidance
language is inconsistent with other legal principles—including Moore’s own holding,
which expressly rejects willful blindness principles. 2015 UT App 112,¶10. For this
reason, it is also unlikely that many parties have relied on the language. Accordingly, this
Court should overrule Moore’s conscious avoidance language because it incorrectly
defines willfulness.
In short, the instructions in Buttars’s case did not adequately instruct jurors on the
mental state necessary to commit securities fraud.
B. Deficient performance.
Counsel performs deficiently when his “conduct f[alls] below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” State v. Ring, 2018 UT
19,¶35 (quotation marks omitted). For instance, counsel performs deficiently by failing to
object to instructions that understate the mens rea element. Barela, 2015 UT 22,¶¶26-27.
Likewise, it is deficient performance to allow instructions that “reduce the State's burden
of proof” and permit jurors to convict under “impermissible scenarios.” Grunwald, 2018
UT App 46,¶42.
Here, counsel performed deficiently by proposing the conscious
avoidance/ignorance language and allowing it to go to the jury. The defense argued that
the “case boil[ed] down to” what Buttars’s mental state was. R.5635-36, 5627, 5645-46.
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Yet, the instructions “understat[ed]” the willfulness requirement by allowing jurors to
convict based on conduct that would not even amount to recklessness. Supra pp.52-55.
Moreover, the instructions allowed jurors to convict under “impermissible scenarios.”
Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46,¶42. That is, jurors could convict if they found that Buttars
acted with an objective other than the desire to misstate a fact or omit a fact necessary to
complete a misleading predicate statement. Id. Thus, the “error[] had the effect of
reducing the State's burden of proof at trial.” 2018 UT App 46,¶42. And no reasonable
trial strategy would justify allowing an incorrect instruction that made it easier for jurors
to convict. See id.
Moore’s language of approval did not change this. 2015 UT App 112,¶17.
Counsel’s duties extend to investigating issues and performing tasks beyond the obvious.
See State v. Eyre, 2008 UT 16,¶¶11-21, 179 P.3d 792; State v. Ison, 2006 UT 26,¶32, 135
P.3d 864. Thus, counsel had a duty to investigate the soundness of the conscious
avoidance language in Moore and ensure that the incorrect language did not go to the
jury. The failure to do so was deficient performance.
If this Court determines Moore’s conscious avoidance language precludes a
showing of deficient performance, then Buttars asks this Court to reach this issue under
the exceptional circumstances doctrine.
The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a “safety device,” to assure that
“manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal.” State
v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The Utah Supreme Court, for instance, has
“employed the ‘exceptional circumstances’ rubric where… the settled interpretation of
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law colored the failure to have raised an issue.” Irwin, 924 P.2d at 10; State v. Lopez, 873
P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
Unique procedural circumstances exist here. This Court’s “interpretation of law”
in Moore was the basis for the erroneous instruction. Id.; Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶17.
Moreover, if this Court finds that Moore excused counsel’s actions, the exceptional
circumstances doctrine is Buttars’s only “safety device” for obtaining review of the
merits. Irwin, 924 P.2d at 8. As shown, the erroneous language significantly distorted the
willfulness requirement. Supra pp.52-55. Moreover, as explained below, the error
prejudiced Buttars. Infra §II.C. Failure to consider the merits of this issue would be an
“injustice” to Buttars and to future defendants whose juries are instructed using the same
erroneous language from Moore. Thus, this case is appropriate for exceptional
circumstances review.
Be it through ineffective assistance or exceptional circumstances, Buttars asks the
Court to reach the merits of this issue.
C. Prejudice.
There was a reasonable probability of a different result but for the challenged
language in Instruction 42. Supra p.45 (setting forth prejudice test). If the jury had been
properly instructed on the definition of “willfulness,” there was evidence from which
jurors could have acquitted Buttars of securities fraud. And where the instruction error
impacts the securities fraud charges, this Court should reverse on the pattern count
because it rests on the underlying securities charges. R.1411,1425-26; supra p.28.
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Moreover, the court instructed jurors that the erroneous definition of willfulness applied
to the pattern count. Id.
The defense argued that the “case boil[ed] down to… what [Buttars’s] intent was.”
R.5635-36, 5627, 5645-46. And it asked jurors to acquit because Buttars did not act
willfully. Id. There was evidence to support that claim.
The evidence was vague and inconsistent as to what, if anything, Buttars said to
the investors. Supra p.29; E.g., R.5078-81. And if he said anything, evidence showed (as
argued above) that Buttars believed everything he said, supra pp.30-31, and used investor
funds for legitimate purposes. Supra pp.47-48. Indeed, the jury acquitted on all theft
counts despite the State’s contention that Buttars was guilty of theft because he accepted
investor funds knowing that he was going to use the money differently than what he
represented to investors. R.5659-60. This suggests that jurors rejected the notion that
Buttars willfully misrepresented how he intended to use investor funds.
Moreover, as discussed, there was evidence that Buttars did not attend all the
meetings with investors. R.5118-19. And importantly, evidence showed that it was
Gerritsen and LaCount who primarily interacted with investors—investors who were
Gerritsen and LaCount’s neighbors, friends, and relatives. R.5089, 5105,5123, 5136,
5139, 5141-42; e.g., R.5139 (it was “Mark LaCount [who] told us how great the company
was” and how “our money… was going to be used”); R.5532-33 (evidence that Mother
spoke with Buttars only once at a concert).
Given this evidence, it is reasonably likely a jury could find that Buttars was not
privy to the conversation during which the predicate statements were made. They could
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also find that Buttars thought it was likely that LaCount and Gerritsen had already
informed investors of any necessary information. Such a belief was reasonable given the
relationships and dealings LaCount and Gerritsen shared with the investors. From this, a
jury could reasonably doubt that Buttars acted willfully, finding that he was unaware of
the utterance of any misstatements or misleading predicate statements.
But the instructions told jurors that it did not matter if Buttars actually knew about
the misstatements or misleading predicate statements. They could “infer[]” that
knowledge if he “consciously avoided the existence of a fact or facts.” R.1413. For
instance, the instruction permitted jurors to infer knowledge if Buttars was aware of some
possibility that LaCount made misleading omissions, but Buttars consciously chose not to
investigate his suspicions. As another example: even if jurors found that Buttars believed
that the patents were unencumbered (there was evidence of a licensing agreement
between MOVIEblitz and Ellipse), the instructions permitted a finding of guilt if Buttars
consciously ignored some remote risk that Romney might have a claim to them. R.553435, 5640. Indeed, Instruction 42 did not specify the level of risk that must be ignored
before jurors could infer knowledge. R.1413; supra p.53. Thus, this Court should reverse
on all counts because the erroneous instructions prejudiced Buttars.
III.

This Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts because the State
presented expert testimony, argument, and jury instructions that misstated
the law surrounding a defendant’s disclosure obligations under the securities
fraud statute.
When given, expert testimony, prosecutorial argument, and jury instructions must

accurately state the law. See Jordan, 2018 UT App 187,¶¶42-52; Stringham, 957 P.2d at
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607-08; State v. Bird, 2015 UT 7,¶14. Here, the State presented expert testimony,
argument, and jury instructions that misstated the law and expanded the conduct
criminalized by the securities fraud statute. To the extent counsel failed to adequately
preserve the issue, that failure constituted ineffective assistance.
A. The State presented expert testimony, argument, and jury instructions that
misstated the law.
The securities fraud statute makes it “unlawful for any person, in connection with
the []sale… of any security… to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading.” Utah Code §61-1-1(2). “‘The plain language of section 61-1-1(2)... makes
no mention of an affirmative duty to disclose in the absence of a prior[, misleading]
statement.’” Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶10. Rather, a defendant has a duty to disclose or
“not omit” only when (1) a predicate statement was made, (2) the predicate statement was
misleading, and (3) the omitted statement was material. Id.; Utah Code §61-1-1(2).
Here, erroneous expert testimony, prosecutorial argument, and jury instructions
suggested that the law imposed an affirmative duty to disclose material information—
even in the absence of a prior misleading statement. The misstatements began with
Lloyd, the State’s securities expert, who gave “legal conclusion[s]” that were “wrong.”
Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607. Lloyd testified, for instance, that “federal and state securities
laws operate under the presumption that a seller of securities has an obligation to make
disclosure[s] so that a purchaser can assess” her purchase. R.4826; Addendum E; see also
R.5468-69 (Lloyd referencing “the fundamental obligations that are established under
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law with respect to disclosure”); accord R.4827-38, 4843, 5468-69. Later in Lloyd’s
testimony, he discussed the “obligation not to omit material information… [and] engage
in deceit. Those… are established by statute.” R.4844.
Then in closing, the prosecutor made further misstatements, arguing that “the
securities industry and the law, it all requires the seller to be up front, to make full
disclosures about information that the average reasonable investor would want to know.
And that's contained in the jury instructions.” R.5611; Addendum F. Thus, Lloyd and the
prosecutor incorrectly suggested that the law imposed an affirmative duty to disclose or
“not[] omit” material information.
Further, the State-proposed Instruction 47 said that
…Even if the Defendant(s) had an honest belief that an event would
occur in the future or made a good faith effort to bring about the future
event, he is still not permitted to make a willful misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact.
Therefore, to the extent that there exists any such belief that the plan
will succeed, that belief does not constitute a defense to the crimes alleged
if you find that the defendant has engage in willful material misstatements
or omissions.
R.1419; Addendum B.
Like Lloyd and the prosecutor, Instruction 47 erroneously told jurors that a
defendant is “not permitted to make[] willful… omission[s] of[] material fact.” Id. The
instruction then went further, incorrectly stating that a finding of “willful material…
omissions” meant that it did not matter if Buttars believed what he said about future
events—“that belief did not constitute a defense.” Id. But such a “belief d[id] not
constitute a defense” only if Buttars willfully violated the securities fraud statute by
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misstating or omitting material facts necessary to correct a misleading predicate
statement. Utah Code §61-1-1(2). Indeed, if Buttars genuinely believed in his forwardlooking statements, that could be a defense to the crimes—specifically, to the allegation
that Buttars uttered misstatements. E.g., SEC v. Ustian, 229 F.Supp. 3d 739 (N.D Ill.
2017) (“future hopes are generally not actionable if they are based on a genuine belief”);
accord Greenberg v. Crossroads, 364 F.3d 657, 670 (5th Cir. 2004). The instruction,
therefore, misstated the law and effect of violating a duty to disclose.
In short, the legal misstatements of Lloyd, the prosecutor, and Instruction 47
suggested that the law imposed an affirmative duty to disclose material information—a
violation of which rendered a defendant’s genuine beliefs in his statements “not [] a
defense.” In turn, the misstatements expanded the conduct criminalized by the securities
fraud statute, thereby reducing the State’s burden of proof. Moreover, these
misstatements prejudiced Buttars. Infra pp.65-66.
B. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance to the extent counsel did not
adequately preserve this issue.
Counsel objected to Instruction 47, but did not object to the misstatements of
Lloyd or the prosecutor. R.4124-26. The court ruled that the instruction was
“appropriate” and gave it over defense counsel’s objection. Id. Buttars preserved an
objection to Instruction 47 because the trial court had the opportunity to rule—and did in
fact rule—on the instruction’s propriety. See Fort Pierce Indus. Park v. Shakespeare,
2016 UT 28,¶13; Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68,¶12.
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This Court may review the misstatements of Lloyd and the prosecutor for
ineffective assistance. Supra p.45 (setting forth ineffective assistance test). Likewise, if
this Court believes that counsel’s objection to Instruction 47 did not preserve the issue,
the failure to properly preserve the issue constituted ineffective assistance. State v.
Larrabee, 2013 UT 70,¶26 (performance deficient because, by failing to object, counsel
“failed to preserve the issue”).
First, counsel performed deficiently by failing to adequately object to the
misstatements. As shown, Lloyd, the prosecutor, and Instruction 47 misstated the law,
supra §III.A; thus, a proper objection to these misstatements would have been well-taken.
Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶10; see Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46,¶42. Moreover, there
“was no conceivable tactical benefit” for counsel to allow expert testimony, argument,
and instructions that departed from “the narrow way in which Utah courts have
interpreted the applicable [securities] statute.” State v. Lewis, 2014 UT App 241,¶13; see
Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶¶6-14; Johnson, 2009 UT App 382,¶42. Indeed, the
misstatements suggested that the law prohibited conduct that was not criminal, thereby
understating the State’s burden of proof. Supra §III.A There is no conceivable tactical
basis for suggesting to the jury that the State’s burden was lower than it actually was.
Grunwald, 2018 UT App 46,¶42.
Likewise, with respect to Instruction 47, the record suggests that counsel’s goal
was to preserve the issue for appeal and prevent the instruction from going to the jury.
R.4124-26. Failing to lodge a specific objection on the record was inconsistent with these
goals. Id. This suggests that counsel’s failure to properly object was not strategy, but an
64

oversight. Id; State v. Moritzsky, 771 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Utah Ct.App. 1989) (counsel
performed deficiently when he “overlooked” the statutory presumption by failing to
check the pocket-part). Accordingly, counsel performed deficiently by failing to
adequately object to the misstatements of Lloyd, the prosecutor, and Instruction 47.
Second, these misstatements prejudiced Buttars, both individually and
cumulatively. The misstatements negatively impacted the elements of securities fraud,
supra §III.A, which in turn, negatively impacted the pattern count as well. R.1411, 142526 (instructions telling jurors that the securities fraud counts were “unlawful” acts upon
which the pattern count could rest). R.1411, 1425-26.
Absent the misstatements, there was evidence from which jurors could have
concluded that Buttars was innocent because he believed all that he said, supra pp.30-31;
was unaware of the utterance of any prior misleading predicate statements, supra pp.2930; and/or he did not misuse investor funds. Supra pp.47-48. But the misstatements told
jurors that none of this mattered if they found that Buttars willfully omitted material
facts—facts that he allegedly had a statutory obligation to disclose. R.1419, 4844, 5611.
True, the elements instructions correctly stated the actus reus for securities fraud.
E.g., R.1409. But the jury was not given a way to reconcile the elements instructions with
Instruction 47, which stated that Buttars was “not permitted to make a willful…
omission[s] of[] material fact.” R.1419; Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985)
(“contradict[ory]” language does not absolve an instructional infirmity); accord State v.
Campos, 2013 UT App 213,¶43. Nor did the elements instruction cure Instruction 47’s
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assertion that Buttars’s genuine beliefs did not matter if he made “willful… omission[s]
of[] material fact.” R.1419.
Moreover, the notion that Buttars had a duty to disclose was reinforced at all
stages of the trial. It was reinforced by Lloyd’s expert testimony, e.g., R.4844; Curtis’s
expert testimony, e.g., R.5227-28, 5423-39; the prosecutor’s argument, R.5611; and in
the jury instructions. R.1419. Standing alone, each misstatement caused prejudice, which
was exacerbated—not cured—by additional misstatements. Thus, the misstatements
individually and cumulatively undermine confidence in the fairness of Buttars’s trial.
IV.

This Court should grant Buttars a new trial on all counts because the State’s
experts gave testimony that violated rules 702, 704, and 403.
“In general, the admissibility and limits of expert testimony are governed by rules

701 through 704.” Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. Rule 702 provides that “a witness who is
qualified as an expert… may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Utah R. Evid. 702; Addendum I.
“Under rule 702, the question that must be posed prior to the admission of any expert
evidence is whether, ‘on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact.’”
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361. “In determining ‘helpfulness,’ the []court must first decide
whether the subject is within the knowledge or experience of the average individual.” Id.
Another “integral element of a rule 702 determination to admit expert evidence is
a balancing of the probativeness of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice.”

66

Id. at 1363 n.12. “This balancing mimics that under rule 403 and is necessary to a
determination of ‘helpfulness.’” Id.; Utah R. Evid. 403.
Under rule 704, “[a]n opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an
ultimate issue.” Utah R. Evid. 704(a); Addendum I. But there “are limits on an expert’s
license to testify as to the legal meaning of a statute.” State v. Johnson, 2009 UT App
382,¶37 n.14. Moreover, “opinions that ‘“tell the jury what result to reach”’ or ‘“give
legal conclusions”’ [are] impermissible.” Davis, 2007 UT App 13,¶15.
For instance, in State v. Tenney, it was plain error to allow the experts to testify
“that the buy-back agreements were securities,” “that certain information was material,”
and “that failure to disclose certain enumerated information would be a material
omission.” Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Similarly, in Stringham, it
was improper for a prosecutor to present a hypothetical “consisting of the exact actions of
which defendant was accused” and ask the expert to opine on “whether these actions
were illegal.” Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607, 607 n.15, 611. Conversely, in Larsen, the use
of the term “material” was not “an inadmissible legal conclusion” because the expert did
not use the term in its legal sense. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-63. Nevertheless, an
objection under rule 403—which allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence when “its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of… unfair prejudice,” Utah R.
Evid. 403; Addendum I—“might have merited serious consideration.” Larsen, 865 P.2d
at 1363 n.12.
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Here, Lloyd’s testimony violated Rules 702 and 704. Infra §III.A. Curtis also gave
improper testimony that violated rules 702, 704, and 403. Infra §III.B. Moreover,
admission of this testimony was prejudicial. Infra §III.C.
A. Lloyd’s testimony violated rules 702 and 704.
In addition to erroneously telling jurors that defendants have a statutory
“obligation not to omit material information,” R.4844; supra §III.A, Lloyd violated rules
702 and 704 when he used the legal term “material” and provided case-specific examples
of material information. See Addendum E (Lloyd’s testimony).
Unlike in Larsen, Lloyd did not use the term “material” in its non-legal sense;
rather, as in Tenney, he used it in its legal sense. Compare Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756; with
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-63. Specifically Lloyd testified that the definition of “material
information would be [] information that’s important to an investor making a decision.”
R.4838; see also R.4830. Thus, the testimony was inadmissible because it “state[d] legal
conclusions.” Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756.
Moreover, Lloyd’s examples of material information mirrored the State’s
allegations. R.4838-39. Lloyd said that “material information” “would include” (1)
“information about the management” including “who is running this enterprise, what’s
their background, what’s their experience, have the ever been involved in… inappropriate
activity.” R.4838. He also listed that it could involve (2) “financial information about the
enterprise” including whether the “financial assets are sufficient to conduct operations”;
(3) “what are the risks of the business”; and (4) information about “the underlying assets
of the business.” R.4838-39. As in Stringham, Lloyd’s examples mirrored the
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information the State faulted Buttars for not disclosing. Compare Stringham, 957 P.2d at
607, 611.
The trial court appeared to determine that Lloyd could give a definition and
examples of material information provided the testimony comported with Moore, 2015
UT App 112. R.4836-37. But as counsel pointed out, the portion of Moore discussing
expert testimony was “not a majority” opinion. R.4837; Moore, 2015 UT App 112,¶27 &
n.4. And even if it was, Lloyd’s testimony ran afoul of Moore by offering certain
examples that “explicitly mirror[ed] the State's allegations.” 2015 UT App 112,¶27.
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Chapman, where the expert merely
gave “some examples” of information he believed was important “[f]or a purchaser… to
make an intelligent investment decision.” 2014 UT App 255,¶21. Here, by contrast,
Lloyd gave a legal definition “material” that was immediately followed by a list of
information that “would” and could be “material.” R.4838-39.
Nor did the court adequately consider whether the opinion testimony helped
jurors. As counsel argued, the materiality question was “squarely within the layman’s
understanding.” R.4827. It is well within the experience of jurors to know the type of
information that would likely influence a reasonable investor. Chapman, 2014 UT App
255,¶32 (Pearce, concurring). This is particularly true in Buttars’s case, which involved a
start-up company with investments made by lay-individuals much like the jurors
themselves. Lloyd’s testimony evidences the lack of complexity. Id. Indeed, Lloyd
“simply listed categories of information,” failing “to explain why such information would
be important to an investor.” Id.; R.4838-39. Lloyd may not have explained his
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conclusions “because they needed no explanation.” Id.¶33. Under these circumstances,
Lloyd’s opinion testimony was not helpful to the jury.
Thus, the testimony was inadmissible under rules 702 and 704 because it “state[d]
legal conclusions,” Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756; it gave “an opinion as to whether [actions
like Buttars’s] actions were illegal,” Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607-08; and it did not help
jurors. Chapman, 2014 UT App 255,¶33 (Pearce, concurring).
B. Curtis’s testimony violated rules 702, 704, and 403.
Curtis gave unhelpful and prejudicial testimony that stated legal conclusions and
opined on the legality of Buttars’s conduct. Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756; Stringham, 957 P.2d
at 607-08. Specifically, Curtis testified:
Prosecutor: You indicated that you have particular experience
investigating and analyzing records of companies or individuals alleged to
have engaged in fraud, deceit, or theft? Is that correct?
Curtis: Yes. That's right.
Prosecutor: In your experience, and based on your practice, are there
certain characteristics that you look for in analyzing a business or an
individual to determine fraud, deceit, or theft?
Curtis: Yes.
Prosecutor: Can you briefly explain what those characteristics are in
general?
Curtis:…As it relates to investment fraud, there would be things like…
financial statement misrepresentations, or misrepresentations of how the
money's being used, or failure to disclose material information, or that
could be omissions. So, if the party has knowledge of material information
and does not disclose that to investors, that's important. Disregard for
corporate formalities. That's where corporations--business and personal
could be commingled and confused…. A business being dependent on
investor money. Investor money not being used for the stated purpose that's
stated to investors, it's used for other purposes or unauthorized purposes….
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Prosecutor: After reviewing the financial records associated with this case,
and after listening to the testimony of this trial, based on generally accepted
accounting practices, do you… see any of these characteristics present in
this case?
Curtis: Yes.
Prosecutor: And which ones, in your opinion?
Curtis: Right. I see characteristics of misrepresentations and omissions, of
investor money not being used for the stated purpose, of inadequate
capitalization or lack of capital to operate the business. Those are the main
ones that come to mind. And dependence on investor money, obviously.
R.5227-28; Addendum D.
This testimony was improper. First, Curtis incorporated the legal terms “fraud,
deceit, or theft” into his conclusion testimony. Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3). The
prosecutor framed his question in terms of those “alleged to have engaged in fraud,
deceit, or theft.” R.5227-28 (emphasis added). From this, it is evident that the terms
“fraud, deceit, or theft” were being used in reference to the statutory crimes that Buttars
was “alleged to have engaged in.” Id. Thus, as in Tenney, the terms were used in their
legal sense. Compare Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756; with Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-63.
Curtis further offered his legal interpretation of these terms by providing casespecific examples of “characteristics” used “to determine” fraud, deceit, or theft. R.522728. Most—if not all—of the examples closely mirrored the allegations. E.g., R.5227-28
(“misrepresentations of how… money's being used”). Curtis then opined that these
“characteristics” were present in Buttars’s case. Id. In effect, the testimony told jurors
that there were characteristics of legal fraud, deceit, and theft in Buttars’s case. While the
testimony fell short of opining that Buttars was guilty of fraud, saying that there are
“characteristics” of fraud implies the presence of at least some of the legal elements of
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fraud. Id. Indeed, “characteristic” is a synonym of “element.”8 And Curtis testified he
observed “omissions” and “misrepresentations”—both of which constitute elements of
securities fraud. Id. Utah Code §61-1-1(2).
The court reasoned the testimony was appropriate provided Curtis did not testify
to the requirements of “Utah law.” R.5223-24; Addendum D. But jurors would have
known that Curtis was drawing conclusions about legal fraud/deceit even if without an
explicit reference to “Utah law.” As explained, the terms “fraud, deceit, and theft” were
used in reference to the statutory crimes Buttars was “alleged to have engaged in.”
R.5227-28. Moreover, Curtis offered no explanation regarding an alternative meaning of
the terms. Id. Even Larsen, which the prosecution used to support its arguments, frowned
upon testimony drawing upon statutory language. Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361-63 & n.3.
The court, therefore, was incorrect.
But even if testimony passes muster provided no reference to “Utah law” is made,
the court did not fully consider the testimony’s helpfulness or admissibility under rule
403. The testimony’s probative value was minimal. Indeed, Curtis had already testified
about troubling charges and “red flags” in Buttars’s financials. R.5199, 5204, 5207,
5180-82, 5185, 5195, 5199-5200. There was little need for further conclusion
testimony—particularly opinion testimony that drew upon the statutory language of
securities fraud.

8

https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/thesaurus/characteristic.
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deceit. The sequencing of the prosecutor’s questions and the use of statutory terms
supported this belief. R.5227-28. Moreover, Curtis’s testimony tended to “‘blur the
separate and distinct responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness,’” and created a
danger that the jurors might “‘turn to [Curtis] rather than the judge for guidance on the…
law.’” Id.; Johnson, 2009 UT App 382,¶37 n.14. Thus, this Court should reverse because
Curtis’s testimony would not help the trier of fact, as required by rule 702; was unduly
prejudicial under rule 403; and stated legal conclusions in violation of rules 702 and 704.
C. Prejudice.
An appellate court must “‘overturn a jury verdict for the admission of improper
evidence’” whenever the evidence reasonably affected “‘the likelihood of a different
verdict.’” State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184,¶34. In this case, there was a reasonable
probability of a different result but for Lloyd and/or Curtis’s improper expert testimony.
Considered individually and cumulatively, Lloyd and/or Curtis’s testimony
negatively impacted the elements of securities fraud. See Utah Code §§61-1-1(2)-(3), 611-21. Because the testimony affected the securities fraud charges, this Court should
reverse on the pattern count as well. R.1411, 1425-26; supra p.28.
Lloyd and Curtis told jurors what result to reach, used statutory terms that
constituted elements of the offense, and opined that those elements or “characteristics”
were present in Buttars’s case. Supra §IV.A-B. Given the complexity of securities law,
Lloyd and Curtis’s conclusions would have been especially persuasive. See Larsen, 865
P.2d at 1361. “[T]here is a danger” that jurors relied on the experts’ expertise rather than
studying the instructions and reaching their own conclusions. Davis, 2007 UT App
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13,¶15. There is also a danger that jurors deferred to Lloyd and Curtis’s expertise even if
they were inclined to believe differently. See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361.
Absent Lloyd and/or Curtis’s testimony, the jury had reason to doubt that Buttars
was guilty of securities fraud. There was evidence from which the jury could have
concluded that Buttars was innocent because: (1) no misleading predicate statements
were uttered, or if they were uttered, Buttars was unaware of them, see supra pp.29-30;
(2) Buttars believed all that he said, see supra pp.30-31; and (3) Buttars did not engage in
a pattern of misusing investor funds. See supra pp.47-48. Absent Lloyd’s testimony, a
jury could also doubt the materiality of Lloyd’s list of allegedly material information. For
instance, a jury could doubt the importance of management’s prior, “inappropriate
activity” where the activity had no bearing on the success of the company. R.4848.
Moreover, Curtis and/or Lloyd’s testimony “could easily have misled the jury”
into convicting based on non-criminal conduct. Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607-08. Through
their use of statutory terminology, Curtis and Lloyd erroneously led jurors to believe
that—notwithstanding the utterance of a prior misleading statement—the fraud statute
condemned the “failure to disclose” the broad list of “material” information identified by
Lloyd. R.4838-39, 5227-28; see R.5227-28 (Curtis identifying the “failure to disclose
material information, or… omissions” as a characteristic of “fraud” and identifying
“omissions” as one of the characteristics of “fraud” that he observed in Buttars’s case).
From this, the jury could have believed, for instance, that Buttars was guilty
simply because he did not disclose otherwise doubtfully relevant/material information
about late payments on his personal credit card. R.4838-39 (Lloyd defining material to
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broadly include “information about the management” of the company). Curtis’s
testimony further supported such a belief, stating that Buttars’s personal state of financial
distress “would be a significant disclosure to investors.” R.5423-39; St.Exs.39-40.
Moreover, as explained, the instructions reinforced rather than corrected this erroneous
impression. Supra pp.65-66.
Considered individually and cumulatively, it is reasonably likely that Buttars
would have enjoyed a more favorable result but for the improper expert testimony.
V.

Cumulative error requires reversal.
Considering “‘all the identified errors’” addressed above, “‘as well as any other

errors [this Court] assume[s] may have occurred,’” this Court should reverse because
“‘“the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines [] confidence… that a fair trial
was had.”’” State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35,¶25.
Here, the improper expert testimony, prosecutorial argument, and instructions
worked to increase the likelihood that the jury convicted based on non-criminal conduct.
Supra §§II-IV. Curtis and Lloyd’s expert testimony, Instruction 47, and the prosecutor’s
argument allowed jurors to convict Buttars for violating an affirmative duty to disclose—
a duty that does not exist under the securities fraud statute. Supra §III-IV. Meanwhile,
Instruction 42 provided an incorrect definition of willfulness that expanded the conduct
criminalized by the securities fraud statute. Supra §II. And Instruction 47 similarly
impacted the mental state requirement by incorrectly describing a scenario where
Buttars’s genuine beliefs did not matter. Supra §III.A.
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: January 26, 2017
At the direction of:
09:59:00 AM
/s/ Vernice Trease
District Court Judge
by
/s/ REBECCA FAATAU
District Court Clerk
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID BRUCE BUTTARS,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
Case No: 131901512 FS
Judge:
VERNICE TREASE
Date:
January 26, 2017

______________________________________________________________________________________
PRESENT
Clerk:
rebeccaf
Prosecutor: MICHAEL D PALUMBO
JACOB S TAYLOR
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): ROBERT B CUMMINGS
CARA M TANGARO
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 29, 1960
Sheriff Office#: 344819
Audio
Tape Number:
W45
Tape Count: 9.05-9.53

CHARGES
1. SECURITIES FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 09/28/2016 Guilty
3. SECURITIES FRAUD - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 09/28/2016 Guilty
5. SECURITIES FRAUD (amended) - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 09/28/2016 Guilty
7. SECURITIES FRAUD (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 09/28/2016 Guilty
9. PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY (amended) - 2nd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 09/28/2016 Guilty

HEARING
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Case No: 131901512 Date:
Jan 26, 2017
______________________________________________________________________________________

Ms. Tangaro enters objections and arguments for objections of PSR into the record.
Mr. Taylor enters arguments in favor of PSR recommendations into the record.
The Court enters sentence.
The Court orders the defendant to pay full restitution on all counts.
file an order of restitution with the Court.

The State will

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 3rd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah
State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY a 2nd Degree Felony,
the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more
than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.
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SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Commitment and charges to run concurrent to any other commitment.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Defendant is taken forthwith to begin serving commitment.
amounts to be paid through the Board of Pardons.

Any and all restitution

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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ADDENDUM D

1
2

Q.

Is that based on what you determined were --

appeared to be investor payments?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

And looking at this, and taking into account

5

all the other information you've heard in this case, have

6

you attended the trial throughout its beginning

7

yesterday?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

Or from its beginning?

Taking into account

10

-- and let me also ask, have you reviewed any other

11

documents in your preparation for performing these

12

analyses and testifying?

13

A.

Yes, I've received some -- reviewed some of

14

the case file from the investigation that the state

15

performed.

16

with some of the -- the management of the company, and

17

yeah, I heard the evidence and the testimony today and

18

yesterday.

I've participated in a couple of interviews

19

MR. TAYLOR:

20

Q.

Let me have a moment, Your Honor.

So, Mr. Curtis, you've indicated that you

21

have particular experience investigating and analyzing

22

records of companies and individuals -- of companies and

23

individuals alleged to have engaged in fraud, theft,

24

things like that.

25

A.

Is that accurate -- is that correct?

Yes.
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Q.

1

So, in your experience, are there certain

2

characteristics that you look for?

And I -- you may have

3

talked about some of these, but are there certain

4

characteristics that you look for in analyzing a business

5

or an individual to determine fraud, or theft, or deceit?

6

MR. CUMMINGS:

Your Honor, may we approach?

7

THE COURT:

8

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows).

9

MR. CUMMINGS:

Yes.

This is going to be the same, Your

10

Honor.

11

characteristics track closely to this case, and

12

especially after he laid out all the evidence, and then

13

he asked what characteristics, he's going to go over what

14

the characteristics were as to what the evidence just

15

said.

16

the jury.

17

Same issue as Mr. Lloyd.

Whether the

I think that's highly prejudicial, and also for

MR. TAYLOR:

He's giving his opinion as to what

18

characteristics of financial fraud are.

19

-- as an expert, he's qualified to do that.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. CUMMINGS:

I mean, that's

Go ahead.
I was going to say, if you go back

22

to the Moore case, though, what concerned at least one

23

judge on the Court of Appeals there, was that the

24

characteristics track too closely to the case.

25

THE COURT:

Is that the concurrent opinion?
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1

MR. CUMMINGS:

Well, it was the -- it was the

2

opinion of the Court that wasn't joined by the two other

3

judges.

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. CUMMINGS:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. TAYLOR:

8
9

Okay.

So --

So --

Yeah.
And I'm not asking him to talk -- I'm

asking him in general right now.
THE COURT:

10

MR. TAYLOR:

11

THE COURT:

Mm-hmm.
And if I recall -Yeah.

The case law says you can ask

12

generally, but you can't tie it specifically to the case.

13

It's part of why I changed my mind on the objection to

14

the material omission because it seemed to me that the

15

case law says that you can't tie it to the case, you

16

can't say that, pursuant to Utah law, these are the

17

things --

18

MR. TAYLOR:

19

THE COURT:

Right.
But a witness can testify generally --

20

an expert witness can testify generally as to things he

21

looks for, or, you know, things of that nature, as long

22

as it's not tied to this case.

23

ask generally what characteristics somebody looks for in

24

the -- in the industry, and so forth, I think that was

25

the testimony that the Court of Appeals -- and I can't

So, if you're going to
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1

remember if it's the Davis case, or Judge Greeley had

2

said was okay.

3

this case, here is what I saw.

4

But you cannot say, based on my review in

MR. CUMMINGS:

And that's where that question was

5

going.

6

testimony, you've heard all the evidence, we just

7

reviewed all the bank records.

8

look for?

9

Because he said, you sat through all the

THE COURT:

Generally, what do you

Mm-hmm.

10

MR. CUMMINGS:

11

MR. TAYLOR:

It's tied directly to the case.
I can rephrase that question.

I can

12

say, based on your experience, in your profession in

13

general, what are -- what are characteristics of

14

financial fraud?

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, you need to make sure that

16

the witness does not say, "well, in this case here's what

17

I saw.".

18

MR. TAYLOR:

19

THE COURT:

Yeah.
He can testify generally in the

20

industry the things that are looked for, or that somebody

21

looks for in his position, when he's analyzing, you know,

22

in general cases.

23

can't say," well, in this case, here's what I saw."

24
25

He can testify about that.

MR. CUMMINGS:

But he

I would still like to lodge an

objection that, at this juncture in the direct
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1

examination, there's no way to have this untethered from

2

the case, after he's laid out all the evidence --

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. CUMMINGS:

5

Well, he can --- gone through all the exhibits,

so...

6

THE COURT:

-- he can testify about things that

7

were red flags to him.

8

MR. CUMMINGS:

9

THE COURT:

Sure.

That's what he's testified to --

10

MR. CUMMINGS:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. CUMMINGS:

Sure. And he -- and he has.

--thus far.
But now on a summation saying, what

13

do you look for in fraud, I -- I, just at this point, I

14

would like to lodge the objection.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. CUMMINGS:

17

Okay.
You can, of course, overrule it,

but --

18

THE COURT:

So -- so, your objection is sustained

19

as to anything -- if the intent was to get him to go

20

through this case and say, what's fraudulent in this

21

case.

22

MR. TAYLOR:

Well, he can opine as to whether there

23

are characteristics of financial fraud in this case.

24

mean, he's allowed to do that under Rule 704.

25

testimony -- expert testimony that embraces the ultimate

I

His
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1
2

issue.
THE COURT:

So, this is the part of the law that I

3

think is sometimes confusing to lawyers, and I don't

4

profess to be the person that knows this, but as a

5

general proposition, a witness -- and I think Moore and

6

Chapman say that an expert witness, in certain

7

circumstances, can give their opinion about the ultimate

8

issue in a case.

9

they can't.

10

But there are some situations where

And if I'm going to err on the side of not creating

11

an issue for appeal, it would be, you get where you want

12

to go by having the witness testify about what

13

characteristics of fraud that he looks for generally,

14

rather than having him say, you know, here's what I saw

15

was fraud in this case.

16

MR. TAYLOR:

Well, it -- in that case, Your Honor,

17

what I'll do is I'll ask him, in general, based on his

18

practice and his knowledge of --

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. TAYLOR:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. TAYLOR:

Right.
-- of forensic accounting -Mm-hmm.
-- what are some characteristics of

23

financial fraud?

24

the Court's ruling, I'm -- I'm just -- I'll have to leave

25

it at that.

And then I guess the Court's -- under

210

05215

1

THE COURT:

Well, and then you can argue it.
Right?

You

2

can argue it to the jury.

3

case law that identifies what -- that says a witness --

4

an expert witness in this situation can say, well, here's

5

the fraudulent things that I saw in this case?

6

MR. TAYLOR:

7

THE COURT:

8

(Inaudible conversation).

9

MR. TAYLOR:

But I -- is there any

If I could have a second, Your Honor?
Okay.

Judge, our understanding of case law

10

is that this is territory we can get into, and I would

11

cite the Larsen decision from 1993.

12

where a securities expert testified, and I believe the

13

Utah Supreme Court held that the securities expert could

14

opine as to whether the -- the alleged material --

15

omissions were material -- would be material or important

16

to the average investor.

17

Now, that was a case

And in addition to that, the Chapman case, we

18

believe, is actually supportive of us, and if the

19

don't mean to ask for a recess, but if the Court wanted

20

to review that, I believe that there's a part of that

21

decision --

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. TAYLOR:

24
25

-- I

There is.
Well, I believe that there's a part of

that decision which says that -THE COURT:

Yeah, and that's why I say, to talk -211

05216

1

let's give the jury a recess and we can talk about this--

2

MR. TAYLOR:

Okay.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. TAYLOR:

5

(End of sidebar).

6

THE COURT:

-- at length.

Okay?

Okay.

Members of the jury, we're going to

7

take about a five or 10-minute recess.

8

talk about the case.

9

things on the record.

Please do not

We just need the time to put some

10

Raine?

11

(Whereupon the jury left the courtroom).

12

THE COURT:

13
14

Please be seated.

All members of the

jury have now left the courtroom.
The discussion regarding the question asked of Mr.

15

Curtis is -- at sidebar is on the record, and I asked the

16

jury to step outside so that we can talk about this more

17

thoroughly rather than on the record.

18

identified State V. Larsen and State v. Chapman.

19

me read this part of Chapman which, again, is what I had

20

indicated to the parties at sidebar.

21

The state has
And let

There are certain things that, under State v.

22

Chapman, an expert witness can testify about.

23

fact, State v. Chapman says, quote, an expert witness may

24

testify in the form of an opinion, and can opine on an

25

ultimate issue at trial, so long as that testimony is

And in
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1

otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence.

2

And then it -- well, and the next -- and then it

3

cites Rule 704.

And then it goes on and says, 'an

4

opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an

5

ultimate issue.

6

permissible testimony when the witness's legal

7

conclusions blur the separate and distinct

8

responsibilities of the judge, jury, and witness, or

9

there is a danger that the juror may turn to the

An expert witness exceeds the scope of

10

witness's legal conclusion rather than judge for guidance

11

on the applicable law.'

12

So, and I'll read the next sentence, because I

13

think it demonstrates why we are struggling with this

14

issue.

15

The case says, 'no bright line separates

16

permissible ultimate issue testimony under Rule 704, and

17

impermissible overbroad legal responses a witness may

18

give during questioning, and the trial court has wide

19

discretion in determining the admissibility of expert

20

testimony.'

21

So, as I indicated to counsel at sidebar, there is

22

no complete exclusion of an expert witness from

23

testifying or giving an opinion, or opining on the -- on

24

an ultimate issue at trial.

25

says.

And that's what the case law

The -- but there are cases, there are situations
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1

where I think the -- the expert witness can overstep

2

their bounds and takes away the determination from the

3

jury as to the ultimate issue at hand.

4

case, or when that is the case, the trial court should

5

not allow the witness to give their opinion about certain

6

things.

7

from the jury, or the finder of fact, their

8

responsibility of making the ultimate determinations in

9

this case.

10

And if that's the

If it appears that that is going to take away

Okay.

So, the objection has been made by Mr.

11

Cummings.

12

is, and exactly what question, and what you are seeking

13

from the witness, and then I'll hear from Mr. Cummings

14

and make a ruling.

15

Let me hear, Mr. Taylor, what your position

MR. TAYLOR:

First, the question that I'm asking

16

Mr. Curtis is, in his experience, if there are certain

17

characteristics that he looks for in analyzing a business

18

or an individual to determine fraud, deceit, or theft.

19

And I could rephrase that to make it clear that I'm

20

asking based on his experience, his knowledge, and -- as

21

a forensic accountant, to explain what those

22

characteristics are.

23

of certain characteristics.

24

activity is dependant on outside investor money --

25

investor money not used for its stated purpose, business

I believe he would give off a list
For example, business
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enterprise lacks profits sufficient to provide the

2

promised returns to investors, high rates of return

3

relative to the promoted investment risk, business

4

experiences -- that the business experiences increasing

5

insolvency, and preferential treatment to certain

6

investors, disregard to corporate formalities.

7

characteristics of financial fraud that he would outline

8

or list.

9

Those are

And then I would ask him, after reviewing the

10

financial records associated with this case, and

11

listening to the testimony at trial -- and perhaps I

12

should've asked this later -- but based on generally

13

accepted accounting practices, do you see any of these

14

characteristics present in this case?

15

him to identify any such characteristics that he -- that

16

he has observed in this case.

17

had an opinion as to whether the defendants engaged in

18

the course of business which operated as a fraud, deceit,

19

or theft.

And I would ask

And I would ask him if he

20

I would ask him, what is your opinion?

21

believe that he would testify that he does see what

22

appear to be the characteristics of financial fraud, and

23

he would outline which ones he sees.

24

THE COURT:

25

Mr. Cummings.

And I

Okay.
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1

MR. CUMMINGS:

2

testified to most of that.

3

multiple times.

4

troubling.

5

what the summaries elicit, what the charges -- what he

6

believes the charges reflect.

7

I think the witness has already
He's used the term red flag

He's said that certain charges are

And so, he's given an expert opinion as to

And in Moore, I think this is important, as the

8

Court has said, an expert witness can tie their opinion

9

-- can't tie their opinion to law -- to the law -- to

10

Utah law, but can embrace an ultimate conclusion, but at

11

the end of this paragraph 22, the court says, 'other

12

jurisdictions have determined that expert witness

13

testimony that encompasses an ultimate issue is generally

14

admissible when it alludes to an inference that the trier

15

of facts should make, or uses a term that has both a lay

16

factual meaning and a legal meaning, and it's clear that

17

the witness is using only the factual term.

18

And in here, the -- it's the legal meaning of

19

fraud.

20

indicia of an enterprise running in a fraudulent manner.

21

I believe that the accounting expert, Mr. Curtis, has

22

laid out all the information, and the jury needs to draw

23

that final inference of whether it constitutes legal

24

fraud.

25

This is indicia of accounting fraud, this is

THE COURT:

Okay.
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1

MR. TAYLOR:

And --

2

MR. CUMMINGS:

And I would also say it's

3

prejudicial under 403 considering the sequencing of the

4

questions and where we're at in questioning.

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. TAYLOR:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. TAYLOR:

9

Okay.
If I may, Your Honor?
Sure.
My recollection of the Moore opinion

is that the witness cannot tie his opinion to the

10

requirements of law.

11

securities fraud, and, of course, there's a lot of gray

12

area when it comes to what the law is -- Utah law, and

13

what the securities statutes say.

14

In Moore, we're talking about

Here, we're not talking about the law.

We're

15

talking about generally accepted accounting principles.

16

So, there's that distinction.

17

And also, again, I'm not asking him to -- to say,

18

this is fraud, it's just that these are characteristics

19

of fraud which I see, and that's the distinction there.

20

And finally, the Chapman decision, in Chapman, the

21

court recognized that where the expert does not

22

specifically testify that the defendant was guilty, or

23

that as a matter of law the facts satisfied the legal

24

standard, I believe the court upheld the expert testimony

25

that was rendered in that case, which was from a
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1

securities expert, I believe.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. TAYLOR:

4

THE COURT:

5

MR. CUMMINGS:

6

train of thought.

Okay.
So, there are those distinctions.
Anything further?
I did, and I just totally lost my

Hold on, one moment.

7

I don't think my -- I would have an objection if

8

Mr. Curtis testified that certain accounting practices

9

here, as evidenced by the banking records, violated GAAP,

10

or the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

11

it's the -- it's the connection of, do these bank records

12

show fraud?

13

reviewed here, is this a fraudulent scheme?

14

there's an important difference between those two --

15

between those two lines of questioning.

But

Are these -- you know, what you have
And to me,

16

THE COURT:

17

So, I'm going to allow the testimony to go through

Okay.

Anything further?

18

as long as there is no mention of, under Utah law, or

19

under the laws of the State of Utah, or federal law, and

20

so forth.

21

mean, there -- I'm assuming -- and I think I'm correct --

22

that there are investigations in the industry looking for

23

fraud, or fraudulent conduct, that may not necessarily

24

rise to the level of a criminal offense, that there --

25

you know, that they may be different.

The witness has already testified that he -- I

So, so long as the
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1

questioning is tied to the witness's experience as a

2

fraud investigator, his experience in the industry, what

3

the industry looks like, what the industry looks for, and

4

so forth, I -- the testimony can come in.

5

because testimony related to, what are characteristics of

6

fraud, are not things that are within the kin or the

7

understanding normally of a layperson, it's information

8

that normally would come from an expert, defining what

9

the industry believes are things that are looked for,

10
11

Particularly

characteristics, and so forth.
It's part of the reason that I changed my mind and

12

allowed the testimony regarding what the industry

13

considers is material information and so forth during the

14

testimony of Mr. Lloyd.

15

questioning and the answers do not touch on, you know,

16

the ultimate question under Utah law, or under the

17

statutes and so forth, as to what is fraudulent, what is

18

securities fraud, and so forth.

19

about his understanding, what is the accepted standard

20

and characteristics in the industry, and so forth.

So again, I think so long as the

The witness can testify

21

Any clarification needed?

22

Any objection if -- well, Mr. Curtis is here on the

23

witness stand, and I think he's heard the Court's ruling,

24

but I -- as I've indicated in the past, if counsel

25

believe that they are going into an area that might cause
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1

an issue, unless there's an objection, I would be fine if

2

leading questions are used.

3

Mr. Cummings?

4

MR. CUMMINGS:

I would just like to put on the

5

record that, as with Mr. Lloyd, the initial round of

6

questions with Mr. Lloyd, I don't believe that it's

7

helpful to the trier of fact.

8

Court's ruling, we'd just like the record clear that part

9

of our objection is also on that aspect.

10

THE COURT:

Yeah.

And I understand the

And I looked at the Chapman

11

case, I think Chapman and Moore -- or one or the other,

12

and the Court of Appeals in one or both of those cases

13

determined that when the witness -- and I think it was

14

Mr. Lloyd, actually, testified -- he testified generally

15

enough, or sufficiently general, did not say that under

16

the laws of the State of Utah this was the case, and my

17

recollection of the question asked by Mr. Palumbo was,

18

according to the industry, or in the industry, yada,

19

yada, yada.

20

And the case law seemed to me to say that there's

21

not an absolute prohibition against an expert testifying

22

about what a material omission, or what material

23

information is.

24

this case, the -- the conduct and the things -- the

25

subscription agreements, things of that nature, are

It depends on the case.

And I think in
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1

things that I don't think the ordinary citizen, ordinary

2

juror, would understand unless they have some specialized

3

knowledge.

4

give that information during his testimony.

And so, it was necessary for Mr. Lloyd to
Okay.

5

Shall we bring the jury in?

6

While Raine is doing that, let me also indicate the

7

following -- in case I forget, will one of you remind me?

8

All the jurors have to leave their copies of the exhibit

9

here.

They cannot take them home.

Raine?

But I don't want to

10

forget that.

11

taking it home and looking at it tonight.

12

at them here and review them, and then when they're done,

13

they leave everything, and they go home, and come back,

14

and so forth.

15

because we don't let them take any exhibits home.

16

(Whereupon the jury entered the courtroom).

17

THE COURT:

In other words, I don't want somebody
They can look

I think that's the way it should be done,

All members of the jury are now in the

18

courtroom, all counsel are present, and the defendant is

19

present.

20

Mr. Taylor?

21

MR. TAYLOR:

22

THE COURT:

23
24
25

Thank you.
And Mr. Curtis resumes the witness

stand, he's previously been sworn in.
Q.
questions.

(BY MR. TAYLOR) Mr. Curtis, a couple more
I can't remember where we left off, so let me
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1

ask you this.

2

experience investigating and analyzing records of

3

companies or individuals alleged to have engaged in

4

fraud, deceit, or theft?

You indicated that you have particular

Is that correct?

5

A.

Yes.

That's right.

6

Q.

In your experience, and based on your

7

practice, are there certain characteristics that you look

8

for in analyzing a business or an individual to determine

9

fraud, deceit, or theft?

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Can you briefly explain what those

12
13

characteristics are in general?
A.

Generally, yeah.

As it relates to investment

14

fraud, there would be things like misrepresentations,

15

financial -- that could be financial statement

16

misrepresentations, or misrepresentations of how the

17

money's being used, or failure to disclose material

18

information, or that could be omissions.

19

So, if the party has knowledge of material

20

information and does not disclose that to investors,

21

that's important.

22

That's where corporations -- business and personal could

23

be commingled and confused, that could be part of that,

24

or disregarded in that way.

25

on investor money.

Disregard for corporate formalities.

A business being dependent

Investor money not being used for the
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1

stated purpose that's stated to investors, it's used for

2

other purposes or unauthorized purposes.

3

those are some of the main characteristics we look at.

4

Q.

Those are --

Maybe you touched on this, but what about the

5

business enterprise lacking profits sufficient to provide

6

the promised returns to investors?

7

A.

Yes.

And also, you know, sometimes

8

businesses are insolvent, that means their liabilities

9

exceed their assets, or they become further insolvent as

10

they continue to operate, or operate with very small

11

capital, or undercapitalized.

12

Q.

Thank you.

After reviewing the financial

13

records associated with this case, and after listening to

14

the testimony of this trial, based on generally accepted

15

accounting practices, do you -- and principles, do you

16

see any of these characteristics present in this case?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And which ones, in your opinion?

19

A.

Right.

I see characteristics of

20

misrepresentations and omissions, of investor money not

21

being used for the stated purpose, of inadequate

22

capitalization or lack of capital to operate the

23

business.

24

And dependence on investor money, obviously.

25

Q.

Those are the main ones that come to mind.

Are those all characteristics that you see?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

MR. TAYLOR:

3

THE COURT:

4

Q.

If I could have a second, Your Honor?
Yes.

(BY MR. TAYLOR) Mr. Curtis, what is the

5

significance of -- or what is the importance of keeping

6

money where it belongs?

7

A.

I think it has to do with the representations

8

that are made to -- to those that are owed a duty.

9

example, those that put the -- put money into a company

10

to invest.

11

MR. TAYLOR:

12

THE COURT:

13
14
15

For

No other questions.

Thank you.

Cross?
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. CUMMINGS:
Q.

Mr. Curtis, my name is Robert Cummings.

We

16

spoke several months ago, I believe, in Ms. Tangaro's

17

office.

18

this matter.

19
20

I'm the attorney representing Mr. Buttars in

You're working for the state today essentially, is
that correct?

21

A.

That's correct.

22

Q.

And you're being paid to be here, right?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

And you were hired by the prosecutor to come

25

provide this testimony, correct?
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ADDENDUM E

1

Lloyd.
THE COURT:

2

Okay.

Would you ask Mr. Wood, if he's

3

not in the courtroom -- he is here.

4

way up --

Mr. Wood, make your

5

MR. PALUMBO:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. PALUMBO:

8

THE COURT:

9

Mr. Lloyd, come on up here to the witness stand on

10

my left, and we will ask you just before you have a seat

11

to raise your right hand and take the oath from the

12

clerk.

13

I'm sorry, it's Brian Lloyd.

Oh, Lloyd?
Yes.

Okay.

BRIAN GLEN LLOYD

14

Having first been duly sworn, testified upon his

15

oath as follows:

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you, sir.

Go ahead and

17

have a seat.

18

obvious, does two things, it records what you say, and

19

also amplifies what you say, so if you'll speak into

20

that, that will help the jurors hear what you have to

21

say, and also make our record clear.

22

That microphone in front of you, this is

Mr. Palumbo, whenever you're ready.

23

DIRECT EXAMINATION

24

BY MR. PALUMBO:

25

Q.

Sir, could you please state your full name
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1

for the record?

2

A.

Brian Glen Lloyd.

3

Q.

And Mr. Lloyd, could you describe your

4
5

educational background?
A.

I have an undergraduate degree in finance

6

from Brigham Young University and a law degree from

7

Columbia University.

8
9

Q.

And you mentioned that you have a law degree.

Are you admitted to practice anywhere?

10

A.

In the state of Utah.

11

Q.

And when were you admitted to practice in the

12

state of Utah?

13

A.

In 1989.

14

Q.

What's your current occupation?

15

A.

I currently serve as the chief legal officer

16
17
18
19

of Merit Medical Systems located here in the valley.
Q.

And prior to holding that position, what did

you do prior to that?
A.

I practiced law in the areas of corporate

20

governance, securities, and mergers and acquisitions for

21

about 20 -- 26 years.

22
23
24
25

Q.

And did you have any titles or distinctions

during the time of practicing law?
A.

Well, at the time that I left private

practice to take my current position, I was a shareholder
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1

in the firm of Parr Brown Gee and Loveless, a law firm

2

here in Salt Lake City.
Q.

3
4

And could you describe some of your duties at

Parr Brown?

5

A.

I represented a number of clients, primarily

6

in securities, either financing or reporting

7

transactions, corporate governance, mergers and

8

acquisitions.

9
10

Q.

And have you ever been affiliated with any

bar sections related to any area of practice?

11

A.

I have been.

I have been a member of the

12

securities section of the Utah State Bar throughout most

13

of my career.

14
15

Q.

And have you ever testified in court about

security matters?

16

A.

Yes, I have.

17

Q.

About how many times?

18

A.

Probably -- actually, in court testimony, six

19

or eight times.

20

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

They were primarily criminal cases.

23

Q.

Could you give the Court a basic definition

24

of a security?

25

A.

21

And were those civil cases or criminal

cases?

Now, the easiest way to understand a
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1
2
3
4

security, in general terms, is that it's an investment.
Q.

Can you give some examples of what a security

might be?
A.

Sure.

It could be the acquisition of stock

5

in a company, it could be the ownership of a partnership

6

interest, it could be an ownership interest in a limited

7

liability company, it could be certain types of notes

8

that are made for investments are securities, bonds are

9

securities, options and warrants are all forms of

10
11

securities.
Q.

And based on your experience in the

12

securities industry, does a security have to be in

13

writing?

14

A.

No, it does not.

15

Q.

Based on your experience in the industry, is

16

there any specific set of laws that exist in the various

17

states and federally that regulate securities?

18

A.

There are.

There are laws both on the

19

federal level, and then each individual state has adopted

20

laws which govern the regulation of securities.

21

Q.

And has Utah adopted its own securities laws?

22

A.

It has.

23

Q.

Based on your experience in the securities

24

industry, could you explain how security differs from

25

other types of consumer transactions?

For example, like
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1

-- how does a security differ from buying a refrigerator?

2

A.

Well, in the industry relating to securities,

3

that industry is regulated because a security involves

4

trust, it involves an -- as I mentioned earlier, an

5

investment in -- with the expectation of profit.

6

When you purchase a hard good, a car, a

7

refrigerator, you have an opportunity to open and close

8

the doors, and the expression with cars is, you kick the

9

tires.

You can look at it, you can touch it, you can

10

feel it, and you can assess what that object is, and what

11

kind of condition it's in, whether it's been treated

12

well, or whether it's been abused.

13

When you purchase a security, you're relying on the

14

representations that are being made to you by the seller

15

of the security, and it's much more difficult to kick the

16

tires, so to speak.

17

securities laws operate under the presumption that a

18

seller of securities has an obligation to make disclosure

19

so that a purchaser can assess what it is that he or she

20

may be purchasing.

21

Q.

And so, the federal and state

And you mentioned a minute ago that sellers

22

of securities may have certain obligations.

23

describe what some of those obligations are?

24
25

A.

Could you

In general, the obligations in the industry

are that they have an obligation not to make
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1

misstatements of material facts, not to omit information

2

that's necessary in order to understand material fact.

3

Q.

And based on your experience in the

4

securities industry, could you explain how fraud is

5

defined in the securities industry?

6

A.

Generally, it's -- fraud is considered when

7

you have a misstatement of material information, or the

8

omission of material information necessary to address a

9

misstatement, or a deceit.

10

Q.

And you mentioned the phrase 'material

11

statements'.

12

industry, could you give some examples of what material

13

statements may entail?

Based on your experience in the securities

14

A.

15

MR. CUMMINGS:

16

THE COURT:

17

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows).

18

MR. CUMMINGS:

That's -- it's information -Objection, Your Honor.

Approach.

This is the situation, I believe

19

that the Chapman court addressed two things, one is

20

defining what is a material misstatement, the second

21

thing is providing examples.

22

examples are going to be too closely related to this

23

case, and at least one judge in -- was it Chapman, or --

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. PALUMBO:

My concern is that the

Moore.
I think you're thinking of Moore.
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1

MR. CUMMINGS:

2

MR. PALUMBO:

3

MR. CUMMINGS:

Moore, thank you.
(Inaudible).
But it was too prejudicial to give

4

the examples of the statements.

The second thing I would

5

submit is that in this case, all these statements or

6

alleged statements and alleged omissions are squarely

7

within a reasonable jury's mindset.

8

don't need expert testimony to say that -- whether a jury

9

will -- a reasonable investor in a jury's mind will say

It's not needed.

We

10

what about credit card debt needs to know about the prior

11

(inaudible) stuff along those lines.

12

MR. PALUMBO:

It's not complex.

And Your Honor, I have a copy of the

13

Moore decision if you would like it for your reference,

14

but I believe the issue in Moore is that there was a

15

discussion of material misstatements, and how the

16

security expert defined them.

17

expert in that case was opining on what the law said

18

rather than what the industry dictates.

19

ask, based on your experience in the industry, I'm not

20

asking the expert to tell me what the law is.

21

him to tell me what his experience in the industry when

22

he forms his opinion.

23

MR. CUMMINGS:

The issue was that the

And so, when I

I'm asking

The distinction with that is the

24

(inaudible) would still be able to make a conclusion

25

that's in the jury's providence.

And again, these aren't
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1
2

complex issues.
MR. PALUMBO:

I'm simply asking also for an example

3

of what the material misstatement might be.

4

asking the expert to talk about what's going on in this

5

case, and to tell the jury that what's happening in this

6

case is a material distinction.

7

THE COURT:

I'm not

If the wit -- if the witness says

8

something that is -- was a material omission in this

9

case, do you see that as a problem?

10

MR. PALUMBO:

11

THE COURT:

Pardon me?

If the witness says -- gives an example

12

of a material omitment -- a material omission, and it's

13

something that was done in this case, do you see the

14

problem with that?

15

MR. PALUMBO:

No, because I think he could provide

16

a number of examples, as long as the examples don't

17

exactly track the facts of this case, and he's not --

18

MS. TANGARO:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. PALUMBO:

And that's what she's asking.

That's what I'm saying.
But I'm saying, if those are the only

21

examples he provides, rather than providing a -- you

22

know, an inclusive list of various types of examples in

23

other cases that would be material --

24
25

THE COURT:

Do you anticipate that the witness will

give examples that are included in this case?
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1

MR. PALUMBO:

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. TANGARO:

4

MR. CUMMINGS:

5

MS. TANGARO:

6
7

Yes.

Yeah.

But not exclusively.

Mm-hmm.
I don't think that's -That's the concern.
I think that's objectionable

(inaudible).
THE COURT:

Okay.

I'm going -- I'm going to

8

sustain the objection for now, but you can ask the

9

witness to define what the definition is of material

10

statements, and so forth, but I don't think it would be

11

appropriate for him to give examples that would include

12

what was mentioned in this case because then he would be

13

saying, you know, that's a material omission (inaudible).

14

MR. PALUMBO:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. PALUMBO:

17

(End of sidebar).

18

Q.

Sure.

Okay.
Thank you.

(BY MR. PALUMBO) Mr. Lloyd, based on your

19

experience in the industry, could you give a working

20

definition of material misstatement?

21

A.

Well, it would be a misstatement of

22

information that a reasonable investor would consider

23

important in making a decision whether to purchase or to

24

sell a security.

25

Q.

In the context of the securities industry,
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1

are you familiar with the term, 'willful'?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

And in the securities industry, what does

4

that term mean?

5

A.

It's generally understood to mean an

6

intentional -- in the case, for example, of statements,

7

an intentional statement.

8
9
10

Q.

And based on your experience in the industry,

is a seller required to disclose all material
information?

11

A.

A seller is -- the industry expectation is

12

that a seller will not misrepresent any material

13

information or omit to provide material information

14

that's necessary to correct a misstatement.

15

Q.

With respect to a purchaser of a security, in

16

the securities industry, does a purchaser of a security

17

have any obligations?

18
19
20

A.

None, other than a contract they may enter

Q.

On the part of a purchaser of a security, is

into.

21

there any legal obligation in the securities industry for

22

a purchaser to engage in any kind of due diligence or

23

investigation?

24

A.

25

No, there's no obligation on the part of the

purchaser.
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1

Q.

I'd like to refer now -- I believe earlier

2

you mentioned some examples of things that are

3

securities.

4

you please explain what a stock is?

5

A.

And I believe you mentioned stocks.

Yes.

Could

Stock represents an ownership interest

6

in a particular type of enterprise called a corporation.

7

And so, a corporation takes in money from investors or

8

other purchasers, and in exchange for the proceeds that

9

it receives, it can issue shares of stock, which

10

represent the ownership interest in the corporation.

11

Q.

12

or obligations?

13

A.

And does acquiring stock come with any rights

Well, stock is, in the industry, considered

14

to be a security.

15

stock is subject to the obligations we've discussed, not

16

to make material misstatements, and not to omit

17

information that is necessary to correct a misstatement,

18

not to engage in deceit.

And so, a party which sells shares of

19

Q.

And are there different types of stock?

20

A.

There can be, yes.

21

Q.

Can you give some examples of what those

22
23
24
25

different types of stock might be?
A.

Principally you have either common stock or

preferred stock.
Q.

And what's the difference between those two?
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1

A.

You know, it varies based on the corporation

2

and the type of stock, but generally common stock is the

3

basic form of ownership interest in a corporation.

4

may be voting stock or it may be non-voting stock, but it

5

is the evidence of an ownership interest which would then

6

permit a shareholder, someone holding that stock, to

7

receive the benefits of the operations of that

8

corporation.

It

9

Preferred stock is called preferred because it has

10

some type of a preference, which means, maybe it has the

11

right to receive payment from the corporation before

12

payment goes to the holders of the common stock, maybe it

13

has the right to vote in preference to the holders of the

14

common stock.

15

preference to the holders of the common stock, or even

16

within the preferred holders, there may be a structure

17

that some preferred holders have benefits that are

18

superior to the benefits of other preferred holders.

19

preferred stock just indicates that it has some type of

20

right or privilege that ranks ahead of another group of

21

shareholders.

22

Q.

It may have a right to liquidation in

But

A moment ago you mentioned that there are --

23

there's voting stock and non-voting stock.

24

just briefly describe what the difference between those

25

two types of stock are?

Could you
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1

A.

Sure.

The -- in general, shares of stock

2

entitle the shareholders to vote on certain matters

3

relating to the operating of the corporation.

4

be able to vote regarding the election of directors.

5

They may be able to vote regarding certain business

6

activities.

7

voting common stock, and permits the shareholders to vote

8

on those matters.

9

They may

And so you can have common stock, which is

You can have common stock which is non-voting,

10

which means that except in certain very limited

11

situations, the shareholders holding that non-voting

12

common stock do not have a right to vote.

13

have a right to receive whatever the economic benefit --

14

excuse me -- the economic benefit of the corporation

15

might be.

16
17

Q.

They simply

Is another type of security called an

investment contract?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

And could you explain what that is?

20

A.

Yes.

An investment contract is a contract

21

between two parties which is formed by an investment in a

22

common enterprise with the expectation of profits to be

23

generated from the activities of one of the parties.

24

Q.

25

warrant?

And is another type of security called a
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And what is that?

3

A.

A warrant generally represents the right to

4

acquire another security.

5

right at some point in the future to purchase shares of

6

stock.

7

that gives a party the right to purchase shares in this

8

-- you know, in -- an example I'm using, to purchase

9

shares of stock at some point in the future.

10

And so, a warrant might be the

And the warrant is a contract that's executed

Q.

And I'd like to maybe take a step back and

11

ask you, in the securities industry, if there are

12

multiple sellers of a security, do -- what are the

13

obligations of each of the sellers?

14

A.

Each of the sellers would have the same

15

obligations as the other -- the obligations we've

16

discussed previously.

17

MR. PALUMBO:

18

THE COURT:

19

Your Honor, if I could have a moment?

Yes.

Could I ask counsel to approach

one more time?

20

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows).

21

THE COURT:

So you guys know this case has been

22

around and I just read a new case and Judge Davis did not

23

find any problem with a witness - with this witness

24

generally stating examples, so long as it wasn't

25

something that explicitly mirrored (inaudible) used
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1

occurred in this case.

2

comment about a concurrence by a judge hearsay from one

3

of the other judges, but the state of the law doesn't

4

seem to say that any stating of examples is is

5

exclusively precluded.

6

doesn't explicitly -- I mean, it could mention these

7

things as an example, as long as the witness is -- is not

8

saying, well, in this case, this conduct would be -- and

9

that's what paragraph two says --

10

MR. PALUMBO:

11

too, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

I understand that there was some

I think it's so long as it

That is my understanding of the law,

-- in Moore, right?

So, the witness in

13

Moore gave a definition of material, and then gave a list

14

of examples.

15

examples was general enough that it was okay -- that an

16

expert witness can give that opinion, so long as it's not

17

explicitly tied to, or the words used, explicitly mirrors

18

the allegation made in this case.

19

if you were to ask the witness, that he would just list

20

these things and then talk about how the allegations in

21

this case --

And the opinion was that the list of

You don't anticipate,

22

MR. PALUMBO:

23

THE COURT:

24

MS. TANGARO:

Well, have you discussed it with him?

25

MR. PALUMBO:

Yes.

I don't anticipate that, Your Honor.

Okay.
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1

MS. TANGARO:

2

MR. CUMMINGS:

3

objection.

THE COURT:

5

MR. CUMMINGS:

6

THE COURT:

Okay.
So it's not a majority (inaudible).

Sure, sure.

And it's the Court of

Appeals.

8
9

One -- I would still like my

Candidly, Moore is one judge.

4

7

Okay.

MR. CUMMINGS:

It's the Court of Appeals, too, so

there's --

10

THE COURT:Supreme Court could still say something--

11

MR. CUMMINGS:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. CUMMINGS:

14

It's still an open issue.

Mm-hmm.
I do think there's issues of law

here.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. CUMMINGS:

Sure.
Specifically giving examples.

And

17

it's -- and again, with this case, different (inaudible)

18

this case, the issues that we're discussing are squarely

19

within the layman's understanding of what it is

20

(inaudible).

21

talking (inaudible).

We're not talking complex issues, we're

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. CUMMINGS:

24

THE COURT:

25

Okay.
So...

Okay.

So, I'll allow it, as long as

you're within the parameters of State v. Moore.
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1

MR. PALUMBO:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. PALUMBO:

4

(End of sidebar).

5

MR. PALUMBO:

6

Okay?
Thank you.

And, Your Honor, if I could just have

a moment?

7

THE COURT:

8

Q.

9

Okay.

questions.

Yes.

Sure.

(BY MR. PALUMBO) Mr. Lloyd, just a few more
Based on your understanding of the securities

10

industry, a few moments ago we discussed the issue of

11

material information.

12

the securities industry, what material information might

13

include, just generally?

14

A.

Yes.

Could you give some examples, in

It depends on the individual entity,

15

but material information would be again information

16

that's important to an investor making a decision.

17

could include information about the business, the

18

underlying assets of the business, if those assets are

19

fixed assets that you can touch and feel, or are they

20

technology assets where you have to understand the nature

21

of the particular technology.

22

information about the management, who is it that's

23

running this enterprise, what's their background, what's

24

their experience, have they ever been involved in

25

criminal or other inappropriate activity, have they ever

It

It would include
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1
2

been sanctioned by regulators.
It can involve looking at the financial information

3

about the enterprise in order to determine whether the

4

financial assets are sufficient to conduct the

5

operations, and what the -- what the financial statements

6

look like.

7

the business, where could this business have problems in

8

the future, and what's the type of information that an

9

investor would want to -- would want to know about

10
11

It could include risks, what are the risks of

potential risks?
Q.

Those are a few examples.

Thank you.

And a few moments ago, you

12

described various types of securities.

13

have to fall into only one category?

14
15

A.

Does a security

No, you could have instruments which satisfy

multiple categories.

16

MR. PALUMBO:

17

And Your Honor, if I could just have one more

18

moment?

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. PALUMBO:

21

Thank you.

Yes.
Thank you, Mr. Lloyd.

Those are all

the questions I have.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. CUMMINGS:

24

///

25

///

Okay.

Cross examination?

Thank you, Your Honor.
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CROSS EXAMINATION

1
2
3
4

BY MR. CUMMINGS:
Q.

And good afternoon, Mr. Lloyd.

We met

previously several months ago.

5

A.

Good afternoon.

6

Q.

But just to refresh your memory, my name's

7

Robert Cummings and I'm representing Mr. Buttars in this

8

action.

9

Now, securities can kind of be an ominous word.

10

But as you said, a security is ostensibly or essentially

11

an investment, right?

12

A.

Generally, in the industry, that's correct.

13

Q.

Now, I want to give you a definition, and I

14

want to see if you would understand -- or if you would

15

agree with me.

16

another person money, and this other person has the

17

discretion on how to use the money, but the original

18

person has an expectation of profit.

19

fair layout, or --

20

A.

But a security is one person giving

Is that kind of a

Yeah, roughly, I think that's accurate.

21

Again, it's generally, in the industry, understood that

22

the type of security you're referring to would be an

23

investment contract, which is where one party makes an

24

investment with the expectation that there will be a

25

profit from the efforts of the other party.
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1
2
3
4
5

Q.

Or a purchase of stock could be the same,

couldn't it?
A.

Purchase of stock would -- is generally

considered to be an investment, so -Q.

Okay.

Okay.

Perfect.

And the company that

6

you work for, Merit Medical, they issue securities,

7

correct?

8

A.

We do.

9

Q.

Are you -- is it a public company, or a --

10

A.

It is publicly traded.

11

Q.

And so, by -- when you say publicly traded,

12

it means that it has shares of stock that are traded on

13

the NASDAQ or some other -- some other market, correct?

14
15
16

A.

Correct.

They're traded on the NASDAQ

exchange.
Q.

Okay.

Now, in order for your company to go

17

-- to issue those stock, or I think you would agree that

18

the term is called, 'go public', they had to engage in a

19

public offering, correct?

20

A.

That's correct.

21

Q.

And in that process, they did what you might

22

refer to as an IPO, or an initial public offering, and

23

they had to make certain disclosures under what you've

24

referred to as the securities laws, correct?

25

A.

There's a little detail to that, but
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1

generally yes, that's correct.

2

Q.

Well, and that's an interesting point that

3

you bring up.

4

right?

The securities laws are very detailed,

5

A.

They are.

6

Q.

IPOs, or initial public offerings that public

7

companies go through, it's a very complex process,

8

correct?

9

A.

It is.

10

Q.

So, very smart men like you that are the

11

general counsels of the company, associate with very

12

reputable law firms, spend a lot of money to issue these

13

stocks, correct?

14

A.

15

correct.

16

Q.

In an initial public offering, that's

Okay.

17

offerings.

18

offerings, correct?

Now, along -- so, those are public

We also have what are called private

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Now, in a private offering -- so, let me take

21

a step back.

22

there is information disclosed in a complex disclosure, I

23

can't think of the term for what that disclosure would

24

be, I don't know if it's proxy, or what would -- what

25

would the initial disclosure be?

In a public offering, the IPO package,
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1

A.

You're probably thinking of a prospectus.

2

Q.

Prospectus, thank you.

So, in the

3

prospectus, there's detailed, detailed information,

4

correct?

5

A.

Correct.

6

Q.

And all that information is required by the

7

securities laws or the SEC, correct?

8

private offerings, right?

9

disclose information are required in private offerings as

10

well, correct?

11

A.

Yeah.

And then we have

And the same obligations to

In the industry, the obligations of

12

disclosure don't change fundamentally between public and

13

private companies.

14

public companies would be subject to; but fundamentally,

15

with respect to the sale of a security, the requirements

16

are the same for public and private companies.

17

Q.

Okay.

There are additional obligations that

But would you agree that the

18

Securities and Exchange Commission, or the Utah Division

19

of Securities Laws sets a baseline for the information as

20

required?

21

A.

Yes.

22

Q.

And can -- would you agree also that an

23

investment promoter -- do you understand when I say like

24

an investment promoter, what I mean?

25

A.

I think generally in the industry I
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1

understand what a promoter is.

2

Q.

So, what would be your --

3

A.

In the industry generally, a promoter is

4
5

someone that is looking to sell securities.
Q.

Okay.

So, would you also agree that an

6

investment promoter can, through a contract, alter some

7

of the obligations, or at least disclose to an investor,

8

'hey, I'm required -- I'm relying upon you to do some due

9

diligence here.'

10

correct?

11

A.

An investment promoter can do that,

Well, you can't alter the fundamental

12

obligations that we discussed earlier, which are, you

13

can't, by contract, alter the obligation not to make

14

misrepresentations --

15

Q.

Sure.

16

A.

-- or alter the obligation not to omit

17

material information, or alter the obligation not to

18

engage in deceit.

19

statute.

20

you wouldn't see a contract that somehow tries to alter

21

those fundamental obligations.

22

Q.

Those -- those are established by

And so -- so, you wouldn't -- in the industry,

So, obviously I can't say, in this contract,

23

I may or may not commit fraud, and by signing it, you're

24

relieving me of that obligation.

25

what you just said?

Is that essentially
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1

A.

That's --

2

Q.

Right?

3

A.

-- that's an accurate statement.

4

Q.

So, putting that aside, other information

5

that might be required, so I can't willfully withhold

6

information, and I can't willfully lie about information

7

with a statement, but additional information, a promoter

8

can tell an investor, you're -- you're relying upon your

9

own due diligence.

10

A.

That can be done, correct?

I'm not sure -- again, you can have

11

contractual obligations back and forth, and a promoter

12

can certainly encourage a purchaser to do due diligence.

13

And, you know, most purchasers engage in some form of due

14

diligence.

15

fundamental obligations that are established by federal

16

and state laws.

17

Q.

But they can't alter by contract the

I think we're saying the same things.

I

18

can't by contract tell an investor I may or may not

19

commit fraud, and I may or may not like you.

20

baseline that I'm discussing here.

21

assume that the information does not fall within that

22

box.

That's the

But if -- let's

23

A.

Mm-hmm.

24

Q.

Those -- the duties and obligations between

25

the parties can be defined by contract, correct?
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1

A.

Well, you can -- you can have a contract that

2

defines what the parties will do in the -- for example,

3

in the course of due diligence.

4

fundamental principle that you can't alter the federal or

5

state statutes that govern securities fraud.

6

Q.

Sure.

Again, subject to the

So, let me take a step back there.

7

You referenced that you worked at Parr Brown Gee and

8

Loveless before you became general counsel at Merit, is

9

that correct?

10

A.

That's correct.

11

Q.

Now, you did private offerings for clients,

12

correct?

13

A.

I did.

14

Q.

Now, in those private offerings, you prepared

15

subscription agreements for those clients, or something

16

similar, correct?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

And in those agreements, there was listed out

19

representations of warranties, correct?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

And a representational warranty is

22

essentially what the signatory, in this context, the

23

investment -- the person making the investment, it's

24

basically a promise that they're making, is that correct?

25

A.

Yes, that's correct.
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Q.

1

Okay.

Now, going back, when I initially said

2

securities were ominous, at least to me I think it's kind

3

of a daunting -- daunting concept.

4

delved into the SEC rules, it gives me a headache.

5

they're all over the place, right?

6

A.

Securities?

7

Q.

Yes.

8

A.

Are all over the place?

9

And if anybody's ever
But

You frequently find

securities in most businesses.

10

Q.

In fact, it can -- there can be securities

11

where you don't even think one -- where one exists,

12

right?

13

A.

There could be.

14

Q.

And so, we talked about Merit Medical being a

15

publicly traded company, and stock being traded on like

16

the NASDAQ, but you could have a mom and pop shop that

17

says, 'I have a great idea for this bakery, but I need

18

money.'

19

get money is through investment and securities, correct?

And one way that a lot of small business owners

20

A.

That's true.

21

Q.

And so, for an -- and that's why securities

22

are all over the place.

23

injection of capital, theoretically is entering into the

24

securities realm?

25

A.

Anybody that needs money, an

In many instances, yes.
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Q.

1

And so, just the sheer fact that somebody's

2

giving money to a promoter, doesn't in and of itself

3

create fraud, right?

4
5

A.

No.

It would be dependant on the facts and

circumstances of that particular investment.

6

Q.

And in a lot of contexts, or would you agree,

7

that securities are kind of the backbone of our economy?

8

Now, let me specifically add on that, for small

9

businesses and small business growth.

10

Would you agree

with that?

11

A.

Yeah, I guess I'm a little unsure exactly

12

what the backbone is, but certainly any small business

13

needs to raise capital, and one of the most common ways

14

to do that is by issuing securities of some form -- some

15

sort.

16

Q.

And in your experience as a professional who

17

worked for Parr Brown Gee and Loveless -- actually, let

18

me take a step back.

19

correct?

20

A.

I do.

21

Q.

Merit Medical, I presume with you being

You admire your old law firm,

22

counsel, hires Parr Brown for some of its securities

23

stuff.

24

A.

We do.

25

Q.

Would you also consider -- what other firms
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1

in town would you consider to be reputable securities

2

firms?

3

A.

Oh, there are a number of them.

4

Q.

So --

5

A.

Dorsey and Whitney --

6

Q.

Okay.

7

A.

-- Holland and Hart, I could probably come up

8

with others.

Durham Jones and Pinegar.

9

Q.

Ray Quinney and Nebeker?

10

A.

I'm familiar with Ray Quinney Nebeker, yes.

11

Q.

And would you consider them a reputable

12

securities firm?

13
14
15

A.

They are one of the oldest firms in the

Q.

Now -- so, going back to -- with private

state.

16

offerings, a small mom and pop shop needing to raise

17

money, and if somebody wants to go into that realm, it's

18

a complex realm, right?

19

practice, you assisted a lot of people in that arena,

20

correct?

In raising money?

21

A.

That's correct.

22

MR. CUMMINGS:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. CUMMINGS:

25

reserve my rights.

And so, in your private

Can I have one moment, Your Honor?

Yes.
And it appears -- I just want to
It appears that you'll be appearing
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1

at the end of the trial on behalf of the state to

2

testify, so I'll have questions at that point.

3

think that's all.

4
5

THE COURT:

But I

Can I ask you both to approach?

Or all

of you?

6

(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows).

7

THE COURT:

I'm just kind of confused about that.

8

Is he not testifying today for the -- right now for the

9

state?

10
11

MR. PALUMBO:

THE COURT:

13

MR. PALUMBO:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. PALUMBO:

Okay.
-- Mr. Lloyd at the end of the trial.

Okay.
To kind of refute some additional

securities process.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. CUMMINGS:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. PALUMBO:

21

THE COURT:

22

I think what Mr. Cummings is

referring to is that the state intends to recall --

12

16

Yes.

Okay.

That's fine.

And to give his opinion.

Right.
Yeah.

But the issue is that you -- you said

you want to reserve your rights to do what?

23

MS. TANGARO:

Just ask him more questions.

24

MR. CUMMINGS:

Ask additional questions.

25

THE COURT:

Oh.

Sure, sure.

Yeah.

I guess what I'm
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1

saying is, if the state doesn't call him, do you want to

2

call him?

Do you want to put him on call?

3

MS. TANGARO:

We might.

4

MR. PALUMBO:

Within --

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. PALUMBO:

7

THE COURT:

8

MS. TANGARO:

9

THE COURT:

So, that's where I'm going.

Yes.

We're calling him.

Are you?

Okay.

It's on my list.

Okay.

10

MS. TANGARO:

11

MR. CUMMINGS:

(Inaudible).
And, Your Honor, I'm just going to

12

telegraph too that I'm going to have some objections on

13

his opinions on the (inaudible) for the same reasons

14

under State v. Moore.

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. CUMMINGS:

17

THE COURT:

18

(End of sidebar).

19

THE COURT:

20

Any redirect?

21

MR. PALUMBO:

22

That's fine.
So...

That's fine.

Okay.

Thank you.

If I could just have a moment, Your

Honor?

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. PALUMBO:

25

THE COURT:

Sure.
Thanks.

Sure.
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1
2
3

MR. PALUMBO:

Your Honor, just one question on

redirect.
THE COURT:

4

Sure.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION

5

BY MR. PALUMBO:

6

Q.

Mr. Lloyd, in the securities industry, you

7

and Mr. -- Mr. Cummings asked you some questions about

8

subscription agreements.

9

what a subscription agreement is?

10

A.

Could you just describe again

A subscription agreement is generally

11

understood to be an agreement between two parties that

12

defines the terms of the sale of a security.

13

could relate to stock, it could relate to limit liability

14

company interest, it could relate to partnership

15

interest, but the subscription agreement identifies

16

what's being sold and what's being paid, and then may

17

contain other provisions that relate to the transaction.

18

Q.

So, it

And in your experience in the industry, are

19

subscription agreements typically signed prior to, or

20

after the sale of a security?

21

A.

The intention is that they would be executed

22

before, because they define the terms of the transaction.

23

So, to execute it afterwards leaves in question what

24

actually happened at the time the transaction was

25

completed.
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1

MR. PALUMBO:

2

Nothing further, Your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

4

Re-cross?

5

MR. CUMMINGS:

6

Thank you.

Thank you.

Not at this time, Your Honor.

you.

7

THE COURT:

8

Thank you, sir.

9

Okay.
You may be excused.

And again,

subject to recall if either of the parties do.

10

Next witness for the state?

11

MR. TAYLOR:

12

THE COURT:

13

Thank

The state calls Vince Romney.
Okay.

Will you ask Mr. Romney to

please step in, if he's not already in the courtroom?

14

Mr. Romney, if you'll make your way up here to the

15

witness stand on my left, please.

16

seat there, please raise your right hand and take the

17

oath.

18

And before you have a

VINCENT CLIVE ROMNEY

19

Having first been duly sworn, testified upon his

20

oath as follows:

21

THE COURT:

22

Okay.

Thank you.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

23

BY MR. TAYLOR:

24

Q.

Can you please tell us your full name?

25

A.

Vincent Clive Romney.
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1

contain the obligations of the parties with respect to

2

the transaction and define what's being sold, and what's

3

being paid, in exchange for that particular security.

4

Q.

And based on your experience, can a

5

subscription agreement alter the obligations of a seller

6

of securities in the securities industry?

7

A.

Well, the subscription agreement defines the

8

obligations of the two parties as it relates to, you

9

know, contractual obligations.

So what are the

10

contractual obligations of the two parties?

11

subscription agreement does not and cannot do is to

12

change the fundamental obligations that are established

13

under law with respect to disclosure.

But what a

14

Q.

And why is that?

15

A.

We spoke at the outset about how securities

16

are different from other types of items that you can

17

purchase.

18

security is something that you can't kick the tires, you

19

can't open and close the doors, you can't touch and feel

20

a security the same way you can with a car, or a

21

refrigerator, that the seller of a security has an

22

obligation to make accurate disclosure.

23

seller of a security cannot make misrepresentations, or

24

cannot omit to provide information that's necessary for

25

the purchaser to assess the merits and the risks of the

And the public policy is that, because a

And that the
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1

transaction.

2

Q.

3

further.

4

advise a client in your practice regarding a seller's

5

obligations to make certain disclosures, would you advise

6

-- would you ever advise a client to withhold certain

7

disclosures if it was agreed to withhold those

8

disclosures in a subscription agreement?

9

And perhaps we could take that a little
And you know, if you were to, for example,

A.

No, I -- you would not advise a client ever

10

to withhold information that's -- that's necessary for

11

the purchaser to assess the merits and the risks of the

12

transaction.

13

Q.

I believe earlier when you testified

14

previously, you talked about what a seller's obligations

15

are in the securities industry.

16

what those obligations generally entail?

17

A.

And could you remind us

Generally, they are not to make

18

misrepresentations, not to omit material information, and

19

not to engage in deceit.

20

Q.

And I'd like to ask you a few questions based

21

on your training and experience of types of things that

22

you might advise a client to disclose, or that you might

23

consider important based on your experience in the

24

securities industry.

25

Based on that experience, would you consider it an
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ADDENDUM F

1

etcetera.

2

a seller beware situation.

3

like purchasing, as Mr. Lloyd explained, a vehicle or a

4

refrigerator, something that you can touch, look at,

5

inspect, take for a test drive.

6

investment for a test drive.

7

what the person selling the security is telling you.

8
9

This is not a buyer beware situation, this is
Purchasing a security is not

You can't take an

You're relying even more on

And so for that reason, the securities industry and
the law, it all requires the seller to be up front, to

10

make full disclosures about information that the average

11

reasonable investor would want to know.

12

contained in the jury instructions.

13

And that's

If you look at instruction number 45, section

14

three, a material fact is something which a buyer of

15

ordinary intelligence and prudence would think to be of

16

importance in determining whether to buy a security.

17

And then if you turn to number 46.

Under this

18

allegation, the allegation of securities fraud, this is

19

the second paragraph, it is not necessary for the state

20

to prove that the individual investors believed the

21

statements to be true, nor that they relied upon the

22

statements in their decisions making -- in their decision

23

making process.

24

that a reasonable person in similar circumstances would

25

have relied upon the statements in making an investment

So long as the statements made were such
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ADDENDUM G

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 28, 2015
/s/ Vernice Trease
07:35:37 PM
District Court Judge

JACOB S. TAYLOR, Bar No. 10840
Assistant Attorney General
MICHAEL D. PALUMBO, Bar No. 13325
Assistant Attorney General
SEAN D. REYES, Bar No. 7969
Utah Attorney General
5272 South College Drive, #200
Murray, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 281-1221
Facsimile: (801) 281-1224
Email: jacobstaylor@utah.gov
mpalumbo@utah.gov
Attorneys for the State of Utah
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

vs.
DAVID BRUCE BUTTARS,
Defendant.

Case No. 131901512
Judge: Vernice Trease
INTRODUCTION

On September 7, 2015, Defendant David Bruce Buttars filed a motion to suppress bank
records the State obtained from JP Morgan Chase Bank and Frontier Bank through investigative
subpoenas issued under the Subpoena Powers for Aid in Criminal Investigation and Grant of
Immunity Act (“Subpoena Powers Act”), Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22-1. The Court held an
evidentiary hearing on Defendant’s motion to suppress and other motions on September 14,
2015. The State filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion to suppress on October 13, 2015.
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Defendants filed a reply on November 13, 2015.
On December 3, 2015 the Court heard oral arguments on the Defendant’s motion.
Assistant Attorneys General Jacob Taylor and Michael Palumbo appeared on behalf of the State.
Cara Tangaro and Robert Cummings appeared on behalf of the Defendant. Defendant was
present at the hearing. The District Court, having reviewed the written materials filed by the
parties and hearing oral arguments, ruled from the bench on December 3, 2015 denying the
Defendant’s motion. The Court now enters the following written Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law, and Order denying Defendant’s motion consistent with its December 3, 2015 ruling.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The following factual findings are undisputed and based on filings by the parties, exhibits, and
testimony obtained during the September 14, 2015 evidentiary hearing in this matter.
The Defendant’s September 7, 2015 motion to suppress concerned investigative
subpoenas issued by the State between April 2011 and August 2012 under the Subpoena Powers
Act during an investigation of Defendant for securities fraud and other crimes. The subpoenas
sought bank records from Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase Bank.
The subpoenas contained references to an irrelevant section of the Utah Criminal Code,
Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22a. Specifically, the subpoenas told the recipients of the subpoenas
(JP Morgan Chase Bank and Frontier Bank) that under Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22a, they
were prohibited from disclosing the subpoenas to any third party. The inclusion of this language
was an error.
Prior to issuing the investigative subpoenas, the State filed a Statement of Good Cause
with the Third District Court and obtained an Order authorizing the investigation under the
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Subpoena Powers Act from a magistrate. A magistrate reviewed and signed the Statement of
Good Cause.
A magistrate reviewed each subpoena before it was issued. The magistrate’s review was
for the purpose of determining whether the subpoenas were reasonably related to the criminal
investigation authorized by the court, as required under Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22-2(3)(b)
(ii). The Defendant does not challenge the good cause basis for the criminal investigation or that
the subpoenas were reasonably related to the criminal investigation.
The State did not seek or obtain a secrecy order from the Court to keep the investigation
or materials obtained through the subpoenas secret.
After serving the subpoenas on JP Morgan Chase Bank and Frontier Bank, the State
obtained bank records of the Defendant.
The State did not notify Defendant when it sought an order authorizing a criminal
investigation, nor did the State notify Defendant when it issued subpoenas to the Defendant’s
banks.
The bank records obtained by the state through the investigative subpoenas were used in
an investigation that led to criminal charges against Defendant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The questions presented by Defendant’s motion are: (1) Whether the subpoenas issued by
the State were unlawful due to the erroneous reference to Utah Code Ann. Section77-22a or
because the State did not give notice to the Defendant when the subpoenas were issued; (2) if the
subpoenas were unlawful, would the good faith exception apply; (3) and finally, if the subpoenas
were unlawful, whether exclusion would be the appropriate remedy.
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Although individuals in Utah have an expectation of privacy right in bank records, the
State may nevertheless search and seize bank records through a lawful subpoena under the
Subpoena Powers Act.
A. The State is Not Required to Give Notice to a Suspect in a Criminal Investigation When
the State Issues Subpoenas to Banks for a Suspect’s Bank Records
The Subpoena Powers Act does not require the State to provide notice to the subject of a
criminal investigation when the State initiates an investigation or issues subpoenas under the
Subpoena Powers Act. Neither State v. Yount, 2008 UT App 102, 182 P.3d 405 (2008), nor State
v. Thompson¸810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991), creates a notice requirement for subpoenas issued under
the Subpoena Powers Act. Furthermore, the Subpoena Powers Act, itself, does not contain a
requirement that the State provide notice to the subject of records when the State issues an
investigative subpoena. The notice requirements in the Subpoena Powers Act pertain only to the
party to whom the subpoena is issued—in this case, the banks.
State v. Thompson was a case decided under the pre-1989 version of the Subpoena
Powers Act and the changes in the Act appear to be a direct response to the issues in Thompson
and In the Matter of Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (1988). In those cases, the issues
centered on whether a defendant had a right to privacy in bank records, and whether the state
should seek judicial approval to obtain bank records because of defendant’s expectation of
privacy.
B. The Erroneous Reference to Utah Code Ann. Section 77-22a Did Not Render the
Subpoenas Unlawful
The inclusion of the secrecy language from Utah Code Ann Section 77-22a in the
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subpoenas did not make the subpoenas unlawful or unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment
or Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. The state met all the requirements of obtaining
a lawful subpoena by having the subpoenas reviewed and signed by a magistrate who also
determined that the subpoenas were reasonably related to a criminal investigation based on good
cause.
The secrecy provision of the Subpoena Powers Act exists to protect the innocent and to
prevent criminal suspects from having access to information prior to prosecution. The fact that
the 77-22a language was included in the subpoenas does not render the subpoenas unlawful.
Whether a secrecy order is properly granted is not a basis for attacking the validity of the
underlying subpoena. This is particularly true in the present case where the Defendant has not
attacked the good cause statement or that the subpoenas were reasonably related to the criminal
investigation. The purpose of the secrecy order is not to create a right for the defendant to move
to suppress the evidence.
Even if the secrecy provision was not included in the subpoena, there is no evidence that
the defendant would have known about the subpoenas or that he would have successfully moved
to quash them.

C. Even if the Subpoenas Were Found to be Unlawful, the Good Faith Exception Would
Apply
The reasoning applied by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Dominguez, 248 P.3d 473
(2011), is compelling in the present case. Failing to meet perfectly the procedural requirements
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of the subpoena powers act, or in this case, including the language from 77-22a, does not
automatically implicate the Defendant’s constitutional rights. The Court has determined that
including the 77-22a language did not render the subpoenas unlawful. But, even if it did, the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply to this case. The state and federal
cases that have applied to the good faith exception are on par with the present case. Specifically,
the cases dealing with search warrants are instructive.
The ruling in State v. Thompson, is based on different facts, and was decided under the
pre-1989 Subpoena Powers Act. Under the Act in effect at the time of Thompson, the State had
the unilateral authority to issue subpoenas without judicial oversight. Thompson is
distinguishable from the present case due to the fact that the State obtained judicial review of the
investigative subpoenas and reasonably relied on the Court’s approval of the subpoenas.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, consistent with the District Court’s December 3, 2015 ruling from the bench, the
District Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress is DENIED.
SIGNATURE CONTAINED ON TOP OF FIRST PAGE
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ADDENDUM H

The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: April 08, 2016
/s/ Vernice Trease
09:33:10 AM
District Court Judge

SUBMITTED BY
CARA M. TANGARO (9197)
TANGARO LAW, P.C.
35 West Broadway, Suite 203
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 673-9984
cara@tangarolaw.com
Robert B. Cummings (SBN 13186)
The Salt Lake Lawyers
10 Exchange Place, Suite 622
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
T: (801) 590-7555
F: (801) 384-0825
E: robert@thesaltlakelawyers.com
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vDAVID BRUCE BUTTARS,
Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
STATE’S MOTION FOR ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE
Case No.: 131901512
Judge: Vernice Trease

Plaintiff, the state of Utah (the “State”) filed a Motion for Admission of Evidence (the
“Motion”) on August 28, 2015. The Court held an evidentiary hearing regarding the Motion, along
with Defendant David Bruce Buttars’ (“Mr. Buttars”) Motion to Suppress, on September 14, 2015.
Pursuant to the Court’s scheduling order entered on the record on September 14, 2015 (docket,
9/24/2015, Hr’ing Trans, at 96-97), the State filed a Supplemental Brief in Support of Motion for
Admission of Evidence on October 13, 2015. Mr. Buttars filed his Opposition to the State’s Motion
on November 13, 2015. Finally, on November 27, 2015, the State filed its reply in further support of
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the Motion. Further more the Court incorporates by reference the ruling issued on the record on this
motion.
Having considered the briefs and arguments of counsel, the Court hereby DENIES the
Motion without prejudice. The State may resubmit the motion and raise Rule 703 second prong and
other hearsay issues. As explained below, while the Court finds that the State met its burden of
proving the authenticity of the bank records at issue, the bank records are still nonetheless hearsay
evidence. And the State has not met its burden of providing sufficient evidence to establish
foundation for a hearsay exception to apply. Because the parties did not brief the second prong of
Utah R. Evid. 703 (i.e., the probative value of disclosing the bank records to the jury substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect), the Court denies the State’s Motion at this time.
BACKGROUND
The State moves for an order of the Court admitting evidence in advance of trial pursuant to
Utah R. Evid. 104. Specifically, the State seeks admission of summaries of bank records at issue in
this case. In its supplemental brief in support of the Motion, the State argues that the summaries are
admissible pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 703, 803(6), and 1006. Mr. Buttars makes two arguments as to
why the summaries are not admissible. First, Mr. Buttars argues that the summaries are not
admissible based upon his arguments raised in his Motion to Suppress Evidence. (Docket,
9/7/2015.) The Court denied Mr. Buttars’ Motion to Suppress. (Docket, 1/12/2016.) Therefore, the
Court rejects Mr. Buttars’ first argument based upon the reasons stated in the order denying Mr.
Buttars’ Motion to Suppress. (Id.)
Second, Mr. Buttars argues that the summaries are inadmissible because the underlying bank
records upon which the State bases its summaries are inadmissible. Specifically, Mr. Buttars argues
that the bank records have insufficient foundation and lack authenticity. The Court will address each
of these arguments in turn.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The State has seven (7) summaries prepared based upon various bank records collected
pursuant to subpoenas issued in this case. (Docket, 9/14/2015, State’s Exhs. 1 through 7.)
2. The State’s accounting expert, John Curtis, prepared the summaries based upon the bank
records obtained from JP Morgan Chase and Frontier Bank.
3. John Curtis has been a forensic accountant for 17 years.
4. Based upon the submissions by the parties, Mr. Curtis appears to be qualified to opine as a
forensic accountant.
5. Mr. Curtis received and reviewed the bank records.
6. Regarding the Frontier Bank records, it appears that the Agent Nesbit collected the records
in person, via U.S. Mail, and also via E-Mail.
7. There are, however, only two custodian certifications provided by Frontier Bank with some
of the records.
8. Mr. Curtis testified during the September 14, 2015 evidentiary hearing that it did not appear
that any of the bank records were missing.
9. Likewise, Mr. Curtis testified that he received and reviewed the verifications provided by
Frontier Bank with the bank records.
10.There are two records custodian certificates from Frontier Bank.
11.Agent Nesbit testified that he received records from Frontier Bank on three or four
occasions.
12.The bank records are voluminous in nature.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The State bears the burden of proving admissibility. At play in the State’s Motion are Utah
R. Evid. 703, 803, 901, and 1006. Each are discussed below.
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I.

Utah R. Evid. 1006
Utah R. Evid. 1006 provides, in pertinent part, “[t]he proponent may use a summary, chart,

or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot
be conveniently examined in court.” This is an exception to the best evidence rule, Utah R. Evid.
1002. As noted above, the moving party, the State here, bears the burden of “establish[ing] a
foundation that the underlying materials on which [the summaries] are based are admissible
evidence.” Trolley v. Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 67 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Here, the voluminous requirement of Utah R. Evid. 1006 is satisfied. Rule 1006, however,
cannot be used as a cover for inadmissible evidence. Therefore, in order to make the summaries
admissible, the State must: 1) there must be competent evidence to establish authenticity; and 2)
provide testimony to establish the foundation for the underlying bank records.
I.

Authenticity
Pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 901, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying

an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.” Utah R. Evid. 901(a). The rule provides a non-exhaustive
list of examples through which the proponent of evidence can satisfy the requirement. Relevant here
are subsection (1) and (4). Subsection (1) states: “Testimony of a Witness with Knowledge.
Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.” Utah R. Evid. 901(b)(1). Subsection (4) states:
“Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or
other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” Utah R.
Evid. 901(b)(4).
These two subsections are met here. To the first subsection, Agent Nesbit is a “witness with
knowledge.” At the September 14, 2015 evidentiary hearing, Agent Nesbit testified that he either
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personally picked up the bank records from Frontier Bank or otherwise received them via U.S. Mail
or E-Mail from Frontier Bank. To the fourth subsection, Mr. Curtis, the State’s forensic accountant,
testified that the bank records appeared to be complete. Therefore, the State has met its burden of
authentication as required by Utah R. Evid. 901.
I.

Expert’s Reliance on Inadmissible Evidence
The State contends that the bank records are admissible based upon Utah R. Evid. 703 and

901. Utah R. Evid. 703 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or
data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the
particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the
subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted.” In other words, once the expert
is qualified, that expert can rely upon inadmissible evidence. But the rule continues: “But if the facts
or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury
only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.” Utah R. Evid. 703.
Regardless if the bank records are ultimately admissible on their own, the Court finds that
Mr. Curtis can rely upon the bank records as part of his expert opinion. Mr. Curtis appears to be
qualified to testify as a forensic accountant. He has practiced as a forensic accountant for 17 years,
and otherwise appears to be competent to testify in that field. Because Mr. Curtis appears to be
qualified to opine as a forensic accountant, Mr. Curtis can rely upon the bank records to form his
opinion.
I.

Admissibility of Bank Records
Utah R. Evid. 802 states that “[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by

these rules.” While the Court finds that the State has provided sufficient evidence to authenticate the

01152
April 08, 2016 09:33 AM

5 of 8

bank records and that Mr. Curtis can rely upon the bank records pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 703, the
hearsay consideration is different than authentication and Rule 703. And the Court finds that the
entries on the bank records are hearsay.
The State contends that Utah R. Evid. 803(6) applies here as an exception to the hearsay
rule. That rule states that “[a] record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis [is admissible]
if” certain conditions are met. Utah R. Evid. 803(6). In order to meet this requirement, the State
must show: “(A) the record was made at or near the time by – or from information transmitted by –
someone with knowledge; (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of
a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; (C) making the record was
a regular practice of that activity; … [and] (E) neither the source of information nor the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate of lack of trustworthiness.” Utah R. Evid. 803(6)(A)-(E). The
rule provides, however, that (A) through (C) can be “shown by the testimony of the custodian or
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a
statute permitting certification[.]” Utah R. Evid. 803(6)(D).
In short, the State needs to provide foundation in support of the bank records to establish an
indicia of reliability. The State has not been able to establish the necessary foundation. The record
reflects that there are two records custodian certificates from Frontier Bank, and the State has
conceded that there are no other records custodian certificates. Agent Nesbit testified, however, that
he received records from Frontier Bank on three or four occasions. Therefore, the State has not met
its burden under Utah R. Evid. 803(6) and 902(11)-(12). The bank records contain inadmissible
hearsay, and are therefore inadmissible on their own.
Rule 703, however, has an additional component. In order to have inadmissible evidence
upon which an expert relies disclosed to the jury, the proponent of the evidence must establish that
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the “probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect.” The parties have not briefed this issue. Therefore, the Court cannot at this point
decide the issue of admissibility under the second prong of Rule 703.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[Court’s Signature Appears at the Top of the First Page of this Order]

STIPULATED AS TO FORM BY:
*This is not stipulated as to form by the State, as discussed in the concurrently filed
Notice of Lodging*
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

JAKE TAYLOR
Counsel for the State of Utah
Electronically signed with permission

THE SALT LAKE LAWYERS
/s/ Robert B. Cummings
ROBERT B. CUMMINGS
Counsel for David Bruce Buttars

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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On the 15th day of March, 2016, I mailed/delivered/electronically filed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACTS, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, AND ORDER GRANTING
STATE’S MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF
EVIDENCE

DAVID BRUCE BUTTARS,
Case No. 131901512
Defendant.
Judge: Vernice Trease
INTRODUCTION
After considering the State’s Motion for the Admission of Evidence, as well as all briefs,
evidence, and arguments by the parties, the Court GRANTS the State’s motion to admit bank
record summaries at trial.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On August 28, 2015, the State moved this Court to rule on the admissibility of bank
record summaries prior to trial. The State argued, among other things that the summaries are
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admissible under Utah R. of Evid. 1006 because they distill voluminous bank records that cannot
be conveniently examined in court. Further, the State argued that the underlying bank records
upon which the summaries are based are admissible under Utah R. of Evid. 703, or alternatively
under Utah R. of Evid. 803(6).
An evidentiary hearing was held on September 14, 2015 during which John Curtis, the
State’s forensic accounting expert, and Special Agent Scott Nesbitt testified. During that hearing,
Agent Nesbitt testified that beginning in 2011 he sought and obtained investigative subpoenas
through the Salt Lake County District Attorney’s Office. Agent Nesbitt described the process he
followed for obtaining the subpoenas, and further testified that he obtained responsive bank
records on several occasions from Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase. Agent Nesbitt testified
that he scanned and made copies of these records and provided them to the Attorney General’s
Office and the Division of Securities. Agent Nesbitt testified that the records he obtained from
Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase appeared to be complete. In total, Agent Nesbitt obtained
records for six Frontier Bank accounts, and four JP Morgan Chase bank accounts. In addition
Agent Nesbitt obtained certificates of authenticity from Frontier Bank and JP Morgan Chase
Bank.
Also during the September 14, 2015 hearing, John Curtis testified that he received copies
of the bank records from the Attorney General’s Office. Mr. Curtis reviewed all of the bank
records, which consisted of approximately 500-700 pages. Mr. Curtis determined that the bank
records appeared to be complete. Mr. Curtis testified that some check images were missing from
the records. However, Mr. Curtis testified, this is not uncommon. Mr. Curtis did not send out his
own subpoenas, but he verified and analyzed the records he reviewed. Based on Mr. Curtis’s
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review, it appeared to him that the bank records were what they purported to be. Based on Mr.
Curtis’s review of the bank records, he formed an opinion as to whether the transactions at issue
in this case had characteristics of fraud.
This Court heard oral argument on the State’s motion for the admission of evidence, and
other motions, on December 3, 2015.
On February 22, 2016 this Court denied the State’s motion without prejudice. The Court
issued written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on April 8, 2016. The Court denied the
State’s motion to admit evidence pursuant to Utah R. of Evid. 703 because, while the State
established the first prong of Utah R. of Evid. 703 (i.e. bank records are the type of evidence a
forensic accounting expert would typically rely upon), the State did not address the second prong
of Rule 703 (i.e. the evidence is more probative to helping the jury evaluate the expert opinion).
The Court also held that the State met its burden of proving authenticity of the bank records. The
Court invited further briefing on the issue of admissibility of the bank records and/or summaries
to address the second prong of Rule 703 and other hearsay issues.
On March 16, 2016 the State submitted its Second Supplemental Brief in support of its
motion to admit evidence. In that brief, the State addressed the second prong of Utah R. of Evid.
703. The State also made an alternative argument under the residual hearsay exception, Utah R.
of Evid. 807. Defendant filed an opposition, and the State filed a reply. Oral argument was held
on May 10, 2016.
On May 23, 2016 the Court issued an oral ruling on the State’s second supplemental
brief, and GRANTED the State’s motion for admission of evidence. The Court incorporated by
reference its prior Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order from February 22, 2016.

01218
June 14, 2016 11:43 AM

3 of 8

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Evidence admitted under Utah R. of Evid. 703 can be used only for the purpose of
assisting the jury in evaluating an expert’s opinion. Evidence admitted under Utah R. of Evid.
807 can be used for its substance. The Court finds that the bank records and bank summaries are
admissible under the residual hearsay exception, Utah R. of Evid. Rule 807. Because the bank
records and summaries are admissible for their substance under Rule 807, the Court does not
address whether the records or summaries are also admissible under Rule 703.
I.

The Bank Records Are Admissible Under Utah R. of Evid. 807

Utah R. of Evid. 807 allows hearsay statements to be admitted even if the statement is not
specifically covered by a hearsay exception Utah R. of Evid. 803 or 804, as long as the statement
satisfies four prongs:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any
other evidence that the proponent can obtain through
reasonable efforts; and
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the
interests of justice.
Additionally, in order for a statement to be admitted under Utah R. of Evid. 807, the
proponent of the evidence must provide the opposing party “reasonable notice of the intent to
offer the statement and its particulars, including the declarant's name and address, so that the
party has a fair opportunity to meet it.”
The bank records that the State seeks to introduce were lawfully obtained through
subpoena (See Order, December 28, 2015). Additionally, the bank records have been properly
authenticated. (See Order, April 8, 2016, at 5). Taking all facts and arguments into
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consideration, this Court finds that the bank records from Frontier and JP Morgan Chase satisfy
each of the four prongs of the residual hearsay exception, Utah R. of Evid. 807.
a. The Notice Requirement Has Been Met
On August 28, 2015 the State provided notice to this Court and the defendant that it
intends to introduce summaries of bank records at trial. The defendant has been on notice of the
State’s intent to introduce the bank records and/or summaries for many months.
The State initially sought to introduce the bank records and summaries under Rule 703.
However, on March 16, 2016 the State argued for admission of the bank records or summaries
under Utah R. of Evid. 807 in its second supplemental brief. Defendant has had an opportunity to
respond to this argument in his opposition, filed on April 11, 2016. At that time, a jury trial was
not set. It was not until May 10, 2016 that the Court set a four day jury trial for September 2016.
The jury trial is several months away. The defendant has had a fair opportunity to respond to the
State’s argument for admission under Utah R. of Evid. 807. Additionally, the defendant has had
an opportunity to cross examine John Curtis and Agent Nesbitt regarding the records. Defendant
will have further opportunities to do so at trial. The defendant has a substantial amount of time to
prepare to meet the evidence at trial. Therefore the Court finds that the State has satisfied the
notice requirement of Utah R. of Evid. 807.
b. The Bank Statements Have Equivalent Circumstantial Guarantees of
Trustworthiness
The question under the first prong of Rule 807 is whether the bank records have
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, similar to other exceptions under the
hearsay rules such as business records, family records, certain public records, and so forth. In
this case, the bank records have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. There is
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both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence to support the trustworthiness of the records. Therefore, the
first factor of Utah R. of Evid. 807 weighs in favor of admission of the bank records.
First, although the State cannot produce authentication certificates for all bank records
the State obtained from Frontier Bank, the State does have certificates for some of the Frontier
bank records.1 These certificates state the things required by Utah R. of Evid. 803(6) to establish
trustworthiness for records of regularly conducted activity. For example, the certificates state that
that the records were kept in the usual course of business, and that the entries in the bank records
were generally prepared contemporaneously with the events described. In other words, the
certificates generally describe the authenticity of records maintained by that bank, and speak to
the reliability of the bank records. All Frontier bank records were provided to the State by the
same personnel and in the same manner in response to lawful subpoenas.
Further, the bank records have been authenticated under Rule 902 through the testimony
of Agent Nesbitt and John Curtis. Agent Nesbitt testified about how he obtained the records
through an investigative subpoena. Mr. Curtis is a forensic accountant with 17 years of
experience and a CPA. In light of testimony presented about his qualifications, education, and
experience, the Court has found that he is an expert qualified to testify and give an opinion on
bank records, fraudulent activities related to finances, including investigating and analyzing
records of companies, banks, and individuals alleged to have engaged in fraud. Mr. Curtis
testified that he received and reviewed the bank records from Frontier and JP Morgan Chase. He
also testified that he reviewed these accounts and all the information related to these accounts. It
did not appear to Mr. Curtis that any records were missing from the bank records, aside from one
1 JP Morgan Chase provided certificates of authentication that appear to meet the requirements of Rule 803(6).
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or two missing check images. But, this is fairly common, and not a big issue in determining the
accuracy and so forth of the records. Mr. Curtis also testified that there were approximately 500700 pages of the records. He reviewed the records to determine if they were what they purported
to be and if he could rely on the records to render his opinion. He testified that in every way, the
bank records appeared to be authentic documents.
The Court finds that the bank records have equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, and so meet the first prong of Utah R. of Evid. 807.
c. The bank records are evidence of a material fact
It is uncontroverted that bank records and/or summaries are crucial to this case. The bank
records/summaries are evidence of a material fact. This factor weighs in favor of admission.
d. The bank records are more probative than any other evidence to show
how investor funds were used
The third factor of Utah R. of Evid. 807 weighs in favor of admission. The bank records,
and/or summaries, are more probative of whether a fraud or theft occurred because they show
what happened to the investment money of victims. There is no other evidence that can be
presented or obtained through other reasonable means or efforts to show what happened to
investor funds, which is a vital question in this case.
e. Admitting the bank records will serve the best interests of justice.
A jury trial is a search for truth. The evidence contained in the bank records and
summaries can assist in that search. Whether the bank records and summaries benefit the state or
the defendant is not the determining factor. The testimony given by Mr. Curtis and Agent Nesbitt
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is that these records contain information about the money alleged to be invested and how it was
used. The bank records come in regardless of whether the records show the money was used
appropriately or inappropriately. The purposes of the rules and interest of justice is met when
trustworthy, relevant information and evidence is admitted to assist the jury in the search for the
truth.
ORDER
The bank records satisfy all four prongs of Utah R. of Evid. 807. The State has also
provided notice to the defendant as required under that rule. Therefore, the bank records are
admissible for their substance. Because the bank records are admissible, this Court finds the
summaries of bank records are admissible under Rule 1006
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the State’s Motion for Admission of
Evidence.

COURT’S SIGNATURE CONTAINED ON TOP OF FIRST PAGE
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ADDENDUM I

Utah Constitution Article I, Section 14
Article I, Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden -- Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.

U. S. Constitution Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.

Utah R. Evid. 403
Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion,
Waste of Time, or Other Reasons
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood
and to make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These
changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result
in any ruling on evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45,
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for
exclusion of relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in
Rule 403. See also Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that
a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing
with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle, 445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex.
1977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same effect. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns, 615 P.2d
1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).

Utah R. Evid. 702
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the
form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue.
(b) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis
for expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or
methods that are underlying in the testimony
(1) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the
underlying principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and
the manner of their application to the facts of the case, are generally accepted by
the relevant expert community.

Utah R. Evid. 704
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue.
(a) In General — Not Automatically Objectionable. An opinion is not
objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.
(b)
Exception. In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an
opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or
condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those
matters are for the trier of fact alone.

Utah R. Evid. 801
Rule 801. Definitions That Apply to This Article; Exclusions from Hearsay
(a) Statement. “Statement” means a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or
nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion.
(b)

Declarant. “Declarant” means the person who made the statement.

(c)

Hearsay. “Hearsay” means a statement that:

(1) the declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and
(2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.
(d) Statements That Are Not Hearsay. A statement that meets the following
conditions is not hearsay:
(1) A Declarant-Witness’s Prior Statement. The declarant testifies and is subject to
cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement:
(A) is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the declarant denies having made
the statement or has forgotten, or
(B) is consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper
influence or motive in so testifying; or
(C) identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier.
(2) An Opposing Party’s Statement. The statement is offered against an opposing party
and:
(A) was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity;
(B) is one the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true;
(C) was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the
subject;
(D) was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that
relationship and while it existed; or

(E) was made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Utah R. Evid. 802
Rule 802. The Rule Against Hearsay
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.

Utah R. Evid. 803
Rule 803. Exceptions to the Rule Against Hearsay — Regardless of Whether the
Declarant Is Available as a Witness
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of whether the
declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present Sense Impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.
(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.
(3) Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition. A statement of the
declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional,
sensory, or physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily health), but not
including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed
unless it relates to the validity or terms of the declarant’s will.
(4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A statement that:
(A) is made for — and is reasonably pertinent to — medical diagnosis or treatment; and
(B) describes medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception;
or their general cause.
(5) Recorded Recollection. A record that:
(A) is on a matter the witness once knew about but now cannot recall well enough to
testify fully and accurately;
(B) was made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness’s
memory; and
(C) accurately reflects the witness’s knowledge.
If admitted, the record may be read into evidence but may be received as an exhibit only
if offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record of an act, event, condition,
opinion, or diagnosis if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by — or from information transmitted by
— someone with knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business,
organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;
(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;
(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified
witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute
permitting certification; and
(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation
indicate a lack of trustworthiness.
(7) Absence of a Record of a Regularly Conducted Activity. Evidence that a matter is
not included in a record described in paragraph (6) if:
(A) the evidence is admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or exist;
(B) a record was regularly kept for a matter of that kind; and
(C) neither the possible source of the information nor other circumstances indicate a
lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public Records. A record or statement of a public office if:
(A) it sets out:
(i) the office’s activities;
(ii) a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but not including, in a criminal
case, a matter observed by law-enforcement personnel; or
(iii) in a civil case or against the government in a criminal case, factual findings from a
legally authorized investigation; and
(B) neither the source of information nor other circumstances indicate a lack of
trustworthiness.
(9) Public Records of Vital Statistics. A record of a birth, death, or marriage, if reported
to a public office in accordance with a legal duty.

(10) Absence of a Public Record. Testimony — or a certification under Rule 902 — that
a diligent search failed to disclose a public record or statement if the testimony or
certification is admitted to prove that:
(A) the record or statement does not exist; or
(B) a matter did not occur or exist, if a public office regularly kept a record or statement
for a matter of that kind.
(11) Records of Religious Organizations Concerning Personal or Family History. A
statement of birth, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, death, relationship by blood or
marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly kept
record of a religious organization.
(12) Certificates of Marriage, Baptism, and Similar Ceremonies. A statement of fact
contained in a certificate:
(A) made by a person who is authorized by a religious organization or by law to perform
the act certified;
(B) attesting that the person performed a marriage or similar ceremony or administered
a sacrament; and
(C) purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time
after it.
(13) Family Records. A statement of fact about personal or family history contained in a
family record, such as a Bible, genealogy, chart, engraving on a ring, inscription on a
portrait, or engraving on an urn or burial marker.
(14) Records of Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. The record of a document
that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if:
(A) the record is admitted to prove the content of the original recorded document, along
with its signing and its delivery by each person who purports to have signed it;
(B) the record is kept in a public office; and
(C) a statute authorizes recording documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in Documents That Affect an Interest in Property. A statement contained
in a document that purports to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter

stated was relevant to the document’s purpose — unless later dealings with the property
are inconsistent with the truth of the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in Ancient Documents. A statement in a document that is at least 20
years old and whose authenticity is established.
(17) Market Reports and Similar Commercial Publications. Market quotations, lists,
directories, or other compilations that are generally relied on by the public or by persons
in particular occupations.
(18) Statements in Learned Treatises, Periodicals, or Pamphlets. A statement contained in
a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet if:
(A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or
relied on by the expert on direct examination; and
(B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the expert’s admission or
testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or by judicial notice.
If admitted, the statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.
(19) Reputation Concerning Personal or Family History. A reputation among a person’s
family by blood, adoption, or marriage — or among a person’s associates or in the
community — concerning the person’s birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage,
divorce, death, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of personal
or family history.
(20) Reputation Concerning Boundaries or General History. A reputation in a community
— arising before the controversy — concerning boundaries of land in the community or
customs that affect the land, or concerning general historical events important to that
community, state, or nation.
(21) Reputation Concerning Character. A reputation among a person’s associates or in
the community concerning the person’s character.
(22) Judgment of a Previous Conviction. Evidence of a final judgment of conviction if:
(A) the judgment was entered after a trial or guilty plea, but not a nolo contendere plea;
(B) the conviction was for a crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more
than a year;
(C) the evidence is admitted to prove any fact essential to the judgment; and

(D) when offered by the prosecutor in a criminal case for a purpose other than
impeachment, the judgment was against the defendant.
The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
(23) Judgments Involving Personal, Family, or General History or a Boundary. A
judgment that is admitted to prove a matter of personal, family, or general history, or
boundaries, if the matter:
(A) was essential to the judgment; and
(B) could be proved by evidence of reputation.
(24) [Other exceptions.] [Transferred to Rule 807.]

Utah R. Evid. 807
Rule 807. Residual Exception
(a) In General. Under the following circumstances, a hearsay statement is not
excluded by the rule against hearsay even if the statement is not specifically covered by a
hearsay exception in Rule 803 or 804:
(1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness;
(2) it is offered as evidence of a material fact;
(3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that
the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and
(4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice.
(b) Notice. The statement is admissible only if, before the trial or hearing, the
proponent gives an adverse party reasonable notice of the intent to offer the statement and
its particulars, including the declarant’s name and address, so that the party has a fair
opportunity to meet it.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. – The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule transfers identical provisions Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) to a new Rule
807 to reflect the organization found in the Federal Rules of Evidence. No substantive
change is intended. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 1006
RULE 1006. SUMMARIES TO PROVE CONTENT

The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous
writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The
proponent must make the originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both,
by other parties at a reasonable time or place. And the court may order the proponent to produce
them in court.

Credits
[Amended effective December 1, 2011.]

Utah Code § 61-1-1
§ 61-1-1. Fraud unlawful

It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any
security, directly or indirectly to:
(1) employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they are made, not misleading; or
(3) engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as
a fraud or deceit upon any person.

Credits
Laws 1963, c. 145, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 284, § 4.

Utah Code § 61-1-21
§ 61-1-21. Penalties for violations
Effective: May 10, 2016

(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who willfully violates:
(a) a provision of this chapter except Sections 61-1-1 and 61-1-16;
(b) an order issued under this chapter; or
(c) Section 61-1-16 knowing the statement made is false or misleading in a material
respect.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this section, a person who willfully violates Section
61-1-1:
(a) is guilty of a third degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, the
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth
less than $10,000; or
(b) is guilty of a second degree felony if, at the time the crime was committed, the
property, money, or thing unlawfully obtained or sought to be obtained was worth
$10,000 or more.
(3) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 is guilty of a second degree felony if:
(a) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully
obtained or sought to be obtained was worth less than $10,000; and
(b) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any money
representing:
(i) equity in a person’s primary residence;
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account;
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal
Revenue Code1;
(iv) an investment by a person over whom the violator exercises undue influence;
or

(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult.
(4) A person who willfully violates Section 61-1-1 is guilty of a second degree felony
punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than three years or
more than 15 years if:
(a) at the time the crime was committed, the property, money, or thing unlawfully
obtained or sought to be obtained was worth $10,000 or more; and
(b) in connection with that violation, the violator knowingly accepted any money
representing:
(i) equity in a person’s primary residence;
(ii) a withdrawal from an individual retirement account;
(iii) a withdrawal from a qualified retirement plan as defined in the Internal
Revenue Code;
(iv) an investment by a person over whom the violator exercises undue influence;
or
(v) an investment by a person that the violator knows is a vulnerable adult.
(5) When amounts of property, money, or other things are unlawfully obtained or
sought to be obtained under a series of acts or continuing course of business, whether
from the same or several sources, the amounts may be aggregated in determining the
level of offense.
(6) It is an affirmative defense under this section against a claim that the person
violated an order issued under this chapter for the person to prove that the person had
no knowledge of the order.
(7) In addition to any other penalty for a criminal violation of this chapter, the
sentencing judge may impose a penalty or remedy provided for in Subsection
61-1-20(2)(b).
Credits
Laws 1963, c. 145, § 1; Laws 1971, c. 155, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 284, § 30; Laws 1990, c. 133,
§ 14; Laws 1991, c. 161, § 12; Laws 1992, c. 216, § 4; Laws 1997, c. 160, § 10, eff. May 5,
1997; Laws 2001, c. 149, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2009, c. 347, § 11, eff. May 12,
2009; Laws 2009, c. 351, § 20, eff. May 12, 2009; Laws 2011, c. 319, § 4, eff. May 10,
2011; Laws 2016, c. 401, § 7, eff. May 10, 2016.

Utah Code § 76-2-103
§ 76-2-103. Definitions
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of
care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor’s standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor’s standpoint.
Credits
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-2-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 4; Laws 2007, c. 229, § 4, eff. April 30,
2007.

Utah Code § 77-22-2
§ 77-22-2. Investigations--Right to subpoena witnesses and require production of
evidence--Contents of subpoena--Rights of witnesses--Interrogation before closed
court--Disclosure of information

(1) As used in this section, “prosecutor” means the attorney general, county attorney, district
attorney, or municipal attorney.
(2)(a) In any matter involving the investigation of a crime or malfeasance in office, or any
criminal conspiracy or activity, the prosecutor may, upon application and approval of the district
court and for good cause shown, conduct a criminal investigation.
(b) The application and statement of good cause shall state whether or not any other
investigative order related to the investigation at issue has been filed in another court.
(3)(a) Subject to the conditions established in Subsection (3)(b), the prosecutor may:
(i) subpoena witnesses;
(ii) compel their attendance and testimony under oath to be recorded by a suitable
electronic recording device or to be given before any certified court reporter; and
(iii) require the production of books, papers, documents, recordings, and any other items
that constitute evidence or may be relevant to the investigation.
(b) The prosecutor shall:
(i) apply to the district court for each subpoena; and
(ii) show that the requested information is reasonably related to the criminal investigation
authorized by the court.
(4)(a) The prosecutor shall state in each subpoena:
(i) the time and place of the examination;
(ii) that the subpoena is issued in aid of a criminal investigation; and
(iii) the right of the person subpoenaed to have counsel present.
(b) The examination may be conducted anywhere within the jurisdiction of the prosecutor

issuing the subpoena.
(c) The subpoena need not disclose the names of possible defendants.
(d) Witness fees and expenses shall be paid as in a civil action.
(5)(a) At the beginning of each compelled interrogation, the prosecutor shall personally inform
each witness:
(i) of the general subject matter of the investigation;
(ii) of the privilege to, at any time during the proceeding, refuse to answer any question or
produce any evidence of a communicative nature that may result in self-incrimination;
(iii) that any information provided may be used against the witness in a subsequent criminal
proceeding; and
(iv) of the right to have counsel present.
(b) If the prosecutor has substantial evidence that the subpoenaed witness has committed a
crime that is under investigation, the prosecutor shall:
(i) inform the witness in person before interrogation of that witness’s target status; and
(ii) inform the witness of the nature of the charges under consideration against the witness.
(6)(a)(i) The prosecutor may make written application to any district court showing a reasonable
likelihood that publicly releasing information about the identity of a witness or the substance of
the evidence resulting from a subpoena or interrogation would pose a threat of harm to a person
or otherwise impede the investigation.
(ii) Upon a finding of reasonable likelihood, the court may order the:
(A) interrogation of a witness be held in secret;
(B) occurrence of the interrogation and other subpoenaing of evidence, the identity of the
person subpoenaed, and the substance of the evidence obtained be kept secret; and
(C) record of testimony and other subpoenaed evidence be kept secret unless the court
for good cause otherwise orders.
(b) After application, the court may by order exclude from any investigative hearing or
proceeding any persons except:
(i) the attorneys representing the state and members of their staffs;

(ii) persons who, in the judgment of the attorneys representing the state, are reasonably
necessary to assist in the investigative process;
(iii) the court reporter or operator of the electronic recording device; and
(iv) the attorney for the witness.
(c) This chapter does not prevent attorneys representing the state or members of their staff
from disclosing information obtained pursuant to this chapter for the purpose of furthering
any official governmental investigation.
(d)(i) If a secrecy order has been granted by the court regarding the interrogation or disclosure
of evidence by a witness under this subsection, and if the court finds a further restriction on
the witness is appropriate, the court may order the witness not to disclose the substance of the
witness’s testimony or evidence given by the witness to others.
(ii) Any order to not disclose made under this subsection shall be served with the subpoena.
(iii) In an appropriate circumstance the court may order that the witness not disclose the
existence of the investigation to others.
(iv) Any order under this Subsection (6)(d) must be based upon a finding by the court that
one or more of the following risks exist:
(A) disclosure by the witness would cause destruction of evidence;
(B) disclosure by the witness would taint the evidence provided by other witnesses;
(C) disclosure by the witness to a target of the investigation would result in flight or
other conduct to avoid prosecution;
(D) disclosure by the witness would damage a person’s reputation; or
(E) disclosure by the witness would cause a threat of harm to any person.
(e)(i) If the court imposes an order under Subsection (6)(d) authorizing an instruction to a
witness not to disclose the substance of testimony or evidence provided and the prosecuting
agency proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a witness has violated that order, the
court may hold the witness in contempt.
(ii) An order of secrecy imposed on a witness under this Subsection (6)(e) may not infringe
on the attorney-client relationship between the witness and the witness’s attorney or on any
other legally recognized privileged relationship.
(7)(a)(i) The prosecutor may submit to any district court a separate written request that the

application, statement of good cause, and the court’s order authorizing the investigation be kept
secret.
(ii) The request for secrecy is a public record under Title 63G, Chapter 2, Government
Records Access and Management Act, but need not contain any information that would
compromise any of the interest listed in Subsection (7)(c).
(b) With the court’s permission, the prosecutor may submit to the court, in camera, any
additional information to support the request for secrecy if necessary to avoid compromising
the interests listed in Subsection (7)(c).
(c) The court shall consider all information in the application and order authorizing the
investigation and any information received in camera and shall order that all information be
placed in the public file except information that, if disclosed, would pose:
(i) a substantial risk of harm to a person’s safety;
(ii) a clearly unwarranted invasion of or harm to a person’s reputation or privacy; or
(iii) a serious impediment to the investigation.
(d) Before granting an order keeping secret documents and other information received under
this section, the court shall narrow the secrecy order as much as reasonably possible in order
to preserve the openness of court records while protecting the interests listed in Subsection
(7)(c).

Credits
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1988, c. 101, § 5; Laws 1989, c. 123, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 217, § 1; Laws 1993,
c. 38, § 92; Laws 2000, c. 223, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2199, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws
2009, c. 6, § 1, eff. Feb. 18, 2009.

